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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction and Summary 
 
1. Background 
 
Protected areas have long been recognized as the single most important method of 
conserving biological diversity worldwide. This practice is more than a century old, but 
during the recent decades, the areas designated as protected have expanded 
dramatically. For instance, by 1989 some 4 500 sites covering 4.8 million km2 (3.2 % of 
the Earth’s land surface) had been protected (Reid and Miller 1989). Among these, 444 
sites constituting 0.9 million km2 were located in the Afrotropical region (Reid and 
Miller 1989). The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) lists eight 
types of protected areas ranging from strict nature reserves to multiple-use management 
areas (see e.g. Brown 2000). The areas are ranged by the accessibility for people, where 
strict nature reserves allow scientific studies only, while the multiple-use management 
areas allow economic activities like pasture, utilization of timber and wildlife etc. The 
national park is listed as the second most restricted protected area. One example is the 
Serengeti National Park in Tanzania which allows scientific studies and non-use tourism 
activities such as game viewing1. This park is also of focus in this thesis. Other 
examples are the Royal Chitwan National Park in Nepal, the Iguazu National Parks in 
Argentina and Brazil, and Volcan Poas National Park in Costa Rica (Brown 2000). 
Today, more than 50 per cent of the protected areas worldwide are in national parks 
(Brown 2000).  
 
In Africa, wildlife resources and the management of protected areas have received a lot 
of attention over the past decades. The attention has been stimulated by the observation 
that protected areas have failed in protecting many wildlife populations on this 
continent. While the areas designated for protection have expanded, several species are 
                                                 
1 The Game Reserves on the western border of Serengeti National Park allow sport hunting for tourists and 
managed cropping of ungulates such as wildebeest, zebra and topi (see chapter 5). 
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now locally extinct or seriously endangered. The African elephant population declined 
by 31 per cent (from 1.2 million to 764 000) between 1981 and 1987, mainly due to the 
demand for ivory (Reid and Miller 1989). In addition, an estimated population of 65 000 
black rhinos in 1970 had fallen to 3 800 rhinos by 1986 (Leader-Williams et al. 1990). 
Today, the rhino population is extinct in Serengeti in Tanzania, whereas elephant 
poaching has stopped. Scientists claim that the elephant poaching was eliminated in 
Serengeti due to the world ban on the ivory trade imposed in 1989 (Sinclair and Arcese 
1995). Still, Serengeti is continuously experiencing an invasion of poachers, targeting 
large resident and migratory herbivores, such as wildebeest, impala, and topi (Campbell 
and Hofer 1995).   
 
Traditionally, the strategy for preventing or restricting human impact and discouraging 
illegal activities in protected areas has been to establish law enforcement to detect and 
sentence intruders. Yet, human encroachment has continued to severely degrade and 
destroy many protected areas. This clearly demonstrates that however important the 
resources are intrinsically, they are also important because humans still use them. 
Whether we welcome or deplore this fact, it is still the key to continued wildlife 
survival. In response to this and the observed failure of protected areas, conservationists 
and scientists have searched for alternative approaches to wildlife management. This 
has resulted in the apprehension that successful management must somehow include the 
co-operation   and support of the local people. Excluding people living adjacent to 
protected areas from use of the resources, without providing them with alternatives and 
compensation, is today viewed as an unethical and ecologically unsustainable 
management approach. During the past two decades, projects involving community 
participation have been launched and implemented. These projects represent a broad set 
of schemes, ranging from pure benefit-sharing, such as transfers from wildlife related 
activities like tourism, to a more far-reaching design of community-based management 
where the local community is trained to manage and control the resources on its own.  
 
This thesis looks at several questions related to the evolvement of wildlife management 
systems. Three of the papers address these questions within a theoretical bio-economic 
framework (chapters 2-4), while the final paper offers an empirical analysis of wildlife 
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utilization and management in Serengeti (chapter 5). The first paper asks whether the 
failure of the traditional ‘fences and fines’ approach to protected area management is 
rooted in restricted access to agricultural land. The answer is partly yes; if agricultural 
land is expropriated for protection, the local people may compensate their loss by means 
of a more extensive use of the wildlife. This result motivates the second question: is it 
possible to promote wildlife conservation by handing the property rights to wildlife over 
to the local people? The answer to this question is unclear. It turns out that local 
management may cause wildlife degradation in areas with severe costs of living with 
wildlife (i.e. extensive wildlife-induced damage in agriculture). Third, can a 
management system based on benefit sharing, which lies somewhere between the 
previous systems, be the solution to wildlife protection? The answer is yes if the 
benefit-sharing scheme is properly related to the conservation objective. The empirical 
analysis of Serengeti shows that the benefit-sharing project established in this area has 
reduced the hunting pressure. In addition, policies which encourage the local people to 
sell agricultural crops on the market may promote wildlife conservation. 
 
2. Property rights  
 
2.1. Property, property rights, and property rights regimes 
Although most economists agree that institutions and property rights are important 
determinants of natural resource exploitation, the focus on this has been both limited 
and confusing in standard economic texts. In general, the functioning of the property 
structure can be used to classify three types of property rights regimes. First, we have 
state or private property, where there is a sole owner of the resource, i.e. the State or a 
private agency. The national park is one example of this regime. Analyses of state or 
private property are based on efficiency; the concept of rent maximization where the 
sole owner treats the resource as an asset. Then, the value of uncaught resources, i.e. the 
shadow price of the resource, prevents the owner from over-exploitation as long as he 
expects to be the one to benefit from the current ‘conservative’ harvesting policy, or 
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investment, in the future. Technically, having a sole owner is in accordance with the 
classical Clark (1973) model2. 
 
Second, let us consider the open-access regime. The theory of open-access exploitation 
was first developed by Gordon (1954) and is explained follows. A particular resource 
can be regarded as open-access property if there is no possibility of excluding harvesters 
attracted by excess rents. In this regime there is no legally defined ownership and every 
agent is free to exploit the resource. Then, no harvester can be sure of who will benefit 
from the value of uncaught resources. New agents will enter the industry, or existing 
harvesters will expand their effort use, as long as there is positive profit to gain. In this 
way, open-access gives entry until zero resource rent. Therefore, all else equal, open-
access leads to economic over-exploitation compared to sole ownership.  
 
It is important to note that the term economic over-exploitation is not equivalent with 
what we understand as ecological over-exploitation. Economic over-exploitation occurs 
when the industry fails in maximizing the economic rent. However, biologists consider 
a resource to be over-exploited only when the population has been reduced below the 
level of maximum sustainable biological yield, i.e. below the level generating the 
maximum natural growth of the resource (see e.g. Clark 1990). Whether the open-
access regime results in ecological over-exploitation is strictly dependent on the 
economic and ecological conditions in place. The open-access extraction level resulting 
from a ‘high’ cost-price ratio is likely to be below the level which generates the 
maximum sustainable biological yield of the resource. Then, open-access gives 
economic over-exploitation but no ecological over-exploitation. On the other hand, a 
‘low’ cost-price ratio may give both economic and ecological over-exploitation in the 
open-access regime. 
 
Somewhere between sole ownership and open-access lies the common property rights 
regime, in which a small number of private agents constitute a group of co-owners. In 
                                                 
2 However, Clark (1973) shows that present-value maximization may cause extinction of the resource if the 
discount rate sufficiently exceeds the maximum reproductive potential of the population. See also Plourde 
(1970) and section 4.1 below. 
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early economic research on property rights, common property was understood as open-
access (see Hardin 1968). In this way, the literature overlooked the possibility that 
conformity and co-operation within the group of owners may result in a well-
functioning common property regime. That is, through co-operation the group of 
owners may succeed in totally internalising stock externalities and maximizing rent. 
There have been a number of studies trying to understand the necessary conditions for a 
well-functioning common property regime. It has been pointed out that co-operation is 
more likely to succeed in small homogenous groups where prevalence of individual 
conformity to group norms is likely to be valid, while group heterogeneity and 
conflicting interests may impede co-operative agreements. See e.g. Bardhan (1993) and 
Seabright (1993). There are several documented examples of co-operation among 
owners, also on the local community level in developing countries. One contributor is 
Ostrom (1990), who cites evidence from several parts of the world.  
 
Today, there is a considerable interest in the literature to solve the confusion between 
common property and open-access. In order to do this, Bromley (1991) emphasises that 
property is a benefit stream rather than a physical object (i.e. wildlife stock, fish stock, 
forested area etc.). He claims that it is the traditional understanding of ‘property’ as a 
physical object which has caused the confusion around the common property and the 
open-access regimes: when interpreting ‘property’ as the resource stock, and if resource 
exploitation is available to all who might be interested, then the ‘property’ is thought to 
be ‘commonly available to all’. Instead, we should think of ‘property’ as a benefit 
stream and a property right as ‘a claim to a benefit stream which the state will agree to 
protect through the assignment of duty to others who may covet, or somehow interfere 
with, the benefit stream’ (page 2). To have a property right to something means to have 
a protected right to the benefit stream arising from that situation. The effective 
protection which the right holder(s) gains from the State is a correlated duty for all 
others interested in his (their) claim. Thus, Bromley (1991) interprets property as a 
triadic social relation involving a benefit stream, the right holder(s) and the duty 
bearers. Rights are not relationships between the right holder(s) and the object, but are 
rather relationships between the right holder(s) and the others with respect to that object. 
Further, a right exists only when the State agrees to defend a right holder’s interest by 
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ensuring that those with duty respect their interests. So, possession of inviolable 
property rights presupposes that the rights are, firstly, authorised by law and, secondly, 
effectively enforced and protected by the State.  
 
The interpretation of property as a triadic social relation helps us to distinguish between 
the common property regime and open-access without the confusion discussed above. 
The common property regime represents a case of legally well-defined ownership in 
which the co-owners have a right to reap the benefits of the resource while the others 
have a duty not to interfere with their interest. Under appropriate designed institutional 
arrangements, these rights are perfectly protected by the State. In contrast, there is no 
legally defined ownership in the open-access regime and no one has the legal right to 
keep any potential user out. The resource is therefore available to the first party to effect 
capture. 
 
As stated above, a well-functioning common property regime requires the presence of a 
social mechanism to ensure co-operation within the group of co-owners. Even if the co-
owners should fail to co-operate, outsiders will still have a duty to respect the owners’ 
rights. However, within the group of owners, the common property regime degenerates 
into an open access regime with economic over-exploitation of the resource. 
 
 
2.2. The property rights regimes of the thesis  
In this thesis, all papers are centred on wildlife conservation and utilization in and 
around protected areas. The category of protected areas in mind is the national park. The 
property rights of most national parks in the developing world are well defined and, 
usually, in the hands of the State (see Brown 2000). In this setting, the State has the 
legal rights to manage and control the use of the resource. One way to do this is to 
impose anti-poaching laws and enforcement in order to restrict the impact of non-
owners who claim their rights through illegal utilization. This is the point of departure 
in chapter 3 to 5, where the local people utilize the wildlife stock through illegal 
hunting. A second alternative for the State is to lease the resource to groups or 
individuals who are thus given user rights for a specified period of time (see Bromley 
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1991). This is the case in chapter 2, where the local people are given legal rights to 
wildlife hunting. A third alternative is to alter the property rights structure by handing 
the property rights over to the local people, i.e. implement a common property regime. 
In this case, the State fully transfers the rights to manage and control the resource over 
to the local community. The effect of altering the property rights regime is investigated 
in chapter 3. 
 
In this section it is of interest to explain how the thesis intuitively and technically 
distinguishes the regime of no property rights to the local people (i.e. state property) 
from the regime where the local people hold the property rights (i.e. common property). 
The important aspect here is whether the local people are able to fully control the 
resource stock through hunting, an ability which is strictly dependent on the property 
rights regime in place. All analyses assume that the local people are able to co-ordinate 
the hunting activity. I am looking away from conflicting interests among them and, 
hence, prevalence of individual conformity to group norms is assumed to be present3. 
Therefore, possible shifts in the capability of the local people to control the stock do not 
result from any change in the social relations within this group. Instead, such shifts are 
caused by a changing property rights regime.  
 
Let us first consider the case where the property rights are in the hands of the State. In 
this scenario the State has the legal rights to manage and control the resource. Then, 
although the local people are able to co-ordinate the hunting, they are unable to control 
the resource stock through this activity. This follows from the property rights regime, 
where the lack of property rights for the local people restricts their hunting decision. In 
the essays of the thesis the reason the state property regime imposes such a restriction is 
due to the respective institutional settings. In chapter 2, the local people are given user 
rights to wildlife, while the property rights are in the hands of the State. The extent of 
the user rights is determined by the State, which has the authority to restrict these rights 
by reducing the size of the legal hunting grounds. In fact, the local people experience a 
continuous risk of being denied future access to these grounds. The uncertainty related 
                                                 
3 In line with traditional reasoning it is assumed that the elders are in charge of the group’s activities (Marks 
1984). 
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to their future rights restricts their hunting decision and unable them to fully control the 
stock. In chapters 3-5, however, it is assumed that the local people have no legal user 
rights and, hence, hunting is illegal. Here, the presence of anti-poaching law 
enforcement, such as guards and patrol units, is what restricts their hunting activity and 
makes it difficult for them to fully control the resource stock. Technically, the lack of 
control means that the local people are not taking into account the stock effect of their 
harvesting decision. Hence, they treat the resource stock as exogenous when deciding 
their harvesting activity. This approach is also used by Smith (1969, 1975). 
 
The scenario is quite different when the local people have the property rights to the 
wildlife. In this case, it is assumed that their rights are effectively enforced by the State, 
meaning that all others are excluded from the use of the resource. As long as the local 
people’s rights are effectively protected by the State, they expect that they are the ones 
to control the benefit stream in the future and, consequently, they will take into account 
the stock effect of their harvesting decision. The group of owners will therefore behave 
as the sole owner in a private or state property regime and succeed in internalising stock 
externalities and maximizing rents (see section 2.1). This means that the local people 
are able to fully control the resource through the hunting activity.  
 
Technically, this regime may be interpreted in two ways. First, in an analysis of sole 
ownership, which is similar to the well-functioning common property regime, Smith 
(1969) assumes that the owner maximizes net present revenue when taking the stock 
effect into account. Hence, he presents a static model where the resource owner 
considers the stock as endogenous when maximizing net revenues. However, Clark 
(1973) claims that it may be more reasonable to assume a dynamic model where the 
resource owner takes into account the preference for present over future revenues. The 
second approach is therefore to consider the resource as a capital stock in that it is 
capable of yielding a sustainable harvest flow through time (see also Clark and Munro 
1975). As in capital theory, the present harvesting decision will have implications for 
the future harvesting options through its impact on the stock level. The problem of the 
resource owner thus becomes one of selecting an optimal harvesting flow through time. 
The resource owner maximizes the present value of the harvest sequence by discounting 
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future revenues at some fixed rate. Then, a higher discount rate increases the value of 
harvesting, or disinvestment, relative to the ‘own rate of return’ from investments in the 
resource stock. Hence, in contrast to Smith’s static model (1969), a positive discount 
rate implies that it is not optimal to invest in the resource to the extent that the current 
resource rent is maximized (see also Plourde 1970). However, when the rate of discount 
equals zero, the dynamic model coincides with the static model (see e.g. Munro and 
Scott 1985) 4.  
 
In this thesis, the case of a well-functioning common property regime is considered a 
special case of the present-value maximization, in which a zero discount rate applies. 
Hence, this regime is implemented in its most optimistic way in the sense that 
disinvestments in the resource today is valued at its lowest possible level. What 
distinguishes this regime from the regime of no property rights to the local people is 
therefore that the local people consider the wildlife stock as endogenous, i.e. they take 
the stock effect into account when determining the optimal harvesting strategy. A more 
detailed discussion of the institutional settings of this thesis is given in the respective 
chapters. 
 
3. Protected area management; designs and possible pitfalls  
 
Despite the extensive network of protected areas and imposed anti-poaching laws, 
poaching has been a continuous threat to wildlife in Africa (see section 1). Today, there 
is a growing understanding among conservationists and scientists that the traditional 
approach of relying solely on law enforcement in the protected areas, has failed to 
protect wildlife on this continent. The exclusion of the local people, usually without 
compensation for the loss of property, title and traditional hunting rights, has worked 
against their economic interests and led to increased antagonism and a disincentive to 
conserve wildlife (see Marks 1984, Kiss 1990, Brandon and Wells 1992, Milner-
Gulland and Leader-Williams 1992b, Swanson and Barbier 1992, Wells 1992, Nepal 
and Weber 1995). A rethinking of wildlife management schemes has emerged, where 
                                                 
4 Note that the open-access regime with zero resource rent can be considered as a special case of the present-
value maximization, in which an infinite discount rate applies. 
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the main strategy is to somehow include the local people to gain their co-operation   and 
support. By stimulating local support, the conservation managers aim at changing the 
current pattern of exploitation and limiting or preventing uses that endanger wildlife and 
other natural resources.  
 
In some instances, the management authorities have been advised to de-gazette 
protected land. For example, Malawi suffers from extreme rural poverty and increasing 
scarcity of arable land, yet 11 per cent of the country’s land area is set aside as protected 
areas. In comparison, the world average is 4 per cent (Swanson and Barbier 1992). It 
has been argued that some of the protected land in Malawi could safely be de-gazetted 
and redistributed to the local people for agricultural use (Swanson and Barbier 1992). 
Clearly, however, there will always be a limit as to how much protected land can be de-
gazetted without seriously affecting wildlife and its resource base.  
 
Possibly a more widely applicable approach, and one which has been promoted 
vigorously by international organizations since the 1980s, is to reconcile local support 
through Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDP). These projects aim 
at enhancing conservation through approaches that address the needs, constraints and 
opportunities of the local people (see Kiss 1990, Barbier 1992, Brandon and Wells 
1992, Wells and Brandon 1992, Barrett and Arcese 1995, Songorwa 1999). Local 
participation is launched as the means to improve the economic conditions of the local 
people, and thus discourage poaching and promote wildlife conservation. Well-known 
ICDPs in Africa are the CAMPFIRE and WINDFALL in Zimbabwe and the ADMADE 
in Zambia (see Kiss 1990, Wells and Brandon 1992, Barrett and Arcese 1995, Gibson 
and Marks 1995, Gibson 1999). The Kenya Wildlife Service has adopted a benefit-
sharing strategy where revenues from protected areas are distributed to local 
communities through a Wildlife Development Fund (Emerton 1998). Another example 
is the Serengeti Regional Conservation Project (SRCP) in Tanzania which is of focus in 
chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis (see also Barrett and Arcese 1998). 
 
In a review of existing ICDPs in Africa, the World Bank discusses three levels of local 
participation to promote the joint goal of wildlife conservation and rural development 
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(Kiss, 1990). These are (1) participation through benefits and compensation; (2) 
participation in planning and design; and (3) participation in implementation and 
management. When addressing the challenges of ICDPs, this thesis centres on projects 
based on strategies (1) and (3). The next step is to define and describe these levels of 
local participation and reveal some problems related to their design. First, participation 
through benefits and compensation, i.e. level (1), represents a direct way of improving 
local income, and is today a generally accepted principle in wildlife conservation 
programmes. Usually, the local communities benefit through money transfers from the 
wildlife tourism sector, village job creation in tourism and park services, and user rights 
or substitutes for resources in which access has been denied. For the latter, game culling 
– i.e. distribution of game meat from managed harvests – is implemented in several 
existing projects. For projects based on this participation level, the property rights to 
wildlife are in the hands of the State or the management authority, while the local 
people have no legal property rights. Second, local participation of level (3) is more far-
reaching than level (1) in that it empowers the local communities to manage the wildlife 
on their own. In its broadest extent, this level of participation is founded on common 
property management, where the local community has the legal property rights to 
manage and control the wildlife. Hence, participation levels (1) and (3) represent 
different property rights regimes.     
 
While the concept of ICDP is viewed as a promising method of conserving wildlife in 
protected areas, experience so far reveals several design dilemmas. Brandon and Wells 
(1992) give a broad discussion of such dilemmas and highlight possible pitfalls 
regarding both levels of local participation described above. First, experience from 
projects based on participation through benefits and compensation shows that many 
existing schemes lack a clear link between the benefit/compensation strategies and the 
conservation objective. As pointed out by Kiss (1990) and Brandon and Wells (1992), 
without such a link it is difficult for the local people to understand that there is a 
purpose of improved conservation behind the benefits they receive. If worst comes to 
worst, they may regard the benefits as lump-sum transfers and carry on the exploitation 
activities as before. This issue will be discussed further in chapter 4. 
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Second, the concept of community wildlife management also faces some difficulties. As 
discussed in section 2.1, heterogeneity and conflicting interests among the community 
members may threaten the performance of the community as a resource manager. 
Another important issue is the one of conflicting interests between the project manager, 
i.e. the State, and the local people (Brandon and Wells 1992). While the project defines 
decline in species as the major problem, this may not be of concern for the local 
community. For instance, in areas where wildlife cause extensive damage to agricultural 
crops and livestock, the local people are likely to be more concerned with preventing 
such damage by getting rid of ‘problem’ animals than conserving the wildlife stock. If 
this is the case, giving the local community full control of the management may be a 
disaster for the wildlife. This issue is addressed in chapter 3 of this thesis.  
 
4. The bio-economic theory  
 
4.1.  Bio-economics and resource extinction 
Bio-economic modelling – i.e. modelling which combines ecological systems and 
economic conditions – is the analytical tool applied throughout this thesis. The tool is 
powerful because it explicitly integrates the influence of human economic activity on 
environmental conditions. In natural sciences, several attempts have been made to 
assess the magnitude of illegal activities in and around protected areas, like quantifying 
the number of exploiters and the damage imposed on the natural resources in these areas 
(for the case of Serengeti, see Sinclair and Arcese 1995). However, less attention has 
been paid to the underlying motivation for exploitation, which is of considerable 
importance to the management of protected areas. Bio-economic modelling extends this 
literature by focusing on the incentives to exploit natural resources. In doing so, it 
addresses important issues and gives valuable policy implications for the management 
of natural resources.  
 
The early focus of bio-economic models, represented by Gordon (1954) and Clark 
(1976), was on marine resources. As mentioned in section 2.1, this literature examined 
the consequences of open access and demonstrated that this regime leads to economic 
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over-exploitation. Further, it was shown that the degree of exploitation increases with 
the price-cost ratio. More recently, Mesterton-Gibbons (1993) has analysed resource 
utilization and property rights regimes in a game-theoretic framework. He demonstrates 
that in a well-functioning common property regime the resulting stock level is 
independent of the number of owners. The reason for this is that the group of co-
operating exploiters will behave as a sole owner. The aggregate offtake is therefore 
independent of the number of exploiters, while the offtake of each individual exploiter 
is reduced with this number. The latter result occurs because the additional exploiter 
imposes additional costs on existing owners through the stock externalities. On the other 
hand, in a non-cooperative game the stock level shrinks when the number of exploiters 
increases, and the system approaches the open-access solution with zero rent as this 
number approaches infinity.  
 
While this literature links resource depletion to the property rights structure, Clark 
(1973) demonstrates that resource extinction might appear as the most attractive policy 
even for the sole owner. He analyses extinction as a process of human choice between 
which productive assets to retain in the natural portfolio (see also Clark and Munro 
1975 and section 2.2). The sole owner maximizes the present value of rent derived from 
resource exploitation. The optimal strategy is to invest in the resource until the marginal 
return from that asset equals the marginal return from other assets. Clark finds that 
extinction is optimal if the harvesting price exceeds the unit cost and the discount rate is 
sufficiently large. The policy implications of the early bio-economic models are 
therefore straightforward: within both poorly managed access and sole ownership, the 
probability of extinction can be reduced through policies which cause the price-cost 
ratio to decline.  
 
Because the early models of resource exploitation were developed within the literature 
of fishery economics, there were assumed to be no alternative uses for the habitat of the 
resource. Competing uses for the marine habitat (i.e. the sea) were not of interest and 
the opportunity cost of using the sea for fish production was assumed to be zero. 
However, on land there clearly exist alternative uses for the habitat of given species, 
such as converting land to agricultural crop production or as grazing land for livestock, 
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both of which represent important alternative uses in rural areas in developing countries. 
Swanson (1994) has extended the bio-economic framework to jointly analyse the habitat 
(i.e. land) and its species. He assumes that the natural growth rate of a biological 
resource is affected by the allotment of the natural habitat. Within this framework he 
demonstrates that species will receive allocations of habitat only to the extent where the 
species are able to generate competitive rate of return from this use of land. Hence, a 
non-competitive resource is subject to more than one form of disinvestment:  in addition 
to direct harvesting, resource depletion results from land being converted to an 
alternative use that yields a higher return.   
 
Since the initial modelling of resource extinction the approach to the problem has 
altered from well-focused concerns about the endangerment of individual species to a 
much broader concern which includes several interdependent species and whole 
ecosystems. Modelling the natural resource in the means of the dynamics of one single 
independent population implies a neglect of ecological as well as economic interactions. 
A single industry (or agent) that exploits several species may severely affect the 
dynamics and stability of the whole corresponding ecosystem. On the other hand, if 
several agents exploit different but biologically interrelated species, the exploitation will 
typically be hampered with externalities between the agents (see Clark 1990).  
 
As pointed out by Clark (1990, chapter 10), multispecies systems are more difficult both 
theoretically and practically than problems involving one single species. In the case of 
open-access he demonstrates that extinction cannot occur in a single species Gordon-
Schaefer model because, as the stock approaches zero, the unit harvesting cost 
eventually exceeds the price. However, when studying the joint harvesting of two 
ecologically independent species, he shows that one population may be driven to 
extinction. In addition, Clark (1990) demonstrates different systems of interacting 
populations: the predator-prey relationship in which the predator feeds on the prey and 
the Gause model where the species compete over a common grazing area.  
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4.2. The present bio-economic literature on wildlife utilization and management  
The following presents a review of the recent bio-economic literature on wildlife 
harvesting and management. This literature comprises several types of models, each of 
which captures important economic aspects of wildlife conservation relevant for the 
analyses presented in this thesis. First, there is a class of bio-economic models focusing 
on illegal wildlife hunting and anti-poaching law enforcement. In these models, the 
resource owner invests in enforcement to protect certain species and the legal benefits 
they provide. Typically, the resource ‘owner’ is the manager of a protected area. These 
models do not take competing land uses into account, as recognized by Swanson (1994) 
(see section 4.1), but focus solely on anti-poaching law enforcement, hunting effort and 
the offtake of wildlife. Such a model has been explored by Milner-Gulland and Leader-
Williams (1992a), who investigate how law enforcement, in relation to changes in the 
detection rate and the penalty level, affects the poachers’ decision to hunt black rhinos 
and elephants in Luangwa Valley in Zambia. They distinguish between the hunting 
incentives of local subsistence poachers and professional gangs involved in commercial 
hunting. Subsistence hunting is defined as hunting performed by the local people for the 
purpose of domestic consumption or to sell wildlife products at the local market. On the 
other hand, commercial hunting is carried out by professional gangs from outside the 
local communities. These gangs sell the wildlife products further afield, often at the 
international market place (Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams 1992b). In the case of 
a Schaefer production function, Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams (1992a) 
demonstrate that it is not worthwhile for the local poachers to hunt any of the two 
species, while it is worth hunting elephants for the professional gang. In the same 
setting, they show that a penalty which varies with a poacher’s offtake is a more 
effective tool against poaching than a fixed penalty.  
 
Skonhoft and Solstad (1998b) are other contributors to this line of research. They focus 
solely on a group of subsistence hunters, and demonstrate that lack of law enforcement 
may result in a wildlife stock as abundant as when law enforcement is present. In 
addition, Bulte and van Kooten (1999) analyse the effect of anti-poaching enforcement 
and the ivory trade ban on illegal exploitation of elephants. The effect of implementing 
a trade ban is generally unclear. However, a sensitivity analysis from Zambia indicates 
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that the ivory trade ban is more effective in conserving elephants than permitting open 
trade.  
 
Second, there is a class of models analysing protected areas, explicit or implicit, through 
different land uses. A group of these models consider a single agent (the State, a private 
agent or a group of local people) who owns land and performs two conflicting land 
uses; land as a wildlife habitat and land as input in agricultural production. Then, 
conversion of land for agricultural production displaces wildlife and vice versa. Brought 
about by conflicting land uses, the single agent models demonstrate how disinvestments 
in wildlife may occur, despite sole ownership to the resource. In the same way as 
demonstrated by Swanson (1994), Skonhoft (1999) shows that increased profitability in 
agriculture is a threat to wildlife because it triggers land use conversion. See section 4.1. 
Skonhoft and Solstad (1998a) study an implicit land use conflict as a group of livestock 
keepers faces a trade-off between keeping wildlife and livestock as assets, where the 
two populations compete in grazing. The owners determine the optimal investment in 
wildlife by balancing the benefits from wildlife and livestock. In this setting, they 
demonstrate that low prices for wildlife products may represent a threat to wildlife. See 
also Skonhoft (1998).   
 
Schulz and Skonhoft (1996) focus on conflicting land uses in a model with two agents. 
First, there is an agency (the state or private) which has the property rights to wildlife 
and practices protected area management as a land use. This agent benefits from 
wildlife culling and tourism. The second agent consists of a group of local people who 
utilize the land surrounding the park in agricultural production. In this model, no illegal 
hunting takes place. The characteristics of a social optimum are quite similar to the 
single-agent model of Swanson (1994). However, Schulz and Skonhoft (1996) consider 
another important issue in their model, namely that wildlife induce damage to 
agricultural crops (see also Huffaker et al. 1992, Carlson and Wetzstein 1993, Bulte and 
van Kooten 1996, Zivin et al. 2000). By implementing crop damage, they demonstrate 
that a competitive solution may result in a wildlife stock above that of the social 
optimum. A similar correlation is shown in chapter 3 of this thesis. Chapter 2 is also a 
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contribution to this line of research and adds some new and important insight into land 
allocation and wildlife conservation. 
 
The final class of bio-economic models of consideration here consists of models which 
analyse the impact on wildlife conservation of various benefit-sharing schemes, i.e. 
local participation of level (1) in section 3. Barrett and Arcese (1998) present a 
household model in order to investigate the effect of game meat distribution from 
managed harvests to the local people. The local people perform illegal subsistence 
hunting and Barrett and Arcese find that game meat distribution succeeds in 
discouraging poaching. However, because the total of the illegal and legal offtake 
increases, this policy leads to wildlife degradation. Skonhoft (1998) analyses a similar 
benefit-sharing scheme but reaches the opposite conclusion regarding wildlife 
conservation. In principle, what makes these results differ is that Barrett and Arcese 
consider the local people as the active agent, while the active agent in Skonhoft’s model 
is the park agency which earns income from legal hunting and tourism. By forcing the 
park manager to transfer a fixed share of the wildlife harvest to the local people, the 
return from hunting is reduced relative to the return on wildlife in tourism. Hence, the 
park manager responds by making further investments in wildlife.  
 
One important feature of Barrett and Arcese’s model is that it is a household model, 
which opens up the possibility of investigating the impact of failures in the markets for 
agricultural output and game meat. They assume that no market exists for game meat, 
resulting in the individual household consuming the whole amount of the illegal offtake 
domestically. The decision problem of the local people is then a problem of utility 
maximization where game meat distribution affects the decision problem by altering the 
budget constraint. On the other hand, if markets exist for both agricultural output and 
game meat, the decision problem of the local people is similar to the problem of a profit 
maximizing firm producing two types of products. In this case, game meat distribution 
works as a lump-sum transfer without any effect on the hunting decision of the local 
people. Chapter 4 of this thesis analyses benefit sharing in a household model where the 
group of the local people is the active agent. This model combines the first and the third 
groups of models above and demonstrates, in contrast to Barrett and Arcese (1998), that 
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distribution of game meat may promote wildlife conservation if properly linked to the 
costs of being caught in illegal hunting.  
 
The bio-economic literature consists of a broad range of theoretical models analysing 
wildlife utilization and management. However, less emphasis has been put on empirical 
analyses of the human-wildlife interface, probably due to the lack of data. Some efforts 
have been made in natural sciences. For instance, Campbell and Hofer (1995) and Hofer 
et al. (2000) have estimated the costs and benefits of illegal hunting in Serengeti using 
records from law enforcement patrols. Campbell and Hofer (1995) estimate the 
‘profitability’ of hunting based on an estimated probability of being caught and the 
wildlife density in each sub-area (grid cell) of Serengeti National Park (SNP). They find 
that hunting is ‘most rewarding’ in the western sector of SNP. This is also the finding of 
Hofer et al. (2000), who add some information about the offtake value, opportunity cost 
of hunting and cost related to confiscated weapons. In Lunagwa Valley in Zambia, 
records from patrols indicate that patrolling affects the level of illegal hunting as 
poachers tend to be seen less often in more heavily patrolled areas (see Leader-Williams 
et al. 1990). However, no one I am aware of has estimated functions of hunting effort 
for the purpose of exploring the incentives behind wildlife exploitation. Therefore, 
based on household data from western Serengeti, chapter 5 of this thesis gives an 
empirical analysis of the incentives to hunt.  
 
5.  Human behaviour and economic theory  
 
The basic assumptions about behaviour in mainstream neo-classical economic theory 
are self-interest and rationality. People are assumed to want to get as much as possible 
out of the feasible alternative actions, and to be able to take into account whatever 
information readily available to assess the consequences of each alternative and choose 
the best one5. Although these assumptions have made economics successful as a 
discipline, they have also led to a belief that economic methodology is inadequate for 
understanding important aspects of human behaviour, particularly in settings in which 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Gravelle and Rees 1992 for a more accurate definition.  
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individuals are concerned about the opinions, opportunities and well being of others. 
There are several examples of social aspects reflecting these concerns, such as culture, 
co-operation, altruism, laws and social norms. Other social sciences have repeatedly 
questioned how economic theory can be used to explain social relationships like these 
(see Elster 1989). The concern about the apparent exclusion of social motivations and 
arrangements leads some to even question whether the traditional analysis of standard 
economic problems is coherent (see Akerlof, 1984). 
 
Looking back on the confusion around open-access and common property as discussed 
in section 2.1, the misconstruction results from the use of very simplistic behavioural 
and institutional assumptions where, among others, people are assumed to be driven by 
self-interests only and unaffected by social aspects and the particular institutional 
arrangements in place. However, empirical and experimental studies suggest that 
integrated systems of social norms and co-operation are crucial for individual 
motivation and behaviour in local resource management (see Ostrom 1990). The well-
functioning common property regime is more than an accidental collection of 
independent individuals: it is a ‘small’ group of people in which the individual members 
relate to each other according to specific conventions on co-operation and co-existence.  
 
Especially within poor rural communities, some social forces may originate from the 
need to establish a mutual insurance against draught, pests and so forth in agriculture. 
Other social norms may be founded on religion, cultural traditions etc. There is a lot of 
debate on whether adoption to social norms etc., especially when there is no system of 
law to enforce them, is consistent with the conception of rational individual behaviour 
(see e.g. Elster 1989). Dasgupta (1993, chapter 8.6) claims that individuals accept social 
norms and conform to them out of simple self-interest: if a person does not conform, he 
will suffer from sanctions and it may therefore be rational to stick to the norm6. 
Analytically, there are two ways of addressing the issue of social forces in economic 
models. Firstly, social forces may be seen as a binding constraint limiting the choices of 
                                                 
6 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the economic explanation of norm conformity and co-
operation. For a broad discussion, see Dasgupta (1993) and Elster (1989). 
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a maximizing self-interested individual, and secondly, they may be integrated in the 
preference structure of the individual agents (Baland and Platteau 1996, page 116). 
 
There are other aspects of human behaviour besides social forces which are important to 
recognize in economic modelling. In traditional economic models, behaviour is driven 
by utility or profit maximization where consumers’ utility and producers’ profit depend 
on a rather limited set of arguments. However, the failure to recognise alternative 
objectives for resource exploitation may cause miscalculations on the level of resource 
use and unsuccessful policy recommendations. For instance, several contributors have 
argued that the motivation for livestock keeping in poor rural developing societies 
differs from the assumption of profit maximization. Doran et al. (1979), Smith (1992), 
Perrings (1993) and Dasgupta and Mäler (1995) claim that livestock keeping is 
influenced by the fact that the animals are regarded as an important store of wealth as 
well as income. People in poor rural societies are often constrained in their access to 
credit, insurance and capital markets, and, consequently, farmers accumulate wealth by 
keeping extra livestock. In addition, the animals are prone to dying when rainfall is 
scarce which leads the farmers to keep more animals as an insurance against drought. 
Moreover, the numbers of animals are more important than the value as far as prestige 
and status within the community are concerned. While the standard theory will suggest 
that livestock keeping is motivated by profit maximization, motives based on insurance, 
prestige and status may cause the number of livestock to be more important than the 
income from livestock. This observation does not weaken the assumption of rational 
individual behaviour, but instead it points out the need to adopt the proper individual 
objective function.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to give a broader discussion of the concept of self-
interest and rationality. Instead, when analysing a co-operating community it is simply 
assumed that there is present an underlying integrated system of social norms which 
encourages people to co-operate. Hence, in accordance with the discussion of common 
property in section 2, this ensures that the community acts as a single decision-maker. 
When it comes to the objective function of the decision-maker, it is assumed that 
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behaviour is driven by utility and profit maximisation. However, the reader should keep 
the above in mind when reading this thesis. 
 
6. An overview of the thesis 
 
The present thesis addresses the performance of wildlife management systems in Africa 
in general and in the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem in Tanzania in particular. The essays to 
be presented were initially motivated by the failure of the traditional management of 
protected areas and the observed difficulties regarding the design of wildlife 
management systems based on local participation. The thesis provides, based on 
economic incentives, an explanation of the failure of the traditional protected area 
management. In addition, the observed broad range of management systems calls for 
studies of different property rights regimes. In addition, founded on both theoretical and 
empirical analyses, three essays discuss under what conditions programmes based on 
local participation will succeed in promoting wildlife conservation.  
 
The methodology of the papers is based on bio-economic modelling and represents all 
classes of models reviewed in section 4.2. The starting point of every model is a 
protected area surrounded by a local community. The property rights to wildlife are 
legally well defined and held by the State or the park manager appointed by the State, 
i.e. a state property regime. The Sate offers the local people user rights to wildlife in 
chapter 2, while, hunting performed by the local people in absence of property rights is 
considered illegal in chapter 3 to 57.  
 
The main contribution of the papers is to explore the incentives of the local people to 
exploit wildlife, and how these are affected by different policies. Throughout the papers 
the local people are considered the only active agent and, hence, the park manager is 
                                                 
7 In reality, other aspects such as corruption may be a threat to the performance of the state property regime. 
For instance, in some countries poaching is successful because government and park officials enter into 
agreements with the poachers where the poachers share the profit with these agencies in return for protection 
from being arrested or convicted (see e.g. Gibson 1999, Brown 2000). Throughout this thesis I do not take into 
account any corruption among the government and park officials.  
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passive. This means that the implemented policies are treated as exogenous in the 
models. The effect of the various management strategies is therefore analysed in the 
framework of partial equilibrium models.  
 
Throughout the thesis, the hunting activity of the local people is interpreted as 
subsistence hunting (see section 4). According to the kind of problem analysed, the 
models vary in their specification of both the ecological and economic part. In the 
ecological part, chapters 2 and 3 provide explicit specifications of two distinct patterns 
of wildlife migration, while this is not of focus in chapters 4 and 5. In the economic 
part, chapters 2 and 3 consider the local people as producers of game meat (through 
wildlife hunting) and agricultural output, with a market for both outputs. Then, the 
decision problem of the local people can be compared to that of a firm producing two 
types of products. In contrast, chapters 4 and 5 regard the local people as a group of 
households who jointly determine their production and consumption decisions. The 
models presented here allow for market failure and domestic consumption of all 
quantity of a particular output. A closer overview of the essays follows below.  
 
6.1. Wildlife conservation, human welfare and the failure of protected Areas 
The traditional approach to wildlife management has been to gazette land for wildlife 
protection without offering the local people any compensation or alternatives for the 
restricted access to land and wildlife. Chapter 2 investigates the impact of this policy on 
wildlife conservation and human welfare. The starting point is a park agency appointed 
by the State. The park agency holds the property rights to wildlife inside as well as 
outside the protected area. Hunting is illegal in the protected area and law enforcement 
is efficient, meaning that the property rights of the park authority are efficiently 
protected and illegal hunting does not take place. However, the local people are given 
user rights to wildlife roaming in the outer area.  
 
The ecological model presented in this chapter is identical to the one developed by 
Hannesson (1998). Here, wildlife migrates between the protected area and the outer area 
in a density-dependent way. Species therefore flow from the densely populated area to 
the area with a low wildlife concentration. In the economic part of the model the local 
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people living in the outer area are involved in two production activities: agricultural 
production and legal wildlife hunting. Hunting is not the only component of the human-
wildlife interface because, when outside the protected area, wildlife destroys 
agricultural crops. Living with wildlife is therefore twofold: it represents a benefit due 
to hunting and a cost due to agricultural damage.  
 
This analysis draws on existing bio-economic literature on marine reserves where, 
Conrad (1998), Hannesson (1998), Pezzey et al. (2000), and Sanchirico and Wilen 
(2001) demonstrate that marine reserve creation in an open-access fishery increases the 
aggregate fish stock. The fishery is defined as better off if the reserve increases the total 
harvest. Because the fish stock disperses between the reserve and the open patch, the 
effect on total harvest of closing one patch is positive if increased dispersal from the 
reserve compensates for the foregone harvest in the reserve. In this way, the literature 
demonstrates that there is a potential for a double payoff of marine reserve creation, 
where both the fish stock and total harvest increase. 
 
This paper adds to the research of marine reserves as it embraces the theory that there 
may be an alternative use for protected land as an input in agricultural production. It is 
assumed that the local people living in the outer area cultivate land for crop production. 
The performance of protected areas is therefore strictly dependent on the type of land 
gazetted. One alternative is to establish a protected area by gazetting non-cultivated 
land. This strategy is quite similar to marine reserve creation, and I show that it 
promotes wildlife conservation. However, the impact on human welfare is negative. The 
second way to establish a protected area is through expropriation of cultivated land. An 
alternative cost of habitat protection is therefore present, and it equals the foregone 
return from agricultural production. I demonstrate, in contrast to marine reserves, that 
this policy may cause wildlife degradation and poorer economic conditions for the local 
people. Hence, this chapter gives a bio-economic explanation of the failure of protected 
areas. Analysing the driving forces behind such an outcome is the main contribution of 
this paper.  
 
 
 25 
6.2. Property rights and natural resource conservation. A bio-economic model with 
numerical illustrations from the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem 
In chapter 3, which is co-authored with Anders Skonhoft, we examine how wildlife 
conservation is affected by altering the property rights to wildlife in the outer area. The 
ecological model presented here differs from the one in chapter 2 as the wildlife 
migration is seasonal and not density-dependent. Wildlife migration is related to food 
supply, an ecological specification that fits the migration of wild herbivores in the 
Serengeti-Mara ecosystem. The resulting ecological system is quite similar to the model 
of Homans and Wilen (1997).  
 
The state has the property rights to wildlife both inside and outside the protected area. 
Law enforcement is effectively preventing illegal hunting in the protected area, while 
illegal hunting takes place in the outer area due to lack of enforcement. As in chapter 2, 
the local people living in the outer area are involved in wildlife hunting and agricultural 
production. Here, however, the land use in agriculture is fixed and we only focus on 
how property rights affect the distribution of labour effort between these activities. Two 
property rights scenarios are considered. First, the local people have no property rights 
to wildlife and hunting in the outer area is illegal. This is in accordance with the stylised 
facts in Africa today. In the second scenario, the property rights to wildlife roaming in 
the outer area are handed over to the local people. Because the local people are 
considered a homogenous group of co-owners, this case captures the impact on wildlife 
conservation of a well-functioning common property rights regime.  
 
While local management is viewed as a superior aim in the literature of community-
based wildlife management, this analysis shows that local management may fail in 
conserving wildlife. This means that even if the local people co-operate, there may be 
conflicting interests between them and the project manager (i.e. the State) responsible 
for the implementation of local property rights. The project manager presumes that 
property rights encourage the local people to invest in wildlife. However, with extensive 
costs of living with wildlife, the local people will increase the wildlife harvest and 
shrink the stock if given the management control. This result adds important insight into 
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wildlife management systems and suggests that project managers should implement 
local control with care in areas where the wildlife induces damage to agricultural crops.  
 
This paper supports the theoretical modelling with a numerical analysis of the 
wildebeest exploitation in Serengeti. The numerical considerations indicate that local 
property rights may work as an incentive to deplete the wildebeest stock. It turns out 
that a better conservation strategy for Serengeti is to support efforts which protect crops 
from roaming wildlife.  
 
6.3. Designing integrated conservation and development projects: 
Hunting incentives and human welfare with numerical illustrations from Serengeti  
As mentioned, chapter 3 investigates the impact on wildlife conservation of a common 
property management regime where the local people constitute the group of co-owners. 
There are, however, other ways in which the local community can participate in wildlife 
management. As discussed in section 3, participation may take place through benefit 
sharing. This is covered in chapter 4, where the local people are considered to have no 
property rights to wildlife, but benefit from money transfers from tourism and 
distribution of game meat from managed harvests. This chapter differs from chapter 2 
and 3 in the following ways. First, wildlife migration is not of focus here. Instead, the 
wildlife stock is roaming within a protected area. Second, while the State has the 
property rights to wildlife, these rights are not effectively protected as illegal hunting 
occurs in the protected area. The final and major difference compared to chapters 2 and 
3, is that this paper considers the local people as a group of households who are both 
consumers and producers of game meat and agricultural output. The household model 
links the producer and consumer decision and, by doing so, it captures some important 
impacts of benefit participation which otherwise would have been lost. In a model of a 
firm, benefit transfers works as lump-sum income and will not affect the decision to 
hunt. However, when modelling the agent as a household, such transfers may affect the 
decision to hunt by altering the budget constraint. 
 
As discussed in section 3, there are some possible pitfalls of management systems 
relying on benefit transfers only, one of which is the lack of a link between illegal 
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wildlife utilization and the transfers. Chapter 4 highlights this shortcoming by 
demonstrating that the project’s design is detrimental to the performance of a benefit-
sharing project. First, the theoretical results suggest that stimulating work opportunities 
in tourism has the potential of promoting wildlife conservation and human welfare. In 
contrast, money transfers from tourism and distribution of game meat from managed 
harvests fail if not explicitly linked to the conservation objective. This is in accordance 
with the analysis presented by Barrett and Arcese (1998). In the next step, such a link is 
modelled by introducing a risk of being excluded from the project benefits if caught in 
illegal hunting. The model demonstrates that relying on this kind of link may be a 
durable mean to reach the goal of improved wildlife conservation and human welfare.  
 
This essay gives a numerical analysis of the wildlife exploitation in Serengeti. The 
simulations reveal some interesting features compared to the results of Barrett and 
Arcese (1998). While they claim that game meat distribution will lead to wildlife 
degradation in Serengeti, I show that game cropping up to a certain level, and in 
presence of a proper link, will promote wildlife conservation in this area.  
 
6.4. Wildlife conservation policies and incentives to hunt: 
An empirical analysis of illegal hunting in western Serengeti, Tanzania 
The last paper of this thesis provides an empirical analysis of the incentives to hunt 
among local people living on the western border of the Serengeti National Park. This 
paper estimates functions for labour use in illegal hunting by using cross-sectional 
survey data on the household level. Data were collected through household interviews 
based on a questionnaire on economic conditions such as illegal hunting, income, land 
use and crop composition in agriculture, domestic animal keeping, and wildlife-induced 
damage. In addition, the survey captures participation in the benefit-sharing project 
established in the study area, namely the Serengeti Regional Conservation Project 
(SRCP).  
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact on illegal hunting of participation 
in SRCP, the pattern of crop production, domestic animal keeping, and wildlife-induced 
damage to crops and domestic animals. The results show that hunting effort is inversely 
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related to participation in SRCP. In addition, the type of crops produced in agriculture 
seems to be detrimental to the hunting effort. Households cultivating a high share of 
cash crops are likely to spend less time hunting. In addition, policies aimed at 
preventing wildlife-induced damage to domestic animals have the potential of reducing 
the hunting pressure. When it comes to reported income, it seems that SRCP fails to 
promote economic development among the local people. Instead, the analysis suggests 
that policies stimulating cash crop production and encouraging households to put crops 
on the market represent a better tool for promoting both wildlife conservation and 
human welfare.  
 
7. Some concluding remarks and steps forward 
 
The basic idea behind this thesis is to utilize bio-economic modelling to better 
understand the incentives for exploiting wildlife, and to analyse how various wildlife 
management programmes influence these incentives. The essays show that there is no 
easy approach for promoting wildlife conservation. Gazetting land may under some 
circumstances increase the wildlife stock, but may under other circumstances trigger the 
depletion of wildlife. A rule of thumb seems to be that habitat protection may have 
unintended effects in areas where cultivated land is withdrawn from people who rely 
heavily on agricultural production as a source of income. Protected areas are more 
successful when non-cultivated land is gazetted.  
 
However, with low costs of living with wildlife, the conservation interest of the local 
people is likely to coincide with the interest of the project management authority. This 
may lead to success for a co-operative local management regime. In contrast, 
communities experiencing high costs of living with wildlife may fail in conserving the 
resource. Instead, benefit-sharing schemes with a proper link to the conservation 
objective may encourage wildlife conservation and improve the economic conditions for 
the local people. Finally, the empirical investigation indicates that stimulating an 
income-generating composition of crops in agriculture is a promising way of enhancing 
both conservation and welfare.  
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 The four essays offer valuable insight into the analysis of wildlife utilization and 
management, but undeniably, there is still a lot of research to be done in this area. First, 
all models in this thesis consider a fixed human population. However, it is easy to 
picture that benefit-sharing projects and local property rights may attract people from 
outside the local community and lead to immigration to these areas. Therefore, bio-
economic models with endogenous population growth should be explored. How will 
immigration affect the co-operation between people in the local community, and 
between the local people and the project authority? How does it affect the land use and 
hence, the exploitation of wildlife and its resource base? Second, wildlife is considered 
one single species throughout this thesis. However, the real world consists of interacting 
species, such as predator and preys, species competing for grazing areas and so forth. 
Obvious issues regarding this shortcoming are of importance when investigating 
wildlife utilization and management.  
 
This thesis explains possible bio-economic outcomes using partially equilibrium 
models. That is, the local people are considered the only active agent, while the park 
authority is passive. The analyses are positive and, hence, they do not predict how the 
local people and the park manager should operate in order to reach a social optimum. 
Both models involving an active park manager and normative analyses of wildlife 
management are necessary in order to reveal the challenges and to design future 
management strategies. Such models should also include game theory to capture the 
interaction between the park manager and the local people. For instance, when 
analysing the design of benefit-sharing schemes, this thesis assumes that the park 
manager defines ‘poachers’ as those caught in illegal hunting, whereas people who 
manage to escape are defined as non-poachers. However, in order to design the optimal 
benefit-sharing scheme, the challenge is to set up prospects consisting of benefit 
transfers and anti-poaching law enforcement in such a way that the poachers who would 
otherwise manage to escape will choose the benefit transfers instead of illegal hunting.  
 
In order to design future management strategies, further research should also involve 
empirical studies. Here, emphasis should be placed on investigating the impact of 
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economic and social conditions on the incentives for exploiting natural resources. In 
addition, case studies of existing management systems offer valuable information on 
project designs. There is no representative ‘model’ of wildlife management and 
therefore, each and every project must address the most serious conservation and 
development issues in the particular geographical area. The challenge for scientists is to 
provide the knowledge required to design the ultimate management strategy for the 
region in question.  
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Abstract  
The establishment and expansion of protected areas in Africa have been motivated by 
the aspiration of increased wildlife abundance. However, the increasing poaching 
pressure on this continent has led to the perception that protected areas have failed in 
preserving wildlife. This paper presents a bio-economic model in order to explain the 
economic factors and mechanisms which may have caused this failure. The analysis 
focuses on a hunter-agrarian economy where an opportunity cost of habitat protection, 
due to less land for agricultural cultivation, pasture, and wildlife hunting, is present. An 
expansion of the protected area restricts the local people’s user rights to land. 
Depending on the economic conditions in agriculture and wildlife hunting, this policy 
may reduce the degree of wildlife conservation. This result contrasts the theoretical 
findings of fishery economics, where a marine reserve increases the aggregate fish 
stock. In addition to the conservation effect of protected areas, this paper investigates 
the impact on human welfare of restricting the user rights to wildlife and land.  
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1. Introduction 
The initial approach to preserve natural resources in Africa had its roots in the Western 
environmentalist movement of the 20th century. This approach saw the establishment of 
large areas of national parks and reserves as the foremost priority for African 
conservation (Marks 1984, Kiss 1990, Swanson and Barbier 1992). The objective of this 
management system was to protect wild animals and natural habitats through 
prohibition or restriction of wildlife utilization. Setting aside areas for national parks 
and game reserves is still the predominating management strategy (Swanson and 
Barbier 1992). The control and management of protected areas are usually vested in the 
State, which reaps economic benefits from wildlife tourism. In contrast, gazetting land 
for wildlife protection has displaced rural communities and curtailed their access to 
natural resources that they previously had access to. Land for cultivation and pasture has 
been lost and harvesting of wildlife in these areas has been deemed illegal (Marks 1984, 
Kiss 1990, Swanson and Barbier 1992, Wells 1992). In addition, local communities 
bear the costs of living with wildlife through agricultural damage induced by animals 
roaming on agricultural land. Hence, while the State reaps the benefits of protected 
areas, the costs are borne at the local level.  
 
The idea of protected areas was motivated by the aspiration of increased wildlife 
abundance. The continuing expansion of protected areas in Africa reflects that this 
perception is still prevalent. However, the increasing poaching pressure has led to a 
growing recognition that protected areas have failed in their goals of preserving wildlife 
(Kiss 1990, Swanson and Barbier 1992, Martin 1993, Barrett and Arcese 1995, Gibson 
and Marks 1995, Songorwa 1999). Martin (1993), for instance, discusses protected 
areas as a tool in wildlife conservation. He claims that Africa has made the mistake of 
gazetting too many and too large areas to be able to meet the minimum operating costs 
required in order to conserve and protect wildlife in these areas. He pictures an 
inevitable situation where budgets are to small to prevent illegal exploitation, leading all 
areas to deteriorate simultaneously (see also Leader-Williams and Albon 1988, Dixon 
and Sherman 1991). Instead of focusing on law enforcement and the amount of 
protected land, Kiss (1990) and Swanson and Barbier (1992), among others, point to the 
lack of economic compensation to the local people as an explanation of the failure of 
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protected areas. They argue that it is necessary to correct this distortion in order to 
promote wildlife conservation, and suggest that this is achievable through revenue 
sharing in wildlife related activities. By providing the local people with such benefits, 
they believe that the management authorities will gain the co-operation of the local 
people and thus reduce their incentives to exploit wildlife.  
 
None of the authors cited above have adopted a model-theoretical framework to explore 
the conservation-effect of protected terrestrial habitats. In contrast, in fishery 
economics, marine reserves have been analysed in a bio-economic context by Conrad 
(1998), Hannesson (1998) Pezzey et al. (2000), and Sanchirico and Wilen (2001), 
among others. Sanchirico and Wilen (2001) consider two fishing patches, initially 
characterised as open-access fisheries (entry until zero rents). A marine reserve is 
created by closing one patch for fishing. The fish stock in the open patch is determined 
by a fixed cost-price ratio and is not altered by closing the other patch. Based on these 
assumptions, a marine reserve increases the aggregate biomass of the two patches for 
every ecological system. Sanchirico and Wilen (2001) also focus on the economic 
impact of a marine reserve. Because free access to the open patch means zero rent, they 
define the fishery as better off if a marine reserve increases the total harvest. As the fish 
stock disperses between the patches, they show that the effect on total harvest of closing 
one patch is positive if increased dispersal between the reserve and the open patch 
compensates for the foregone harvest in the reserve. Also Hannesson (1998) shows that 
marine reserve creation increases the aggregate fish stock when there is open access to 
the area outside the reserve. However, he demonstrates that a marine reserve of a 
moderate size will have only a small conservation effect, compared with open access to 
the entire area inhabited by the stock. In addition, Hannesson (1998) shows that the 
impact on the aggregate catch depends on the size of the marine reserve.     
 
This paper adds to the research of marine reserves by presenting a bio-economic model 
of wildlife habitat protection. Terrestrial habitats differ from marine habitats in that 
there may be, in addition to hunting, an alternative use of protected land. In the present, 
agricultural crop production is considered the alternative use of land. In order to draw a 
line to marine reserves, this paper makes a distinction between two policies of land 
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protection. The difference between these policies lies in the type of land gazetted. One 
alternative is to establish a protected area by gazetting non-cultivated land only. In such 
a case, there is no alternative use of the protected area except hunting. This policy is 
therefore quite similar to marine reserve creation and the analysis demonstrates that it 
promotes wildlife conservation. However, rapid human population growth in Africa has 
forced humans to bring their agricultural activities ever more close to wildlife habitats 
(see Dixon and Sherman 1991 and Martin 1993). The second alternative is therefore to 
expropriate cultivated land for wildlife protection. In this case the protected area does 
not only close off an area for hunting, it also withdraws land previously used in 
agriculture. Consequently, an alternative cost of habitat protection is present, namely the 
foregone return from crop production. The analysis shows, in contrast to marine 
reserves, that this policy may cause wildlife degradation. Analysing the driving forces 
behind such an outcome and its impact on human welfare are the main contributions of 
this paper.  
 
The bio-economic model developed in this paper draws on the biological system 
presented by Hannesson (1998). See also Armstrong and Reithe (2001). Hannesson 
looks at a fish stock located in an area of a fixed size and the marine reserve is defined 
as a subset of this area. In the present paper the biomass is a wildlife stock dispersing 
over a fixed area or ecosystem. The ecosystem contains two sub-areas, the protected 
area and the outer area. The protected area is managed by an agency appointed by the 
State. On the border to the park a group of peasants utilize the outer land for agricultural 
production and wildlife hunting. Following the fishery analyses cited above, it is 
assumed that hunting is not allowed within the protected area and that law enforcement 
is effectively preventing illegal hunting here. However, the local people have legal 
rights to exploit the land in the outer area and the wildlife roaming outside the park. 
That is, they have user rights to land and wildlife in the outer area1.  
 
Throughout this analysis the local people are considered the only active agent. It is 
assumed that the size of the protected land is determined by the State and, therefore, 
                                                 
1 In a state property regime individuals or groups may be allowed to make use of the natural resources without 
having any property rights. Bromley (1991) defines this as usufruct rights.  
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cannot be altered by the park manager. Hence, expropriation of land will be considered 
exogenous in the model. In addition, because we neglect illegal hunting, there is no 
need to focus on law enforcement and consequently, the park manager plays no role in 
the subsequent model. Instead, the manager is a passive beneficiary of non-consumptive 
use of the protected stock, for instance tourism2. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the ecological model, 
while the behaviour of the local people follows in section 3. The impact on wildlife 
conservation and human welfare of protected area creation is investigated in section 4. 
A summary and discussion follows in section 5.  
 
2. The ecological model 
Consider an area or ecosystem of fixed size divided in two sub-areas; a protected area 
and an outer area. The ecological modelling is identical to Hannesson (1998) who looks 
at species dispersing between the sub-areas in a density-dependent way. This means that 
wildlife migrate to the relatively less dense area (see e.g. Pulliam 1988). The animals 
roam freely between the sub-areas, because there are no physical obstructions, e.g. 
fencing, separating the parkland from the open area. It is further assumed, as already 
mentioned, that wildlife harvesting only takes place when the species are outside the 
protected area.  
 
In the following, some restrictive assumptions are made about the quality of land. First, 
land is considered homogenous, i.e. every part of the ecosystem is equally suitable as 
habitat for wildlife. Secondly, although agricultural production takes place in the outer 
area, we assume no incompatibility in land use. That is, there is no negative impact on 
the living conditions of wildlife of adding more land to agricultural production. 
However, in reality, unexploited land may generate more wildlife than agricultural land 
as land clearing, fencing and so forth result in poorer conditions and smaller refuges for 
wildlife (see Norton-Griffiths 2000). This may be captured, as in Huffaker et al. (1992), 
by assuming a smaller intrinsic growth rate of wildlife in the outer area. Skonhoft 
                                                 
2 It is therefore assumed that the management of the protected area involves no harvesting or culling. For a 
critical review of this assumption, see e.g. Wright (1999). 
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(1999) and Bulte and Horan (2000) present an alternative approach where the carrying 
capacity in the outer area is specified as a decreasing function of the amount of land 
utilized in agricultural production or other alternative uses. However, in order to capture 
the main ideas, no incompatibles in land uses are assumed to be present here.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the conservation effect of altering the size of the 
protected sub-area. An increase in the size of this area is followed by the same reduction 
in the outer area. Therefore, the ecological part of the model, which is identical to the 
system presented by Hannesson (1998), specifies the migration rates between the sub-
areas as dependent on the size of the protected area. Technically, the probability of an 
animal being located in the protected area or the outer area equals the size of the 
respective areas. Now, assume that the size of the ecosystem is normalized to one. A 
fraction w of this area is gazetted as protected land and consequently, (  is the size 
of the outer area. Let X(t) be the density of the stock in the protected area at time t, 
while Y(t) is the density in the outer area at time t. In the following, the time subscript is 
omitted. The size of the wildlife stock in the protected area and the outer area is wX and 
 respectively, so that the aggregate stock equals   
)w−1
Y)w−1 .Y)w( −1 (wXS +=
 
Let  be the moving rate of wildlife, i.e. the rate at which an animal moves to bring 
it to the nearest suitable spot for grazing or prey
0≥z
)w
3.  means that the animals do not 
move around at all. The rate of dispersal of the stock in the protected area is then zwX. 
 is the probability that the moving animal will migrate out of the reserve. The 
migration out of the reserve is therefore . To translate this into change in 
stock density in the outer area, we divide it by the size of that area. Hence, the increase 
in the density of wildlife in the outer area due to migration from the protected area is 
zwX. Similarly, Y is the migration from the outer area onto protected land. The 
reduction in the density of wildlife in the outer area due to migration to the conservation 
area is then zwY. In the same way, the change in the stock density in the conservation 
0=z
wX
( −1
)w(z −1
)w(zw −1
                                                 
3 The moving rate may also be related to breeding. For instance, animals with slow growing non-precocial 
young are obliged to stay within a small area to breed. This is the case for carnivores like lions and hyenas. In 
contrast, ungulates with precocial young do not need to stay in one place because the young can follow the 
mother within an hour or so of birth (Caughley and Sinclair 1994).   
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area due to migration from the outer area is , while the stock density in the 
conservation area is reduced by  due to migration to the outer area. 
Y)w(z −1
)
dt/dS =
X)w(z −1
Y)(w( −−11
h)YX( −−
0>r/
 
Because of the non-incompatibility of land, the carrying capacity per square kilometre is 
equal in each sub-area and therefore normalized to one. Natural growth is assumed to 
take place in both sub-areas and is given by a logistic growth function. The rate of 
change in the density of wildlife in the two sub-areas is given by4 
 
(1)    Xz)X(rXdt/dX +−=
 
(2)  zw)Y(rYdt/dY +−= 1
 
Here, h is the harvesting rate, while r is the intrinsic growth rate. Note that the rate of 
change in the aggregate stock is given by  If the 
whole ecosystem is gazetted for wildlife protection ( w ), then and 
. In the same way, with no protection ( )  and 
. Throughout the analysis it is assumed that 0 .  
dt/dY)w(dt/wdX −+ 1 .
1= S =
0=w S =
1<< w
X
Y)S(rSdt/dS −= 1
)S(rSdt/dS −= 1 h−
 
In absence of man, , Figure 1 illustrates the isoclines of (1) and (2). This figure is 
quite similar to the graphical demonstration of a two-patch density-dependent system in 
Skonhoft (1999) and Sanchirico and Wilen (2001) (see also Appendix 1). Here, the 
marginal migration rates are below the maximum specific growth rate so that 
 and . This makes sense because a system with a 
migration exceeding the intrinsic growth is likely to fail in sustaining an ecological 
equilibrium with positive biomass within each patch. The X-isocline is a strictly convex 
function of X and runs through the point (1,1). Above the isocline, the natural growth 
and dispersion from the outer area exceed the dispersion out of the reserve so that 
. The opposite occurs below the isocline. The Y-isocline is a strictly concave 
0h =
1− (z01 >− r/zw
0dt/dX >
1− )w
                                                 
4 The dispersal functions of (1) and (2) are somehow different from those presented by Conrad (1998), 
Skonhoft (1999) and Sanchirico and Wilen (2001). This is explained and justified in Appendix 1.  
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function of X and runs through the point (1,1). Below the isocline,  is positive, 
whereas above, dY  is negative.  
dt/dY
dt/
r/
 
              Y 
                 
 
                1 
                  
 
 
 
           1-zw/r                                                  
 
 
                                          1-z(1-w)/r             1  
Feasible 
Region 
dt/dY 0=
Figure 1: Ecological equilibrium in
/dX 0dt =
 
 
 
In absence of man and migration below th
unique equilibrium with stock densities equa
one in equilibrium. It can be demonstrated t
region for an interior solution of the system 
and the axes. The size of this region depends
If the moving rate z approaches zero, i.e. a 
the individual stocks collapse to zero or the 
rate increases so that  (or 
reduces and collapses to a lens with interse
 (and b ).   
r/zw
= 1
)w(z −1
r/)w(za −−= 11 zw−
 
Throughout this analysis it is assumed tha
positive. Introducing human activity as a fix
                                                 
5 The stability conditions read /)1,1(gX/)1,1(f ∂∂+∂∂
1,1(g)(Y/)1,1(f() ∂∂∂−Y/)1,1(g)(X/)1,1(f( ∂∂∂∂
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 absence of man. 
e intrinsic growth, it will therefore be a 
l to one. Hence, the aggregate stock equals 
hat the equilibrium is stable5. The feasible 
is found in the area closed by the isoclines 
 on the biological parameters of the model. 
system of closed and independent patches, 
carrying capacity of its area. If the moving 
) approaches one, the feasible region 
ction at (a,0) (or (0,b)) and (1,1), where 
r/
t the patches are interdependent, i.e. z is 
ed positive harvesting rate in this system 
 and 
.   
0)zr2(Y <+−=
)zr(r)X/) >+=∂ 0
 
shifts the Y-isocline in Figure 1 down, i.e. human activity reduces the density in the 
outer area for a given stock density in the game reserve. Consequently, due to a relative 
dense population in the protected area, wildlife disperses to the outer area, which causes 
a decline in X. This illustrates that harvesting in the outer area spells over to the 
protected area. The system settles in a new stable equilibrium where both stock levels 
are smaller than their respective carrying capacities and Y . Throughout the 
remaining analysis it is assumed that the system is in ecological equilibrium 
( dX ). 
X<
0dt/dYdt/ ==
 
3. The economy 
The ecological steady state above was established for a given harvesting rate. However, 
the harvesting activity is determined by economic considerations, which are outlined in 
this section. Before we move to the economic part, it is convenient to establish the 
different ways in which land is utilized in this model. Recall that land is utilized by two 
agents. First we have the park manager who utilizes the protected area in production of 
non-consumptive tourism services (see section 1). Second, we have the local people 
who have legal rights to utilize the outer area in agricultural production and wildlife 
hunting.  
 
The State may instruct the park manager, for presumed conservation purposes, to 
expand the protected area. This can only take place by implementing parts of the outer 
land into the park area. There are two ways in which the State may accomplish this, and 
these are related to the type of land as discussed in section 1. First, if present, the State 
can protect non-cultivated land. For the local people living in the outer area, this policy 
represents limited user rights to wildlife, but no restriction on the rights to exploit land 
already cultivated for agricultural use. Technically, this will be the case where the 
constraint on agricultural land is non-binding. Second, in marginal areas, the State must 
expropriate cultivated land in order to expand the protected area. For the local people, 
this procedure restricts their user rights to agricultural land as well as their user rights to 
wildlife. This will be the case when the constraint on agricultural land use is binding. 
The two scenarios of protected area expansion will be analysed in section 4.1 and 4.2, 
respectively.  
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The next step is to present a formal model of the hunting and agricultural decision of the 
local people. Throughout the analysis the local people are considered a homogenous 
group of peasants and, in line with traditional reasoning, it is assumed that the elders are 
in charge of the group’s activities (Marks 1984). The number of animals harvested H is 
specified as an increasing function of labour effort , stock density Y, and the size of 
the outer area (  as . In the following, H is considered linear 
in  and Y, but concave in ( . The wildlife offtake is specified as  
hE
)w−1 , )w,Y,E(HH h −= 1
)w1−hE
 
(3) YE)w(fH h−= 1  
 
Here,  is interpreted as the catchability coefficient.  because additional 
areas are open for hunting as the outer area expands
)w(f −1 0>'f
h
6.  reflects that the marginal 
catchability decreases with the size of the hunting ground due increased distance from 
the home region and because a larger area is likely to include a more diverse and less 
advantageous topography. To translate the offtake into change in the wildlife density in 
the outer area in (2), we divide H with the size of this area, so that  is the 
hunting rate
0<''f
)w/(H −= 1
7. 
 
The next step is to present the agricultural activity, interpreted as crop production, of the 
local people. The agricultural production is a function of labour  and land  as AE L
                                                 
6 This formulation of H differs from Skonhoft (1999) and Pezzey et al. (2000) who use a Schaefer specification 
H = qE , where q is the catchability coefficient, y is the stock size, and  is the carrying capacity of 
the outer area. They further assume that  is an increasing function of the size of the outer area. That is, in 
contrast to the present model, and for a given , the wildlife offtake decreases with the size of this area due 
to reduced stock density. However, the ecological system presented by Skonhoft and Pezzey et al. differs from 
the present system in that they allow for increases in the size of the outer area without altering the size of the 
protected land (see Appendix 1). Then, by assuming that wildlife roams onto the ‘new’ land, an increase in the 
habitat size in the outer area has a direct negative effect on stock density , for a given stock size y. 
Hence, they assume that the impact on wildlife offtake is negative, simply because a less dense population is 
harder to catch. Here, however, there is no direct effect on stock density Y of increasing the size of the outer 
area. That is because the outer area increases by altering a non-physical border between the protected land and 
the outer land.   
yh K/y yK
yK/
yK
hE
y
7 Following Barrett and Arcese (1998), Lopez (1998), Skonhoft (1998), Skonhoft and Solstad (1998), and Bulte 
and van Soest (1999), the local people are the only agents involved in wildlife hunting in the outer area. That is, 
we ignore the possibility of outsiders and professional gangs area entering this area for hunting.  
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(A
 (see below). The endowment of labour is normalized to one and, hence, the 
constraint on labour use reads 
 
(4) , 1
                                                
≤+ AE
 
Throughout the analysis it is assumed that the constraint is binding. A trade-off between 
wildlife hunting and agricultural production is present in that the opportunity cost of 
wildlife harvesting equals the foregone return from agricultural production (and vice 
versa). 
 
As mentioned in section 2, land is homogeneous as habitat for wildlife. It is therefore 
convenient to consider land as homogeneous for agricultural uses as well. This means 
that additional land is equally suitable in agriculture as previously exploited land (see 
also Bulte and Horan 2000). Then, proportional increases in labour effort and land use 
must cause output to increase by the same proportion. Consequently, the average returns 
to land  and labour  are left unchanged. The agricultural production 
function is therefore characterised by constant returns to scale and specified as a Cobb-
Douglas type as follows (Hayami and Ruttan 1985).  
L/ AE/A
 
(5) , ααµ −= 1LE)L,E AA
 
Here, µ > 0 is a technology parameter and 0 < α < 1 is the output elasticity of labour. 
Because of its homogeneity, diminishing return to land is not caused by taking inferior 
land into production, but by reduced labour effort per unit of land8. The total area 
available for agricultural production is given by the size of the outer area ( . The 
constraint on land use is therefore given by  
)w−1
 
(6)  )w(L −≤ 1
 
 
8 For linear homogeneous or constant return to scale production functions, the marginal products are 
independent of scale and depend only on the input proportions. 
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Investment costs on land, for instance related to clearing and fencing, and costs in 
cultivation and crop harvesting are ignored in this analysis9. The only agricultural cost 
of consideration here is related to damage caused by wildlife roaming on agricultural 
land. The nuisance stream per unit of land is equal to cY , with c > 0 and fixed10. 
Consequently, the total damage of the wildlife roaming on agricultural land is . c is 
interpreted as the marginal damage per animal. All else equal, more agricultural land 
means more nuisances. 
cLY
 
When inserting for the effort constraint (4) into the production function in (5), the net 
benefit function of the local people yields 
 
(7) , cLYPL)E1(PYE)w1(fP A
1
hAhh −−+−= −ααµπ
 
where  and  denote the price of game meat and agricultural output, respectivelyhP AP
11. 
These prices are assumed fixed throughout the analysis. 
 
As mentioned, the local people have user rights to land and wildlife. This means that 
they are not granted titles to these resources and, consequently, they face a continuing 
risk of the State withdrawing their user rights through an expansion of the protected 
area. The local people have therefore few, if any, incentives to base their wildlife 
harvesting on long-term considerations. Hence, they do not take the stock of wildlife 
into account when deciding upon their effort use12. Technically, this is captured by 
assuming that the local peasants treat the stock density Y as exogenous, which is in 
accordance with one of Smith's models (1975). See also Skonhoft and Solstad (1998). 
The local people choose the hunting effort  and cultivated land L to maximize (7), hE
                                                 
9 In reality, however, there will be costs related land clearing, fencing, sowing, fertiliser and pesticide use and 
so forth. Modelling such costs will not alter the qualitative results of this analysis. 
10 In reality, the local people can perform damage control through fencing, guard patrols and so forth. In the 
model this would have worked through a changing c. Here, such measures are neglected. 
11 In accordance with the traditions in the past century, it is therefore assumed that no economic compensation 
is paid to the local people for the loss of access to land and wildlife (Marks 1984, Kiss 1990, Swanson and 
Barbier 1992, Wells 1992). 
12 Martin (1993) points out how the risk of land expropriation affects landholders. He writes (p. 15):  “The 
influence of the preservationist lobby is a serious disincentive for the landholder contemplating an investment 
in wildlife as a land use”. 
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given the constraint on land use in (6). The Lagrange function reads 
, where λ is the 
shadow price of land. Equations (8)-(10) yield the first order conditions for maximum 
when an interior solution for hunting effort is supposed to be present.  
))w(L(cLYPL)E(PYE)w(fPV AhAhh −−−−−+−= − 111 1 λµ αα
ααµα −−−=− 11hAh L)E1(PY)w1(fP  
λαµ αα +=−− − cYPL)E)((P AhA 11  
0≥λ 0=λ )w1(L −<
)w(LL I −<= 1
 
(8)   
 
(9) 
 
(10) ;  if  
 
Equation (8) shows that the optimal hunting effort is determined by equality between 
the marginal product of hunting and the marginal product of labour effort in agricultural 
production. The decision rule in equation (9) states that the local people will convert 
land in the outer area to agricultural use until the value of the marginal product of land 
in crop production equals the marginal cost. The marginal cost consists of the value of 
the marginal damage per unit cultivated land and the shadow value of land. This value 
equals zero when the constraint on land use is non-binding, while it is positive for a 
binding constraint (see (10)).  
 
The economic equilibrium condition in (9) is illustrated graphically in Figure 2. Here, 
the marginal benefit and costs of land cultivation are measured along the vertical axis. 
Consider the case of intersection between the marginal cost curve and the marginal 
benefit curve, which results in . This means that the local people 
choose not to utilize the whole outer area for cultivation and, hence, λ = 0. However, a 
positive shift in agricultural productivity µ and/or a downward shift in the marginal crop 
damage caused by a lower c or Y, increase the demand for cultivated land. In Figure 2, 
this is illustrated by an upward shift in the marginal benefit curve caused by a higher µ. 
For a given land use at , the marginal benefit of cultivated land exceeds the marginal 
crop damage by the positive shadow value of land. The local people respond by 
IL
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converting additional land to agricultural production. In the new equilibrium, λ remains 
positive if the local people utilize the whole outer area for agricultural production, 
, reflecting that land is a scarce factor. This will be the case if µ is ‘high’, 
while c and Y are ‘low’. In addition, an increase in the size of the protected area w shifts 
the vertical curve denoting the size of the outer area to the left and increases the shadow 
value of land.  
)w(L −= 1
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dependent on whether the state gazettes non-cultivated land or expropriates cultivated 
land, i.e. whether the constraint on land use is non-binding or binding. Section 4.1 
considers the case of a non-binding constraint on land use, while the constraint is 
binding in section 4.2.  
 
4.1 The constraint on land use is non-binding 
Assume that the protected area is relatively small, so that land is not a scarce factor in 
the outer area. Then, the local people settle with an interior solution for cultivated land, 
, where the marginal return from land equals the marginal damage in (9) and 
. Combining (8) and (9) (with ) and solving for Y gives 
)w(L −< 1
0=λ 0=λ
 
(11)  [ ] [ αα ααµ −−−= 111 c/)()w(fP/PY hA ]
 
Equation (11) alone determines the equilibrium stock density in the outer area Y. This 
means that Y is determined by the (fixed) economic parameters and the park size only. 
The result stems on the constant return to scale in the agricultural production function. 
Accordingly, the input proportion  is constant and independent of the scale 
of crop production for fixed model parameters. This means that we cannot solve the 
optimal input combination and the resulting crop output from the economic first order 
conditions. Instead the stock density in the outer area is determined by the economic 
conditions, while the hunting effort  and the stock density in the protected area X are 
solved from the ecological equilibrium in (1) and (2) (with ). 
Although the systems are quite different, the same result occurs in Sanchirico and 
Wilen’s model (2001). The aggregate stock follows from . Finally, the 
amount of cultivated land L is determined through the fixed input proportion. 
L/)E( h−1
hE
0dt/dYdt/dX ==
0dt/ =dS
  
The economic and ecological effects of an expansion of the protected area is found by 
taking the total differential of (11) and (1) and (2) (with dX ) (for 
details, see Appendix 2). With a non-binding constraint on land use, the state gazettes 
0dt/dYdt/ ==
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non-cultivated land when expanding the protected area13. This means that more habitat 
protection displaces the local people from pre-hunting areas without restricting their 
rights to utilize land in agricultural production. The effect on hunting effort and land use 
is unclear. However, equation (11) demonstrates that an expansion of the protected area 
increases the stock density in the outer area. This gives more dispersal into the protected 
area and leads to a more dense population here. Because of increased stock densities, 
there must be a positive effect on the aggregate stock of gazetting non-cultivated land 
for wildlife protection. The conclusion is therefore that more protection gives more 
wildlife even if the local people increase their hunting effort.  
  
The next step is to investigate how this intervention affects the economic conditions of 
the local people. Recall from fishery economics that Sanchirico and Wilen (2001) claim 
that a marine reserve may benefit the fishermen through increased aggregate catch, if 
increased dispersal from the marine reserve compensates for the foregone harvest in the 
reserve. In the present model, however, the effect on the wildlife harvest is not an 
adequate measure of the impact on the economic conditions of the local people. Instead 
we need to investigate the effect on the net income in (7) in optimum. This is done by 
taking the differential of (7) with respect to w, when accounting for the effect working 
through a changing stock density (see Appendix 2). In contrast to marine reserves, it 
turns out that there is no potential for improved human welfare of expanding a protected 
area. There is a direct negative effect working through the reduced income from hunting 
due to restricted hunting rights. While the expansion of the protected area increases the 
stock density in the outer area, this cannot offset the direct negative effect. This means 
that positive effect on the wildlife density cannot compensate the local people for the 
foregone hunting ground. This negative income effect is strengthened by the fact that a 
more dense wildlife population imposes further damage to agricultural crops. Gazetting 
non-cultivated land for habitat protection will therefore promote wildlife conservation at 
the expense of human welfare. See also Table 1 in section 4.2.  
                                                 
13 In addition, an expansion of the protected area is feasible through expropriation of agricultural land in the 
outer area. In this case, the local people are displaced from both pre-hunting areas and pre-cultivated land. 
However, because land is homogeneous and there is no investment cost in land, the local people simply move 
their agricultural production to the pre non-cultivated areas. Therefore, as long as the constraint on land use is 
non-binding, the conservation-effect of gazetting non-cultivated or pre-cultivated land is identical. 
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4.2 The constraint on land use is binding 
Assume that land is a scarce factor to the local people living in the outer area. This is 
the case if, relatively speaking, the protected area is widespread, the agricultural 
productivity is high, and/or the marginal wildlife-induced damage to crops is low. In 
such a scenario, the local people settle in a corner solution for cultivated land, i.e. 
 and  from (10). Hence, the marginal return on land cultivation 
exceeds the marginal damage in (9). See also Figure 2. Inserting  in (8) 
gives 
)w(L −= 1 0>λ
)w(L −= 1
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Equation (12) states that the local people will divert effort to hunting until the marginal 
benefit of hunting equals the marginal cost. The marginal cost reflects the alternative 
cost of hunting, namely the foregone return on agricultural production. In contrast to the 
non-binding scenario, the hunting effort  is now determined from the economic first 
order condition for a given wildlife density Y. This is because the amount of cultivated 
land L is fixed at (  and, hence, the hunting effort follows from the fixed input 
proportion (   
hE
h (f
)w−1
w/() −1 [ ] )/(Ah )Y)wP/(P)E αµα −−=− 1111 .
 
The economic equilibrium for a given wildlife density in the outer area is illustrated in 
Figure 3. Here, the marginal benefit from hunting (MBH) is measured along the left-
hand vertical axis, while the marginal benefit from agricultural production (MBA) is 
measured along the right-hand axis. The optimal hunting effort is determined by the 
intersection between the two curves. Equation (12) shows that an expansion of the 
protected area, i.e. an increase in , has a direct negative effect on the marginal return 
on labour in agriculture. This is because the State must expropriate cultivated land in 
order to expand the protected area and this is new compared to the non-binding case. 
Consequently, the MBA curve in Figure 3 shifts down, which works in the direction of 
increased hunting effort. However, restricted hunting rights reduce the marginal return 
on hunting, which shifts the MBH curve down. This leads the local people to direct less 
w
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effort towards hunting. The total effect on hunting effort is therefore unclear. If 
restricted hunting rights affect the local people less than reduced cultivated land, i.e. 
<∂∂∂ wE/H h2 w)E(/A h ∂−∂∂ 12 , they will reply to habitat protection by directing 
more effort to hunting. This is illustrated in Figure 3 by a stronger downward shift in the 
MBA curve. 
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Second, we have the indirect effect working through the hunting decision of the local 
people. As discussed above, restricted user rights to wildlife reduce the marginal return 
from labour in hunting, while restricted user rights in agriculture reduce the marginal 
return from labour in crop production. These have opposite effects on the hunting effort. 
As argued, if the local people respond less to the closed hunting ground than the loss of 
cultivated land, they will divert more labour effort towards wildlife exploitation. This 
will be the case in areas where the local people rely heavily on agriculture as a land use 
so that expropriation of cultivated land represents a considerable income loss. In this 
case, the indirect effect on wildlife conservation implies less wildlife in the outer area 
and a smaller aggregate stock. The total effect on wildlife conservation is therefore 
unclear. Contrary to the non-binding scenario, this demonstrates that protected areas 
which restrict the user rights to wildlife and cultivated land may reduce the degree of 
wildlife conservation. This obscure result occurs because the constraint on land use in 
agriculture is binding, meaning that there is an alternative use of the protected land in 
agricultural production.  
 
The final part of this analysis is to investigate how expropriation of cultivated land 
affects the economic conditions of the local people living with wildlife. Again, 
differentiation of (7) with respect to w, when taking into account the effect working via 
a changing wildlife stock, gives the effect on local income in optimum. There are three 
possible outcomes regarding wildlife conservation and local welfare, and these are 
summarised in the second column of Table 1. Assume first that an expansion of the 
protected area fails and results in a smaller degree of wildlife conservation. As reported 
in the table, this results in poorer economic conditions for the local people. Therefore, 
this model predicts that where protected areas have failed in promoting wildlife 
conservation, they have also caused a degradation of human welfare14.   
 
 
                                                 
14 Obviously, protected areas cannot promote local welfare at the expense of wildlife conservation. In the case 
of a binding constraint on land use and dS/dw>0, dπ/dw>0 must indicate that the local people were utilizing 
‘too much’ land for agricultural production prior to the expansion of the protected area. In this case, profit-
maximization requires that the local people choose an interior solution for cultivated land (i.e. a non-binding 
constraint on land use). 
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   Table 1: The welfare effect of an increase in w in equilibrium.    
  Non-binding constraint  
 on land use 
 Binding constraint on land use* 
S  +  ÷  +∗∗ 
 
π 
  
 ÷ 
 
 ÷ 
  
 
 ÷  
z low 
or 
z high; c high, Ph low 
 + 
z high; c low, Ph high 
 
  
   * The welfare effect is conditioned by the impact on wildlife conservation. 
   ** Here, it is assumed that the wildlife stock in the outer area increases, . The 
magnitude of  increases with z. z ‘high’ is interpreted as the case where increased dispersal 
from the protected area compensates for the foregone hunting ground. z ‘low’ means that dispersal from 
the protected area cannot compensate for the foregone hunting ground. 
01 >− dw/Y)w(d
dw/dY
 
An expansion of the protected area promotes wildlife conservation if the local people 
respond to restricted user rights by devoting more effort to agricultural production. As 
shown in Table 1, the resulting effect on local welfare is ambiguous and dependent on 
the moving rate of wildlife and the benefit and cost of living with wildlife. First, the 
income from hunting is reduced if increased dispersal from the protected area cannot 
compensate for the foregone return from the pre-hunting ground. This will be the case if 
the moving rate z is ‘low’. Then, an expansion of the protected area promotes wildlife 
conservation at the expense of human welfare15. Although the systems are quite 
different, the same conclusion is drawn by Sanchirico and Wilen (2001). Second, the 
income from hunting increases if increased dispersal from the protected area exceeds 
the foregone return from the pre-hunting ground. As for marine reserves, this requires a 
‘high’ moving rate z. Still, and in contrast to marine reserves, there is a negative impact 
on human welfare as more animals in the outer area cause more damage to agricultural 
crops. If the cost of living with wildlife is sufficient above the benefit (i.e. c ‘high’ and 
 ‘low’), wildlife conservation is promoted at the expense of human welfare. On the 
other hand, the welfare effect is positive if the benefit of living with wildlife exceeds the 
cost.  
hP
 
                                                 
15 Here, the effect on local welfare stems from the assumption that more wildlife in the entire area is a result of 
higher densities and stock sizes in both sub-areas. See Table 1. 
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The results summarised in Table 1 demonstrate that there is a potential for a double 
payoff to emerge where both wildlife and the local people benefit from an expropriation 
of cultivated land. On the other hand, while the degree of wildlife conservation 
increases, the welfare of the local people reduces when the State gazettes non-cultivated 
land. The reason for these adverse effects on human welfare lies in the assumed 
constant return to scale in the agricultural production function in (5). In presence of this 
formulation, the equilibrium stock density in the outer area is determined by the size of 
the protected area and the fixed economic parameter values when the constraint on 
agricultural land is non-binding. Hence, in this case, the stock density in the outer area 
is independent of the hunting effort and the stock density in the protected area. The 
implication of this is that the welfare of the local people in optimum is only influenced 
by the direct effect of a changing w and the following effect working through a 
changing Y. That is, the welfare in optimum is independent of how a changing w affects 
 and X and, thereby, the dispersal from the protected area. The mechanism at work is 
quite different when the constraint on agricultural land is binding. Then, the equilibrium 
stock density in the outer area is affected by the hunting effort, the density in the 
protected area and the dispersal from this area onto the open land. In presence of this 
interdependency in equilibrium, the local people will benefit from any increased 
dispersal from the protected area. Precisely this effect gives the potential for a double 
payoff to emerge from expropriation of cultivated land.  
hE
 
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
Establishing national parks and other types of protected areas have been the traditional 
approach to natural resource conservation in Africa. However, protected areas have 
during the past decade been viewed as having failed to preserve wildlife on that 
continent (Kiss 1990, Barrett and Arcese 1995, Gibson and Marks 1995). Martin (1993) 
explains this failure by claiming that the budgets and funds are too small to finance the 
activities necessary to combat illegal hunting on protected land. This paper gives an 
alternative explanation of what may have caused the failure of protected areas. In 
contrast to Martin, the analysis demonstrates that protected areas may cause wildlife 
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degradation, even when anti-poaching law enforcement succeeds in eliminating illegal 
hunting in the gazetted area.  
 
What has been analysed in this paper is a wildlife management system where land is 
gazetted as a protected area in order to conserve wildlife. The ecosystem of 
consideration is of fixed size and consists of two sub-areas – the protected area and the 
outer area – over which the wildlife stock disperses. The outer area is settled by humans 
who utilize this area for wildlife hunting and agricultural production. The local people 
have user rights to wildlife and land for cultivation in the outer area, but they do not 
have the property rights. Related to the land use in the outer area, this paper 
distinguishes between two ways of gazetting land. First, the state gazettes non-
cultivated land. This policy restricts the local people’s user rights to wildlife by 
withdrawing former hunting grounds without interfering with their rights to cultivate 
land. Technically, this is the case where the constraint on land use is non-binding. 
Second, the state expropriates cultivated land, a policy which restricts the local people’s 
user rights to both wildlife and land for cultivation. In this scenario, the constraint on 
land use is binding. 
 
The main point of the analysis is to find out under which conditions protected areas may 
fail in conserving wildlife. In addition, the analysis focuses on the economic impact of 
protected areas by investigating the effect on human welfare. It is shown that the actual 
outcome of habitat protection depends critically on whether the constraint on land use is 
binding. Only when the constraint is non-binding will protected areas with certainty 
increase the wildlife stock. This scenario is quite similar to a marine reserve creation 
with no alternative use of the marine habitat. However, in contrast to marine reserves, 
there is no potential for improved human welfare of gazetting non-cultivated land.  
 
Protected areas work quite differently from marine reserves when the constraint on land 
use is binding and the State expropriates cultivated land for wildlife protection. This 
discrepancy stems from the alternative use of protected land as land for agricultural 
production. The model demonstrates that an expansion of the protected area causes a 
degradation of wildlife if the impact of lost cultivated land is high relative to the impact 
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of lost hunting grounds. If this is the case, the local people will compensate themselves 
by devoting more time on hunting. In contrast, if the impact of less cultivated land is 
low relative to the impact of restricted hunting grounds, the local people respond to land 
expropriation by devoting more time on agricultural production and, thereby, reduce the 
time spent hunting. In this case, an expansion of the protected area promotes wildlife 
conservation. Then, a double payoff will emerge if the wildlife-induced damage to 
agricultural crops is small and the increased dispersal from the protected area 
compensates for the foregone wildlife harvest on the pre-hunting grounds.  
 
It is important to note, however, that this model simplifies the interaction between the 
wildlife population dynamics and the human activities. In the ecological part of the 
model, the quality of land as habitat for wildlife is considered constant and independent 
of the agricultural use in the outer area. In reality, however, unexploited areas may 
generate more wildlife than cultivated land. Therefore, the analysis overlooks a positive 
effect on wildlife conservation as protected areas displace agricultural activities in the 
wildlife habitat. However, the weakness of omitting this connection becomes less 
apparent as there is assumed to be no cost in converting land to agricultural use in the 
economic part of the model. In reality, investing in land is costly and time consuming. 
This strengthens the negative impact on the local people of an expansion of the 
protected area and may therefore lead to wildlife degradation. Implementing investment 
costs may even cause failure when the constraint on land use is non-binding.  
 
It is also important to notice the lack of economic compensation to the local people of 
restricted user rights to wildlife and land. With the growing recognition of the failure of 
protected areas, international conservation organizations and African governments have 
developed a new approach to wildlife conservation, namely the Integrated Conservation 
and Development Project (ICDP) (see Kiss 1990, Barbier 1992, Wells and Brandon 
1992, Barrett and Arcese 1995, Barrett and Arcese 1998, Songorwa 1999). The central 
issue in ICDPs is benefit sharing, or compensation for restricted user rights, for instance 
through income transfers from the tourism sector. Neglecting such compensation 
schemes may suppress a potential positive effect on local welfare of protected areas. 
Still, because there is no broad-based evidence in the literature suggesting that existing 
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ICDPs can fully compensate the local people for the loss of user rights, such benefit-
sharing schemes have not been taken into account in this paper (see also Barrett and 
Arcese 1995, Gibson and Marks 1995, Emerton 1998, Songorwa 1999).  
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Appendix 1               
Migration between a protected area (or marine reserve) and an outer area is also of 
focus in Conrad (1998), Skonhoft (1999), and Sanchirico and Wilen (2001). The point 
of departure for these analyses is that the migration is density dependent, i.e. the net 
in/out migration of the protected area depends on the ratio of the stock size to the 
carrying capacity within each sub-area. This means that increased carrying capacity in 
one sub-area, which reduces its stock density, leads to reduced migration out of this 
particular area. Skonhoft (1999) interprets the carrying capacity of each sub-area as 
proportional to the size of the respective area (see also Pezzey et al. 2000). In addition, 
the size of the ecosystem is not fixed, meaning that it is possible to increase the size of 
one sub-area without altering the size of the other area. This is illustrated in the figure 
below, where the size of the protected area increases as indicated by the left-pointing 
arrows. In this system, more protected land means more space for the animals, which 
has a direct negative effect on the stock density in the protected area. Consequently, the 
migration into the protected area increases due to a relatively low density here.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the present analysis, the ecosystem is of a fixed size. This means that an increment in 
the protected area takes place by altering the (non-physical) border between the park 
and the outer area. Consequently, more protected land is followed by an equal reduction 
of the open area, as illustrated by the right-pointing arrows in the figure below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Protected area Outer area 
Y X 
X Y 
 Protected area Outer area 
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In this system, the effect on wildlife migration of altering the size of the protected area 
is somehow different from Skonhoft’s model (1999). Here, there is no direct effect on 
the stock densities. Instead, expanding the protected area reduces the probability of an 
animal in the pre-protected area moving into the outer area. Recall that this probability 
is given by ( . For a given stock density X, this effect works in the direction of 
reduced migration out of the protected area. At the same time, for a given stock density 
Y, the probability w that an animal in the pre-outer area is included in the protected area 
increases. However, when the outer area shrinks, its stock size (  is reduced for a 
given Y. Translated into a changing stock density in the protected area (i.e. 
, see the main text), these latter effects work in the direction 
of reduced migration into the protected area. A fixed positive harvesting rate in the 
outer area gives (see main text), and, consequently, the total effect on net 
migration into the protected area is positive.  
)w−1
(zw/ =
X
Y)w−1
Y)wY)w(zw −− 11
Y>
 
Both Conrad (1998) and Skonhoft (1999) consider the rate of change in biomass x and y 
in two areas with different carrying capacities xK
)Y
 and  and with a dispersal function 
given as . Skonhoft extends this dispersal function by taking into 
account the fact that dispersion due to different sex and age composition of the two sub-
populations can be skew. The function is therefore given by . 
Sanchirico and Wilen (2001) define the stock densities as  and Y  
and specify the dispersal function as . In the present analysis, the carrying 
capacities per square kilometre equal unity so that  and Y  β 
equals 1, and the migration rate s equals zw(1-w).  
yK
X =
)K/yK/x(s yx −
)K/yK/x(s yx −β
xK/ yK/y=
)w/(y −= 1 ,
xX =
w/x
X(s −
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Appendix 2 
1. Non-binding constraint on land use                                                               
Taking the total differential of the ecological equilibrium dX in (1) 
and (2) yields  
0dt/dYdt/ ==
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h
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)w/(Y)w(f
dw
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The determinant 
 is 
positive from the condition of ecological stability. Figure 1 shows that a given positive 
harvesting effort shifts the Y-isocline down for a fixed positive wildlife density in the 
protected area. Consequently, 
[ ][ ] )w(wz)w/(E)w(fzw)Y(r)w(z)X(rD h −−−−−−−−−−= 11121121 2
[ ]112111
0
<−−−−−−−== )w/(E)w(fzw)Y(r/))w/(Y)w(f(dE/dY hdXh
[ ] 011121 <−−−−−= )w(D/Y)w(f)w(z)X(rdE/dY h
0 , 
meaning that the denominator is negative. The system settles in a new ecological 
equilibrium with reduced densities. It follows from (A1) that 
. The differential of (11) 
together with (A1) gives the comparative static results in the case of a non-binding 
constraint on land use as 
 
(A2)  
dw
)w(f/Y)w('f)w(z)XY(z
dE
dX
)w/(Y)w(fzw
)w(z)X(r
h


 −−−−−=
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
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
−−−
−−−
ρ
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 69 
 where the determinant of the system s 
positive.  
[ ] )w/(Y)w(f)w(z)X(r −−−−−− 11121  i
The sign of  [ ] )w(f/Y)w('f)w/(E)w(fzw)Y(r h −−−−−−−−= 111121 αρ
[ )w/(YE)w/()w(f)w('f)XY(z h −−−−−−−+ 1111
wdXdS +=
]
]
]
 is unclear. The corresponding 
change in the aggregate stock density equals  
where dY is given from the differentiation of (11) and dX is given from (A2).  
dw)XY(dY)w1( −−−
 
The input proportion in agricultural production is found by inserting (11) in (8) (or (9)) 
and equals ( . Differentiation of this with respect 
to L, , and w gives 
[ ))(w(fP/cPL/)E hAh αα −−=− 111
hE
 
(A3) [ ] [ dw)w(f/)w('LfdE)E/(LdL hh −−−−−= 111  
 
Taking the differentiation of (7) with respect to w, and taking into account the effect 
working through Y, gives the effect on local welfare of expanding the protected area. 
 
(A4)  [ ] dw/cLdYPY)w('fdw/dY)w(fEPw/ Ahh −−−−=∂∂ 11π
 
Here, the term  reflects that the income from hunting increases due to 
increased stock density, while  reflects reduced income from hunting due to 
the foregone return from the pre-hunting ground. It is easy to show that the net effect on 
the income of the local people is negative. Inserting for 
 from the differentiation of (11) with respect to w 
gives . 
dw/dY)w(f −1
'f
11 −− )w(f/Y)w
1−−= EPY)w('f h
Y)w( −1
0>
1 +− )(h α
= ('fdw/dY α
dw/dπ [ ] 01 <− )w(f/cLPAα
 
2. Binding constraint on land use 
Recall that , where dX  and are given from 
(A1). 
dw)XY(dY)w1(wdXdS −−−+= dY
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With a binding constraint on land use, the comparative static results are derived from 
differentiation of this and (12) with respect to w  
 
(A5)  dw
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The sign of 
 is negative so that the determinant is positive. The sign of 
 is positive, while the signs of  
 and 
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are unclear.  
D/
 
Again, differentiation of (7) with respect to w, and taking into account the effect 
working through Y, gives the effect on local welfare of expanding the protected area.  
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Here,  is determined in (A1) when accounting for the effect working through 
the hunting effort in (12). 
dw/dY
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Chapter 3 
 
Property rights and natural resource conservation. A bio-economic model with 
numerical illustrations from the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem 
 
Anne Borge Johannesen and Anders Skonhoft 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
Department of Economics 
NO-7491 Trondheim, Norway 
(E-mail: anne.borge@svt.ntnu.no, anders.skonhoft@svt.ntnu.no) 
 
Abstract 
This study develops a model for wildlife species migrating seasonally between a 
conservation area and a neighbouring area. When being outside the conservation area, 
harvesting takes place by a group of peasants. The local people have two motives for 
harvesting; to get rid of ‘problem’ animals as roaming wildlife destroys crops and 
agricultural products, and hunting for meat and trophies. Depending on the specification 
of the property rights, the harvesting is legal or illegal. It is demonstrated that it is far 
from clear which of the two property rights regimes that gives the highest wildlife 
abundance. Hence, contrary to what is argued for in the literature, handing the property 
rights over to the local people means not automatically more wildlife and a more 
‘sustainable’ resource utilization. The reason lies in the nuisance motive for harvesting. 
The exploitation under the two different property rights regimes are illustrated by 
numerical calculations with data that fits reasonable well with the exploitation of the 
wildebeest population in the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem. 
 
 
We would like to thank Jan Tore Solstad for valuable comments and for funding from 
Norwegian Research Foundation, and The European Commission, through the 
programme BIOECON. 
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1. Introduction 
For a long time it has been recognised that institutions play an important role in natural 
resource management, and that the specification and function of property rights to a 
large extent determine whether resources can be utilized in a sustainable way. These 
dimensions will be at the focus in the present study when analysing the management 
and exploitation of wildlife in a sub-Saharan Africa context with example from the 
Serengeti-Mara ecosystem. When considering natural resources in the form of wildlife 
in this region, as in other regions in the sub-Saharan Africa, central issues are the 
behaviour of the rural people living close to the wildlife, and the interaction between the 
rural people, the wildlife and the agency managing and having the legal property rights 
of the wildlife. Often this interaction represents conflicting interests; both the legal 
owner of the wildlife (usually the State, or large private landowners) and the rural 
people claim their rights to reap the benefits of the huge amount of wildlife resources. 
In addition, the costs of having abundant wildlife populations differ between them. 
These conflicts, rooted in the prevailing property structure and its functioning, have 
serious implications for the resource exploitation and, thus, on the management of the 
wildlife in general (Marks 1984, Kiss 1990, Swanson and Barbier 1992, Naughton-
Treves and Sanderson 1995, Sinclair and Arcese 1995, Skonhoft and Solstad 1998, 
Bulte and van Kooten 1999). 
 
The common perception in the literature is that local communities will support wildlife 
conservation and reduce the wildlife offtake if they are ensured a sufficient share of the 
benefits from wildlife (see Kiss 1990, Swanson and Barbier 1992, Mangel et al. 1996). 
Under what conditions a community based management system results in a higher 
wildlife abundance and more conservation than the polar scheme where the local people 
have no legal rights to wildlife exploitation, is analysed in the present paper. The 
starting point is that we have a protected area, a national park or a conservation area of 
fixed size, with no harvesting of the wildlife. The protected area is the basic living area 
of the species, but they roam freely in and out of the park. When being outside, the 
game destroys the crops of the peasants living in the vicinity of the park and hence, the 
wildlife represents a nuisance for the local people. The park agency has the property 
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rights of the wildlife within as well as outside the protected area, but illegal harvesting 
takes place outside as the property rights is not effectively protected here. This is the 
first regime where the local people have no property rights1. In the next step, the 
property rights are handed over to the local people and hence, the exploitation of the 
wildlife outside the protected area takes place in a legal manner2. The different degree 
of wildlife utilization is compared under these two regimes, and contrary to what is 
argued for in the literature the first property rights scheme may result in the highest 
wildlife abundance. Analysing the driving forces behind such an outcome is the main 
contribution of this paper.  
 
The hunting activity and the utilization of the wildlife under these two regimes are 
exemplified by the migration of wild herbivores in the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem. The 
migration pattern here, which is seasonal and related to rainfall and food supply, is also 
used as a motivation for the ecological part of the model. Parts of the year the wildlife is 
staying within the huge Serengeti national park and it is assumed that no human 
extraction takes place here3. However, when being outside there is hunting. The 
conceptual framework for analysing the exploitation of terrestrial species when there is 
migration, and hunting is a seasonal activity, is another contribution of the paper. 
 
                                                 
1 Economists frequently confuse what is meant with property rights. Daniel Bromley understands property as a 
benefit stream and a property right as ‘the capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one's claim to a 
benefit stream’ (Bromley 1991, p.15). Possession of inviolable property rights presupposes that the rights are 
authorised by law and that the law is effectively enforced by the state. Hence, a well-functioning property 
regime is characterised by, firstly, legally welldefined property rights and, secondly, effectively protected 
property rights. The existence or non-existence of these two factors defining the functioning of the property 
structure can be used to classify three different types of regimes. First of all we have the case where there is 
legally well-defined ownership and perfect state protection (exclusive rights, perfect law enforcement). This is 
in accordance with the classical Clark (1973) model. Secondly, we have the case where the ownership is legally 
well defined but not adequately enforced by the government. Under such a scheme, often due to lack of societal 
recognition of the property rights in place, the management is likely to be affected by conflicting property 
rights claims. Finally, we have the case where there is no legally defined ownership; that is, the open-access 
case regime (Gordon 1954). Hence, the second of these regimes is the starting point in the following analysis.  
2 These schemes are polar because the local people obviously can obtain other rights than full property rights of 
the wildlife when being outside the park, say, through a specific harvesting quota, the rights to harvest problem 
animals, and so forth (cf. the concluding section).  
3 In reality, poaching takes place within as well as outside the borders of Serengeti National Park (see Sinclair 
and Arcese 1995). However, to simplify the theoretical framework, without altering the qualitative results, we 
assume that hunting is only taking place in the outer area.  
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To simplify the following analysis we consider only two areas; the protected area and 
the whole boundary region collapsed into one boundary area. The protected area is the 
basic living area of the wildlife and is owned and managed by the State. No human 
extraction is allowed here, and hence, non-consumptive benefit (tourism, existence 
value, etc.) is the only benefit of this area. However, the park manager play no role in 
the subsequent model as the management of this area is supposed to have no stock 
effects (no harvesting, no culling)4. The peasants are living in the boundary area, where 
the wildlife roams during the migration season. They are involved in two production 
activities; agricultural crop production and wildlife hunting (see, e.g., Barrett and 
Arcese 1998). First, we study today’s situation where the local people have no property 
rights, and hence, they hunt illegal. This is in accordance with the ‘open-access’ model 
of Smith (1975). Under this scenario we disregard any enforcement use and 
consequently, the park manager is passively benefiting from non-consumptive 
utilization of wildlife in the protected area. Because of small funds and large areas, this 
represents a good approximation to the present reality (see also footnote 1). In a next 
step, we study what happens when the property rights over the wildlife are given to the 
local people. 
 
We start by formulating the ecological model and the migration pattern in section 2. In 
section 3 the benefit function of the local people is presented, and in section 4 it is 
studied how this translates into harvesting when they have no property rights. In this 
section, as later, it will for simplicity be assumed that only the current benefit, or current 
utility, is steering the harvesting activity. In section 5 the model is analysed when the 
local people have the property rights over the wildlife. In section 6 the two different 
property rights regimes are illustrated by numerical calculations with data that fits 
reasonable well to the exploitation of the wildebeest population in the Serengeti-Mara 
ecosystem.  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 For a critical review of this assumption, see, e.g., Wright (1999). 
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2. The ecology 
As already noted, we consider species migrating over the year in a well defined way, 
and where harvesting only takes place when the species are outside their core area, i.e., 
the conservation area or the national park. Because the seasonal migration is related to 
rainfall and food supply, there is no density-dependent factors influencing the species 
flow. For simplicity it is assumed that the whole wildlife population is leaving the core 
area, and we separate sharply between the periods of the year when the wildlife is 
roaming outside and when the species are staying inside of the protected area. These 
two periods are synonymous with the ‘fishery season’ and ‘between season’ in Homans 
and Wilen (1997)5. We start by formulating the hunting season dynamics while the 
between season dynamics and the steady state follow next. 
 
Migration and harvesting 
As in Homans and Wilen (1997) (see also Getz and Haight 1989), we suppose that the 
hunting effort of the local people is utilized at a constant rate throughout the period 
when hunting takes place, i.e., when the wildlife is roaming outside the conservation 
area. The wildlife harvesting function is specified as a Schaefer function giving the 
harvest at time t as  
 
(1) ,  )t(qaX)t(h =
 
where X(t) is the wildlife stock (measured as biomass), while a is the fixed harvesting 
effort. q is a parameter, the so-called catchability coefficient. 
  
When being within the conservation area the wildlife grows in a density-dependent 
fashion (see below), and when being outside natural mortality is ignored6. Outside the 
conservation area the stock therefore shrinks according to . The 
stock level outside the conservation area at time t is accordingly 
)t(qaXdt/)t(dX −=
                                                 
5 There are few, if any, papers analysing time discrete models with migration for terrestrial animal species 
within a bio-economic concept. Fancy et al. (1994) formulate a time discrete migration model for the porcupine 
caribou herd. The migration here is also seasonal, but this paper has no economic content.  
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 (2)   qat0eX)t(X
−=
 
where  is the stock level when the species starts roaming outside the protected area.  0X
 
The length of the migration period, i.e., the time when being outside the conservation 
area, is fixed as T. Hence, the stock level when the wildlife is returning back to the park 
is 
 
(3)   sXeXX 0
qaT
0T == −
 
where is the survival rate of the species when being outside the 
conservation area. Under these assumptions, total amount of wildlife harvested is 
1es0 qaT ≤=< −
 
(4) .  )s1(XXXH 0T0 −=−=
 
Natural growth and ecological equilibrium 
So far we have studied a single period migration, where the stock size  at the 
beginning of the period of migration is predetermined. However, as the number of 
animals harvested depends on the initial stock, the harvest changes when  changes. 
The factors affecting the initial stock size are found by analysing the dynamics between 
the seasons of migration. We assume that the conservation area is the basic living area 
where calving takes place, meaning that the stock size returning back determines the 
natural growth. When  is the stock returning back to the conservation area at time t, 
the density-dependent growth is accordingly determined as . We represent 
natural growth by a logistic function with K as the carrying capacity and r as the 
maximum specific growth rate. Hence, if  is the stock level at the beginning of the 
next period of migration, the dynamics between the migration seasons is given by  
0X
0X
t,TX
)X(F t,T
1t,0X +
                                                                                                                                               
6 Introducing natural mortality makes the model quite more complicated, but it will not change the qualitative 
 78 
 (5) . )K/X1(rXX)X(FXX t,Tt,Tt,Tt,Tt,T1t,0 −+=+=+
 
Equation (5) together with the balance equation (4) written as , 
yields . Ecological equilibrium is defined by a constant 
wildlife stock returning back to the park area, 
1t,T1t,01t XXH +++ −=
TX
)X(FXXH t,Tt,T1t,T1t +=+ ++
)s1(X)K/sX1 00 −=−
0
1t,Tt,T XX == +
H)X(F T =
7. In steady-state, 
natural growth, taking place within the conservation area, is therefore equal to 
harvesting, taking place in the surrounding area, . When substituting for 
the logistic growth function and equation (3) and using (4), we obtain 
. Consequently, the ecological equilibrium is given by 
 and 
(srX 0
X 0 =
 
(6)  )s/1r1)(rs/K(X 0 −+=
 
with . From this equation it follows that the equilibrium stock returning 
back to the conservation area is equal to . Because more 
harvesting effort reduces the survival rate s, more effort also clearly reduces the stock 
size, . From the equilibrium condition , we also have 
as long as − . When evaluating at the equilibrium, or 
differentiating equation (6) directly, this condition also writes [ ] . In 
what follows, this is assumed to hold.  
(1 1/ ) 0r s+ − >
0a/X T <∂∂
0a/ <∂
)s/1r1)(r/K(X T −+=
)X(FXX TT0 +=
'F
s/2 −
X 0∂ 'F1 <
0)r1( >+
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
content of the analysis. 
7 Combining equation (5) and equation (3) written as yields sXX 1t,1t,T +=+ =[ ] )X(G)X(FXsX t,Tt,Tt,T1t,T =+=+
1'G1 <<−
. It is well known (see, e.g., Clark 1990, Ch.7) that the condition for 
stability is that  holds at the equilibrium. We have [ ])K/rX2r( t,T−1s)'F1(s'G +=+=
TX
 which 
at the equilibrium reads  when inserting for  (see the main text). Hence, stability demands 
 and . The first of these conditions is therefore the same as the condition 
[ )r1(s/2s +−
0)r1(s/1 <+− 0)r1(s/3 >+−
]
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3. Agricultural production, crop damage, and harvesting 
Above we established the ecological steady-state for a fixed amount of hunting effort. 
However, the hunting activity is determined by economic considerations and now these 
motives are outlined. Throughout we will think of the local people as a homogeneous 
group of peasants living in the boundary area of the park8. They are involved in two 
different production activities; agricultural production and wildlife hunting. In the 
model, as in reality, there are two basic motives behind hunting. In addition to the 
already mentioned nuisance motive where hunting takes place to get rid of ‘problem’ 
animals destroying crops and agricultural products, there is also hunting for meat or, 
occasionally, for trophies (Marks 1984, Barrett and Arcese 1998). As noted, because of 
small funds and large areas, the harvesting, when being illegal, takes place in an 
environment lacking any enforcement use. 
 
We first look at the nuisance motive working through the agricultural yield function. 
The maximum agricultural yield, i.e., the yield without damage, depends on the amount 
of agricultural land, pesticides and fertiliser use, rainfall, etc., and effort use. Keeping 
all factors fixed except of effort, the yield function reads  
 
(7)   ( )A A N=
 
here N is the total (cumulative) labour input in agricultural production over the year 
(seeding, harvesting and maintaining the crop). A is an increasing function of N with 
, but at a decreasing rate, so that  and  hold.  0)0(A = 0)N('A > 0)N(''A ≤
 
More wildlife means more nuisance, and following Zivin et al. (2000) we assume that 
the damage is proportional to the amount of wildlife. Wildlife consumes a fraction β of 
its body weight in forage dry matter per day, and a fraction γ of this is eaten from crops. 
                                                                                                                                               
0a/X 0 <∂for obtaining an interior steady-state, while the second condition is fulfilled if ∂  holds (see the 
main text).  
8 It is therefore assumed that there are no conflicting interests among them. Hence, prevalence of individual 
conformity to group norms is assumed to be present. In line with traditional reasoning, it is assumed that the 
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The nuisance stream at time t is therefore γβ  with 0  and 0  as fixed 
constants
)t(X 1β< < 1γ≤ ≤
9. Consequently, the cumulative damage of the wildlife roaming outside the 
conservation area is  
 
(8)    qa/)s1(XD 0 −= γβ
 
 when using equation (2) and integrating. If  is the crop price, assumed to be fixed, 
and leaving out fertiliser and pesticides costs, etc., the net crop benefit is 
AP
 
(9) , [ ]D)N(APB A −=
 
with D defined in the interval [  as the damage can never exceed the yield. The 
nuisance motive for harvesting is therefore working through D. More harvesting 
reduces the damage for a given stock size as the total amount of harvested animals 
increases.  
]
                                                                                                                                              
)N(A,0
 
In addition to the nuisance motive, we have the direct benefit of hunting in the form of 
meat (and trophies). The hunting benefit is given as  
 
(10)  )s1(XPHPV 0HH −==
    
where  is the marginal valuation, or price, of the offtake, also assumed to be fixed.  HP
 
There will be a constraint on effort used in hunting and crop growing. As a is hunting 
effort per unit of time and T is the length of the migration and hunting season, this 
resource constraint reads 
 
elders are in charge of the group’s activities (Marks 1984). This obviously means that the scenario of property 
rights to the local people in section 5 is implemented in its most optimistically way (cf. the concluding section).  
9 We assume that hunting is the only damage control performed by the local people (see below). In addition, 
and in reality, damage control is also performed through fencing and other measures more directly related to 
protecting the crop. In the model this would have worked through γ. As we are neglecting such measures, γ is 
assumed to be constant. 
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 (11) . NaTL +≥
 
L is the total available time per year, which also can be interpreted as the total human 
population living in the vicinity of the conservation area. Throughout the analysis L is 
fixed, meaning that we are ignoring any, if possible, Malthusian mechanism. Moreover, 
all the time the constraint is assumed to be binding, and hence, there is always a positive 
opportunity cost of labour use. 
 
When using the resource constraint, we obtain the total current benefit of the local 
people as 
 
(12) . 0 0(1 ) [ ( ) (1 ) / ]H AU P X s P A L aT X s qaγβ= − + − − −
 
In the next section, we determine the optimal harvesting effort and wildlife population 
when the local people have no property rights to the wildlife roaming in the outer area.  
In section 5, we study the polar case when they are given full property rights.   
 
4. No property rights of the local people 
Assuming that the local people have no property rights corresponds, as already 
mentioned, to the stylised facts situation in sub-Saharan Africa today. When having no 
property rights and obtaining no legal benefit from the wildlife, they have few, if any, 
incentives to base their harvesting on long-term considerations. Technically, this means 
that they do not take the stock of wildlife into account when deciding their effort use, 
and hence, the number of animals entering the boundary area is treated as an exogenous 
variable. As already mentioned, this corresponds to what Smith (1975) calls an ‘open-
access’ solution. See also Skonhoft and Solstad (1998). 
Maximizing the benefit function (12) with respect to the control a, when keeping  
exogenous, yields the first order condition 
0X
 
 (13)        qTsXPa/CXPT)N('AP 0H0AA =− γβ
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 when we have an interior solution so that effort is allocated to both production 
activities. C collects terms, and reads [ 0s)qaT1(1)qa/1(C >+−= ]
                                   
10. The optimal 
hunting effort is therefore determined by the equality between the marginal benefit in 
agricultural production, corrected for damage of the roaming wildlife, and the marginal 
hunting benefit.  
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The economic equilibrium condition (13) together with the ecological equilibrium 
condition (6) defines the equilibrium values of hunting effort a  and the initial stock 
size  (superscript ‘∞’ denotes no property rights of the local people). In a next step, 
the equilibrium wildlife population returning back to the park area at the end of the 
season  is found by using equation (3). When taking the total differential of these 
equations, the economic and ecological forces at work can be demonstrated (for details, 
see Appendix 1). The results are reported in Table 1. As already indicated, a higher 
nuisance effect reduces the marginal productivity of agricultural production and, hence, 
the local people increase their harvesting effort, ∂ . Consequently, the initial 
stock  decreases, and this will also be so for . A higher price of game meat will 
also motivate for more hunting effort, , and hence,  as well as  
decrease. A higher crop price causes the local people to divert more effort towards 
agriculture and the stock will increase, . This result is in line with the 
reasoning of Brown et al. (1993) and the analysis in Skonhoft and Solstad (1998), who 
find that better economic conditions in the agricultural sector always works in the 
direction of more wildlife conservation when the land use, as here, is fixed.  
∞
∞
0X
X
X
∞
T
∞
0
0/a >∂∞ γ
∞
TX
0PH >
0>∂ AP
/a ∂∂ ∞
0∂ ∞ /X
∞
TX
∞
0X
  
                      Table 1: Comparative static results 
  No property rights  Property rights  
Parameter ∞a  ∞0X  
*a  *X 0  
 + - + - 
AP  - + -/+ +/- 
HP  + - +/- -/+ 
T ? ? ? ? 
L + - + - 
q ? ? ? ? 
r + + ? ? 
K + + ? ? 
γ
                          Note: When ‘+/-‘; a reduction in (-) is accompanied by a higher*a *X 0
* (+),  
                          and vice versa. When  ‘?’; ambiguous sign.  
 
The effect of a higher T is ambiguous. First, a longer migration period reduces the 
productivity of hunting as an instrument of damage control. This causes the local people 
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to channel more effort towards agricultural production. Second, the marginal product of 
hunting for meat increases with the period of migration, leading the local people to 
increase their hunting effort. Consequently, if the costs of living with wildlife exceed 
the benefit, then more effort is directed to agriculture. However, the effect on total 
hunting effort (aT) and wildlife conservation is unclear. For other results, see Table 1.  
 
5. Property rights to the local people 
Above the harvesting activity and stock sizes were found when the local people had no 
property rights and hence, the harvesting activity was not based on long-term 
considerations. Now we proceed to study what happens in the polar case when the 
property rights are handed over to the local people and they do no longer harvest 
illegally. Giving the property rights to the local people means that they are investing in 
wildlife and hence, take the wildlife abundance into account when allocating effort 
among the two production activities. Technically, the problem now is therefore to 
maximize (12) with respect to a, subject to the ecological constraint (6)11.  
 
The first order condition for this problem is  
 
(14)             
[ ] [ ] qTsXPqars/)r1(s/2K)s1(qTqaPP
a/CXPT)N('AP
0HHA
0AA
=+−−−−
−
γβ
γβ
 
when still assuming an interior solution. This equation together with equation (6) 
determines the equilibrium effort a and equilibrium stock size , while  again 
follows from equation (3) (superscript ‘*’ denotes the property rights case). The 
difference compared to the economic equilibrium condition (13) in the case of no local 
property rights, is the third term on the left hand side. [  is here positive 
because  holds (see section 2). The new term, depending on the sign of 
* *
0X
)r+
*
TX
]1(s/2 −
0a/X 0 <∂∂
                                                 
11 A shadow price is therefore now imposed on the wildlife. It can easily be shown that it is positive only as 
long as [PAγβ − PHqa] >0 holds; that is, the non-nuisance case (see the main text below). Accordingly, the 
shadow price is zero in the no property rights case. 
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[ qaPP HA −γβ
a
∞< 0*0 XX
γ∂∂ /a*
], can therefore be either positive or negative, and hence,  can be below 
as well as above that of . Consequently,  can also be above or below that of .  
*a
∞a
PA
*
0X
∞
0X
∞> a
 
The general conclusion following the model is therefore that it is unclear whether 
handing the property rights over to the local people will result in a higher wildlife 
abundance and a more ‘sustainable’ resource utilization. On the one hand, having the 
property rights and taking the size of the wildlife into account when determining 
hunting effort, work in the direction of a higher stock size. However, at the same time, 
crop damage related to the size of the wildlife will also be taken into account, and this 
works in the other direction. The actual outcome depends critically on whether the 
marginal nuisance of the wildlife stock dominates the marginal harvesting benefit; that 
is, the sign of the term  above. If  holds we therefore obtain 
the standard result from the literature saying that the presence of property rights means 
less harvesting effort and more wildlife conservation compared to the no property rights 
case; that is, and . On the other hand, when the marginal nuisance 
dominates the marginal harvesting productivity, the nuisance case, we obtain . 
Hence, taking the nuisance into account yields less wildlife than not doing so, 
. 
[ ]qaPH−γβ
∞> 0*0 XX
γβAH PqaP >
∞< a*
a*
 
The comparative static results are now found by taking the total differential of equations 
(14) and (6) (for details, see again Appendix 1).  More nuisance increases the 
agricultural damage and, hence, reduces the marginal benefit from crop production. 
This direct effect is the same as in the no property rights case, and increases the 
equilibrium hunting effort. In addition there is now an indirect effect working through 
the stock size at the beginning of the next hunting season, which reinforces the direct 
effect.  is therefore stronger when it is local property rights.  The direct effect 
of a higher game meat price is more benefit from hunting. As for the no property rights 
regime, this motivates for increased hunting and stock depletion, which is the same 
result as in the standard harvesting model (see, e.g., Clark 1973). Now, however, this 
effect is weakened because a higher offtake reduces the crop damage and hence, 
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motivates for more effort allocated to crop production because the crop damage is taken 
into account. Thus, the indirect effect is of the opposite and the sign of  is 
ambiguous. In the same way, the effect of a higher agricultural price is ambiguous. 
These results contrast the no property case, but are in line with results from harvesting 
models with competing uses among different assets (see, e.g., Swallow 1990). Other 
results are again given in Table 1, and as seen, the outcomes are to a large extent 
ambiguous.  
H
* P/a ∂∂
 
6. Numerical illustrations  
The theoretical reasoning will now be illustrated by data that fits reasonable well with 
the exploitation of the wildebeest population in the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem. This 
ecosystem covers an area of some 25,000 km2 on the border of Tanzania and Kenya 
(Sinclair 1995). The Serengeti National Park is a part of it, and is wide known for the 
migration of its large herbivore populations of which the wildebeest has been most in 
the focus. Each year about a million wildebeest migrate across the Serengeti-Mara 
ecosystem (Murray 1995). The overall migratory pattern is supposed to be related to 
food supply, which in turn is connected to rainfall. The Serengeti ecosystem can be 
divided into two main regions; the southern short grasslands with low annual rainfall 
and the wooded northern grassland with higher rainfall (Fryxell 1995). The migratory 
wildebeest use the short grasslands in the south during the wet season and the tall 
grassland in the north during the dry season (Sinclair 1984 and 1995, Fryxell 1995).  
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Figure 2: The seasonal ranges occupied by migratory wildebeest in the Serengeti-
Mara         ecosystem (adopted from Murray 1995). 
 
The migratory herds know no boundaries, and make extensive use not only of the 
gazetted land, but also the open areas in the districts outside the borders of Serengeti 
National Park (cf. Figure 2). During the migration they spread beyond the park into the 
western frontier and enter land settled by humans. This side of Serengeti National Park 
is densely populated, and the population is increasing (Barrett and Arcese 1998). As a 
consequence, there are threats to the species diversity and the ecosystem because the 
landscape is modificated and habitat land is converted into agricultural use (Sinclair and 
Arcese 1995). The detrimental effects of the human-wildlife interaction are, however, 
not only one-way. The local people and the local communities also bear costs from the 
high wildlife abundance as the large herds of migrating herbivores induce crop damage 
(Emerton and Mfunda 1999). Villagers protect their crops and compensate themselves 
by hunting; in addition they also hunt for meat (Arcese et al. 1995). Hunting in this 
region is basically illegal12. Therefore, living with wildlife is twofold; it represents a 
                                                 
12 Harvesting is not strictly illegal in parts of the western side of the Serengeti National Park, and persons 
having a car and firearms can obtain a hunting licence (Rugumayo 1999). 
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cost to the local peasants due to crop damage while it represents a benefit due to illegal 
harvesting. 
 
The ecological model, using the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem as an illustration, is 
specified for the numerical analysis at the scale of one km2 and one year. The same 
scale is also used for the agricultural benefit as well as the hunting benefit. The closer 
definition of the protected area and the outer area is found in Appendix 2. The baseline 
values for prices and costs together with ecological data and data for crop production 
used in the simulations are also presented here. As demonstrated above, the 
conservation effect of giving the local people property rights depends critically on the 
costs and benefits of living with wildlife. Because of the unclear nuisance effects, the 
damage coefficient γ will be varied throughout the simulations where a low value of γ , 
as mentioned, may be interpreted as more extensive use of fencing or other measures 
taken to protect crop production from the roaming wildlife. In addition, because of the 
unclear price effect under the property rights scenario, we will also vary the crop price 
. The conservation effect of shifting the hunting price  together with changing 
ecological and productivity conditions will be studied as well.  
AP HP
 
Figure 3 demonstrates how the wildlife abundance varies with the crop damage 
coefficient γ under both property right schemes. More nuisance means less wildlife, and 
hence, the conservation-damage schedule slopes down under both scenarios. However, 
in accordance with the theoretical reasoning, the nuisance effect is quite more 
substantial under the local property rights regime. The figure also demonstrates that 
handing the property rights over to the local people gives more wildlife only when the 
crop damage is quite low. Hence, only when γ < 0.01 and less than 1% of the forage is 
eaten from the crop, local property rights results in higher wildlife abundance. Within 
this range the marginal benefit of living with wildlife exceeds the marginal cost, i.e., the 
term [  from section five is negative. The figure also demonstrates that the 
nuisance effect is so strong that the presence of local property rights means a total 
depletion of the wildlife when more than 9 % of the forage is eaten from the crop. 
Hence, according to the model and the imposed parameter values where the baseline 
]aA HP P qγβ −
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value of the damage coefficient is 12 %, γ  = 0.12 (see Appendix 2), the presence of 
local property rights would have meant an extinction of the wildlife. 
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conservation is met for a higher value of the damage coefficient. We have also studied 
the effects of shifting the migration period T, interpreted as taken place as a result of, 
say, drought. The conservation-damage schedules, however, are only modestly 
influenced. 
 
7. Discussion and concluding remarks 
There is a growing recognition that a viable and sustainable wildlife utilization in the 
future depends on the support of the local communities living close to the wildlife, and 
during the last years community based wildlife management projects have increasingly 
become one of the means for safeguarding wildlife in sub-Saharan Africa (Kiss, 1990, 
Swanson and Barbier 1992). The basic idea behind these schemes is to engender the co-
operation of local communities in wildlife conservation and wildlife management by 
ensuring that parts of the benefits from wildlife utilization go to the local communities. 
There are several ways in which benefit sharing can take place; through revenue sharing 
from tourism, safari hunting, or establishing user rights through hunting quotas (see 
Skonhoft 1998 for an analysis), or through local job creation in tourism, wildlife and 
park services. The experiences from two prototypes of community based projects are 
summarised by Kiss (1990), namely Windfall and Campfire (both in Zimbabwe). 
 
What has been analysed in this paper is a more far-reaching community based 
management system as the local people have been given the full property rights of the 
wildlife; that is, they control and obtain the whole benefit stream from the wildlife when 
it is outside the protected area. This management scheme has been compared to the 
polar one of having no property rights. Under the scenario of no property rights, the 
local people have no incentive to take into account that their hunting today influences 
the wildlife stock and hence, reduces the potential for hunting next year. Technically, 
the stock size is then treated as an exogenous variable when allocating hunting effort, 
and is in line with the ‘open-access’ solution of Smith (1975). In the next step, when 
assuming that the property rights are handed over to the local people, they have 
incentives to invest in the wildlife stock, and take the stock size into account when 
hunting. Smith (1975) specifies this scenario within an inter-temporal framework where 
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the present-value benefit is maximized. The present exposition where the local people 
consider the wildlife stock as an endogenous variable under ecological equilibrium 
coincides with the steady-state of the Smith model when the discount rate is zero (see 
also Munro and Scott 1985). Throughout the analysis it is assumed that the local people 
is a homogenous group with no internal conflicting interests. That is, the property rights 
scenario is implemented in its most optimistically way. 
 
The main point of the analysis is to find under what conditions community based 
management and property rights of the local people might result in a higher wildlife 
abundance compared to the no property rights scenario. It is shown that the actual 
outcome depends critically on the difference between the benefit and cost of living with 
wildlife; that is, the marginal harvesting value versus the marginal crop damage. 
Accordingly, only when the nuisance from the roaming wildlife is small and the 
marginal benefit exceeds the cost, we find that community based management increases 
the wildlife stock compared to the scenario of no property rights. The main message 
from the theoretical analysis is therefore that relying on local property rights alone as a 
tool in wildlife conservation may not work. This conclusion contrasts Kiss (1990) and 
Swanson and Barbier (1992) who argue that local property rights generally will promote 
wildlife conservation.  
 
The theoretical model is illustrated by data that represents the Serengeti-Mara 
ecosystem in a stylised manner. For the baseline parameter values the nuisance from the 
wildlife dominates the benefit, and hence, local property rights may give incentives to 
deplete the roaming stock of wildebeest. A better conservation strategy than handling 
the property rights over to the local people is probably to protect crop production by 
supporting fencing or take other types of control measures to reduce the damage caused 
by the roaming wildlife. The numerical simulations also demonstrate that an increased 
crop price or higher crop productivity through, say, improved fertiliser and pesticides 
use, may lead the local people to channel more effort towards agricultural production. 
Hence, such measures will also work in the direction of more wildlife conservation. 
This conclusion is in line with Barrett and Arcese (1998) who find that to succeed 
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promoting wildebeest conservation in Serengeti, wildlife management schemes must 
attempt to increase local people’s benefit from alternative activities.  
 
The focus of the present analysis has been property rights and wildlife conservation. 
The basic idea behind giving the local people full property rights over the wildlife is, 
however, to promote wildlife conservation together with economic development and 
increased welfare (see, e.g., Kiss 1990). Ceteris paribus, the presence of property rights 
increases the welfare of the local people compared to the scenario of no property rights 
as both effort and wildlife abundance are adjusted optimally within this regime, while 
only effort is adjusted within the no property rights regime.  When the damage of the 
roaming wildlife is small so that the benefit of living with wildlife exceeds the cost, we 
can therefore conclude that the presence of local property rights promotes wildlife 
conservation as well as local welfare. On the contrary, according to our numerical 
results, local welfare is promoted at the expense of wildlife conservation when the cost 
of living with wildlife exceeds the benefit. 
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Appendix 1 
Comparative static results 
The comparative static of the no property rights scenario of the local people is found by 
taking the total differential of (6) and (13). The result is   
 
(A1)  
[ ]
[ ]
dT
G
rs/s/rqaK
dP
a/CXT)N('A
dP
TsqX
d
a/CXPda
dX
Qa/CPqTsP
rs/KqTs/r
AH
AAH


 −++


−+


−+



−=




+
−+−
2100
0211
00
0
0
γβ
γβγβ
 
where  from the second order 
maximum conditions while the sign of 
 is ambiguous. The 
determinant of the system  is also negative 
due to the second order conditions.  
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The comparative static results when having property rights are found when taking the 
total differentiation of (14) and (6). Equations (A2)-(A4) give the stock effects where Z 
> 0 from the second order maximum condition.  
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Appendix 2  
The numerical analysis 
As mentioned in the main text, the ecological model is specified for the numerical 
analysis at the scale of one km2 and one year. The same scale is also used for the 
agricultural benefit, as well as the hunting benefit, given in 1998/99 prices. The 
protected area, consisting of Serengeti National Park and its surrounding game reserves, 
covers an area of some 26 000 km2 (TANAPA Planning Unit 1996). The outer area is 
considered the catchment area surrounding the western edge of the protected area. 
Following Campbell and Hofer (1995), we assume that the catchment area, where the 
local people are originated, is located with a maximum distance of 45 km to the 
protected area. This area constitutes some 30 500 km2 (Campbell and Hofer 1995). The 
human population in the outer area is estimated to be about 1.1 million with an average 
household size of about 7 persons (Campbell and Hofer 1995). Accordingly, there will 
be about 5 households per km2 in the outer area. On average, 2 persons per household 
work in agricultural production and hunting. Hence, the effort constraint L yields 
10•365 days a year, and we have . aTN +=3650
 
 The wildebeest migration is related to rainfall and the wildebeest population enters 
agricultural land while it grazes the northern grassland during the dry season. The 
length of the dry season is about four months (Barrett and Arcese 1998). Four months, 
or 122 days, is also assumed to be the length of the migration period, and hence, T =122 
days. The wildebeest population is estimated to be about 1.3 million animals and the 
annual offtake to some 120 000 animals (Campbell and Hofer 1995). The wildlife 
density during the period of migration is therefore about 43 animals per km2, while the 
total offtake is 4 animals per km2. The number of hunters per household in the western 
Serengeti is assumed to be about 0.2 (Campbell and Hofer 1995). Consequently, it is 
one person involved in hunting at full time basis for every 5 households, and the 
baseline value of a is accordingly 1. By imposing these values for a and T into the 
survival rate together with as 4/43, the catchability coefficient is calculated from 
equation (4). The result is q = 0.0008. Following Barrett and Arcese (1998), the hunting 
value of a wildebeest is about US$16, . The natural growth function is specified 
0X/H
16=HP
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as logistic. To calibrate the wildlife stock to its base level the carrying capacity K is set 
to 59 animals per km2 outer area, meaning that the ecosystem can carry a stock of 
wildebeest just below 1.8 million animals. The maximum specific growth rate is fixed 
as r = 0.3 (Caughley and Sinclar 1994).  
 
The yield function is specified as  with µ as a productivity parameter and 
α as a scale parameter. The scale parameter is given as 0.8 (Barrett and Arcese 1998). 
According to a questionnaire among 300 households in Serengeti and Bunda Districts in 
June-September 2001 (Anne Borge Johannesen, work in progress), the average plot size 
per household is 7.4 acres, corresponding to a cultivated area of a fraction of 0.15 per 
km
αµN)N(A =
2 for the average 5 households. For the same districts, the average value of the yield 
is estimated to be about US$19 000 per km2 cultivated land (Emerton and Mfunda 
1999). At our scale of one km2, this represents a value of 19.000•0.15 = US$2 850 (or 
US$570 per household). The main crops grown in the Western Serengeti are sorghum, 
cassava, maize, and cotton (SRCP 1998). Personal communication (SRCP 1999) 
indicates a per kg price of US$ 0.18 for sorghum, US$ 0.05 for cassava, US$ 0.11 for 
maize, and US$ 0.19 for cotton. By weighting the crop prices by the relative magnitude 
of these crops, we arrive at the price per kilo agricultural output equals US$ 0.15.  = 
0.15. Consequently, for the specified yield function we have Nα
AP
AP µ  =0.15•µ(3650 -
1•122)0.8 =2 850, balancing with µ = 28.  
 
The wildebeest has a daily consumption of about 3% of their body weight in dry forage 
(Murray 1995), hence, β  = 0.03. When assuming an average weight of 150 kg per 
animal, the daily consumption of dry forage is therefore 4.5 kg per animal. To obtain a 
value for the fraction of the forage eaten from the crops γ, we use the first order 
condition (13). For the above estimated parameter values together with the imposed 
values for a and , γ = 0.12 balances this equation. Hence, through this calibrating we 
find that 12% of the wildebeests daily consumption of dry forage is from crops. 
Plugging into equation (8) this corresponds to a yearly damage on crop production of 
about 14%. This is the average of the estimates found in Emerton and Mfunda (1999) 
0X
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and Anne Borge Johannesen (work in progress).  Table A1 summarises the baseline 
parameter values.  
 
 
 
Table A1: Baseline values prices and costs (1998/99-prices), ecological    
parameters and other parameters 
Parameter Description Value 
HP  Meat price  16 ($/animal) 
q Catchability coefficient  0.0008 (1/day) 
AP  Crop price  0.15 ($/kg) 
α
µ
β
γ
 Input elasticity labour crop production 0.8 
 Productivity crop production 28 (kg/day) 
 Fraction daily consumption of dry forage  0.03 
 Fraction dry forage consumption crop  0.12 
L Total available effort 3650 (day) 
T Length of migration period  122 (day) 
K Carrying capacity  59 (animal) 
r Intrinsic growth rate  0.3 
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Chapter 4 
 
Designing Integrated Conservation and Development Projects: 
Hunting incentives and human welfare with numerical illustrations from Serengeti 
 
 
 
Anne Borge Johannesen 
Department of Economics 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, NTNU 
NO-7491 Trondheim 
(E-mail: anne.borge@svt.ntnu.no) 
 
Abstract: 
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) attempt to link 
conservation of natural resources in protected areas to economic development in the 
surrounding communities. Such projects have been introduced in many parts of Africa, 
but their performance has so far been hampered by numerous difficulties. This paper 
develops a hunter-agrarian household model to explore the effect on wildlife 
conservation and human welfare of the most common instruments of existing ICDPs. It 
is demonstrated that stimulating working opportunities in the formal sector has the 
potential of promoting conservation and welfare, while money transfers and distribution 
of game from managed culling fail in conserving wildlife, if not explicitly linked to the 
conservation objective. In contrast, the analysis shows that such links, modelled as a 
risk of being excluded from the project components if caught in illegal hunting, may be 
a more durable mean for ICDPs to reach its goal of improved wildlife conservation and 
human welfare. The model is illustrated by numerical calculations with data from 
Serengeti. 
 
 
I would like to thank the Norwegian Research Foundation and The European 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) are widely launched as the 
solution to the problem of biodiversity loss in developing countries. In sub-Saharan 
Africa, ICDPs are frequently designed to encourage conservation by reconciling the 
management of protected areas with the social and economic needs of the local people 
(see Kiss 1990, Barbier 1992, Brandon and Wells 1992, Wells and Brandon 1992, 
Barrett and Arcese 1995, Barrett and Arcese 1998, Songorwa 1999). Through benefit 
sharing it is expected that ICDPs will discourage poaching and promote economic 
development (see Kiss 1990 and Barbier 1992). The understanding is therefore that such 
a management scheme can improve the livelihood of rural communities without 
contributing to environmental degradation. There are several ways in which ICDPs can 
generate benefits for the local people, e.g. through revenue transfers from tourism, local 
job creation in the formal sector, stimulating increased productivity in the agricultural 
sector, and so forth. Benefit sharing is also obtainable through direct utilization of 
wildlife, such as harvesting quotas for the local communities and controlled culling 
operations. By providing such benefits, the ICDPs aspire to stimulate the local people to 
reduce wildlife exploitation (Brandon and Wells 1992, Wells and Brandon 1992, 
Gibson and Marks 1995, Songorwa 1999). 
 
However, ICDPs have recently attracted attention because of the untested assumptions 
behind the projects. Brandon and Wells (1992) give a broad and instructive discussion 
of the design dilemmas of ICDPs and describe some of the trade-offs inherent in linking 
conservation and development. Experience shows that many existing projects lack a 
direct link between the hunting activity of the local people and the conservation 
objective. As pointed out by Kiss (1990) and Brandon and Wells (1992), without such a 
link it is difficult for the local people to realize that there is a purpose of improved 
conservation behind the benefits they receive. If worst comes to worst, they may regard 
the benefits as lump-sum transfers and carry on the exploitation activities as before. 
Both Kiss (1990) and Brandon and Wells (1992) stress the necessity of establishing 
such a connection.  
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The lack of a proper link in existing ICDPs is the point of departure for the present 
paper. The main purpose is to compare the performance of two different ICDP designs 
or regimes. The difference between the regimes is related to the implementation of one 
of the four ICDP tools of focus here. This tool is the benefit-sharing instrument which 
consists of distribution of game meat from controlled culling and income transfers from 
the tourism sector. In the first regime, an ICDP is implemented without an explicit link 
between the benefit transfers and the hunting activity of the local people. That is, there 
is no risk of being excluded from these benefits if caught in illegal hunting. This 
corresponds to Barrett and Arcese’s model (1998) (see below) and is in line with the 
design of most existing ICDPs today (see Brandon and Wells 1992). In the second 
regime, the project designer implements a link by creating a continuous risk of being 
excluded from the benefit transfers if caught in illegal hunting. Then, if caught, the local 
people receive no benefits from the ICDP. There are, of course, other ways in which 
ICDPs can link the benefit transfers with the conservation objective. For instance, 
ICDPs may offer comprehensive training and education to the local people in order to 
make them realize that the magnitude of future transfers depends on the wildlife 
abundance – and consequently on their hunting activity – as more wildlife generates 
more income in tourism and opens for more extensive game culling. The link modelled 
here, however, is more direct and easier to implement because the performance of the 
project does not require that the local people behave in a self-enforcing and less myopic 
way.  
 
Barrett and Arcese (1998) reveal possible unintended outcomes of benefit sharing for 
wildlife conservation. They present a bio-economic model with no explicit link between 
the conservation objective and the benefit-sharing instruments. The economic part of the 
model consists of a representative household for the rural population in western 
Serengeti in Tanzania which derives utility from consumption of game meat, 
agricultural output and leisure. It is also assumed that no market exists for game meat, 
meaning that the meat is used for household consumption. First, they demonstrate that 
money transfers from tourism may lead to a smaller degree of wildlife conservation. 
This is because the money transfers produce a positive income effect on game meat 
consumption. Second, they show that the conservation effect of game meat distribution 
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from controlled culling is negative. Because the market for game meat fails, increased 
endowment of meat leads the household to reduce the illegal hunting. However, game 
meat consumption is considered a normal good and, consequently, there is a less than 
one-for-one trade-off of distributed meat for illegal meat, meaning that the aggregate 
wildlife offtake increases1. Hence, the analysis of Barrett and Arcese (1998) gives 
reasons to question ICDPs that rely on money transfers and culling operations2. 
 
As already mentioned, the main focus of this paper is to analyse under what conditions, 
and for which design, ICDPs relying on benefit-sharing instruments can promote 
wildlife conservation and human welfare. Quite similar to Barrett and Arcese (1998), 
the analysis demonstrates that, in absence of a link between illegal hunting and the 
received transfers, as described above, benefit transfers will lead to a smaller degree of 
wildlife conservation. However, in contrast to Barrett and Arcese (1998), benefit 
sharing may promote wildlife conservation in presence of a link between the transfers 
and illegal hunting. It turns out that benefit transfers perform better if combined with 
more extensive use of guards and patrol units in the protected area. In this case, benefit 
sharing may also improve the economic conditions of the local community.  
 
In addition to the design of the benefit-sharing strategies, the present paper also looks at 
the role of working opportunities in the formal sector, improved productivity in 
agriculture and, as mentioned, anti-poaching law enforcement. The wage rate in the 
formal sector and the productivity in agriculture are considered independent of whether 
the local people are caught in illegal hunting. This assumption seems reasonable 
because ICDPs cannot fully control the conditions in these sectors. In the analysis of 
anti-poaching law enforcement the focus is on increased use of guards and patrols, in 
                                                 
1 This result follows automatically from the assumption that game meat is non-tradable, i.e. the consumption C 
equals the sum of illegal meat h and distributed meat M as . Partial derivation of this constraint with 
respect to M gives . Because game meat is a normal good, i.e. ∂ , it follows 
from this equality that . 
MhC +=
1+∂∂=∂∂ M/hM/C
1−>∂∂ M/h
0>∂M/C
2 When it comes to game meat distribution, the opposite result occurs in Skonhoft’s model (1998). This stems 
from the fact that Skonhoft considers the local people as passive, while the park manager, who benefits from 
both legal hunting and tourism, is the active agent. When the state instructs the park manager to distribute a 
fraction of the legal harvest to the local people, the marginal return on hunting is reduced relative to the 
marginal return on tourism and, consequently, the manager increases the investment in wildlife. With a passive 
local community, this promotes wildlife conservation. 
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order to improve the detection rate, and an increase in the fine level imposed on the 
local people if they are caught. 
 
When it comes to agricultural policies, attempts to stimulate productivity improvements 
are repeatedly suggested in wildlife management  (see Brown et al. 1993). It is believed 
that this will divert labour away from wildlife hunting to agricultural production. 
However, Lopez (1998) demonstrates that this argument may be false, depending on for 
what type of crop the productivity increases; i.e. land-intensive crop or labour-intensive 
crop. Using a static model with fixed land endowments and no labour market, he shows 
that an increased price for the land-intensive output is likely to reduce the labour 
demand for farming, and hence increase the resource extraction. Also Schulz and 
Skonhoft (1996) discuss agricultural productivity and its impact on resource extraction. 
Focusing on the conflict between land as an input agricultural production and land for 
wildlife habitat, they demonstrate that a higher return on agriculture increases the 
conversion of land and is therefore a threat to wildlife conservation (see also Skonhoft 
1999).  
 
Other contributors who question the importance of agricultural productivity are Bulte 
and van Soest (1999). Utilizing a dynamic model for a hunter-agrarian household, they 
demonstrate that the conservation effect of increased agricultural productivity is unclear 
and critically dependent on whether or not there exist markets for game meat and 
labour. With such markets present, the household solves the optimal effort in agriculture 
and hunting separately3. Consequently, there is no effect on wildlife exploitation of 
improved productivity in agriculture. However, with no markets present, they 
demonstrate that the conservation effect of productivity improvements is ambiguous. 
These analyses indicate that ICDPs promoting agricultural productivity should be 
implemented with care, especially when it comes to land use conflicts and regional 
conditions such as the functioning of markets.  
 
                                                 
3 The intuition is that when a labour market is present the household is able to alter the effort use in agriculture 
by adjusting its labour supply in formal employment, while the effort use in wildlife harvesting is left 
unchanged, and vice versa.   
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The following analysis differs from the contributions quoted above in two important 
ways. First, while most of the authors referred to above limit their focus to benefit-
sharing strategies and improved agricultural productivity, this paper also considers the 
impact of employment in formal sector and anti-poaching law enforcement. The main 
contribution of the paper is to suggest an ICDP design that will succeed in promoting 
wildlife conservation. As already mentioned, this involves an explicit link where the 
local people are excluded from the benefit transfers if caught in illegal hunting. Second, 
because ICDPs also aim at improving the economic conditions of the local people, the 
present paper extends the above contributions by exploring the welfare effect of the 
ICDP incentives. 
 
1.2. Assumptions   
This paper presents a bio-economic model of a hunter-agrarian community on the 
border of a protected area, i.e. a national park. The property rights to wildlife are held 
by the State which has appointed a park agency to manage the protected area. The local 
people have no legal rights to wildlife hunting, but the degree of anti-poaching law 
enforcement imposed by the park agency is not sufficient to eliminate illegal hunting 
and effectively protect the property rights of the State4.  
 
Throughout the analysis, the local people are considered the only active agent, while the 
park authority is passive (see also Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams 1992). This 
means that the State instructs the benefit-sharing strategies and the law enforcement 
activities on the park manager and, hence, these activities are implemented as 
exogenous5. This is contrary to the analyses of Skonhoft (1995), Skonhoft (1998), and 
Skonhoft and Solstad (1998) where the game culling and the level of law enforcement 
are determined within the model. Following Barrett and Arcese (1998), it is further 
assumed that game meat is distributed freely to the local communities and, 
consequently, this activity does not generate income for the park manager. However, the 
park agency benefits from non-consumptive use of the wildlife, such as tourism. A fixed 
share of this income – pre-determined by the State – is transferred to the local people. 
                                                 
4 For a broad discussion of protected areas and law enforcement, see Martin (1993). 
5 See e.g. Wright (1999) for a further discussion of culling operations as a tool in wildlife management. 
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As in Barrett and Arcese (1998), Lopez (1998), and Bulte and van Soest (1999), it is 
assumed that illegal hunting is only performed by the local people living in the vicinity 
of the protected area. Poaching carried out by outsiders is therefore ignored. In addition 
to illegal hunting, the local people are involved in agricultural production and offered 
work opportunities in the formal sector, such as employment in the local industry and 
tourism. A market for labour is therefore present and this is in accordance with the 
general model of Bulte and van Soest (1999), while Barrett and Arcese (1998) and 
Lopez (1998) assume that no such market exists. In contrast, there exists no market for 
game meat which may be a result of high transaction costs (see e.g. Sadoulet and de 
Janvry 1995). With no market for game meat the local people’s consumption is 
constrained by the transfers from the managed culls and the illegal offtake (see below, 
see also Barrett and Arcese (1998)). 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2, while 
section 3 explores the conservation and welfare effects of ICDPs implemented without a 
link between the benefit sharing instruments and illegal hunting. That is, the local 
people receive the benefit transfers regardless of their involvement in illegal hunting. 
This regime is referred to as Regime I. In Regime II in section 4, the model is adjusted 
to investigate the performance of ICDPs where the local people face a risk of being 
excluded from the benefit transfers if caught in illegal hunting. Section 5 illustrates the 
theoretical model with a numerical example of the wildlife exploitation in Serengeti. 
The paper is closed by a discussion and concluding remarks in section 6. 
 
2. The model 
Consider a local community consisting of a homogeneous group of peasants living on 
the border of a protected area6. The local people produce two types of output; 
agricultural crops and game meat. The agricultural production is dependent on the 
amount of agricultural land, pesticides and fertiliser use, rainfall etc., as well as labour 
                                                 
6 There are assumed to be conflicting interests among the local people. Hence, prevalence of individual 
conformity to group norms is assumed to be present. In line with traditional reasoning, it is assumed that the 
elders are in charge of the group’s activities (Marks 1984).   
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effort use. Following Barrett and Arcese (1998), Lopez (1998) and Bulte and van Soest 
(1999), all factors are fixed except for labour . Then, the production function reads AE
 
(1) , )E(AA A=
 
where output increases by a decreasing rate in effort,  and . 0'A > 0''A ≤
 
The households produce game meat through illegal hunting of wildlife in the protected 
area. It is assumed that the wildlife offtake is a function of labour effort and the wildlife 
abundance, specified as 
 
(2) , XEfh h )(=
 
where  is effort directed towards hunting and X is the wildlife stock. The offtake 
increases by a decreasing rate in effort,  and 
hE
0>'f 0≤''f 7. The degree of effort 
directed towards wildlife hunting is influenced by the fact that this activity is illegal. 
The probability of being caught in illegal hunting θ is given as 
 
(3) [1, δEmin=θ h] 
 
θ increases with the hunting effort, but the probability of being caught cannot exceed 1 
(see also Skonhoft and Solstad 1998). δ > 0 is the marginal rate of detection, which 
reflects the productivity or the level of law enforcement activities carried out by the 
park manager. For a given hunting effort, more extensive enforcement use increases δ 
and, hence, θ increases. If caught in illegal hunting, the households are imposed a fixed 
fine F.  
 
In addition to wildlife hunting and agricultural production, the local people have the 
opportunity to work in the formal sector (see section 1.2). Let N be the labour use in 
                                                 
7 Concavity of f may be due to technological restrictions such as access to weapons, transport etc. It is seen that 
if f’’ = 0, (2) is in line with the Schaefer harvesting function. 
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formal sector and T be the fixed available labour effort interpreted as the total human 
population living in the vicinity of the conservation area8. Then, the time constraint 
reads 
 
(4)  TNEE Ah ≤++
 
Throughout the analysis the time constraint is assumed to be binding, and hence, there 
is always a positive opportunity cost of labour use. As a result, a trade-off between 
effort in wildlife hunting and the legal activities is present. 
 
The households derive utility from the consumption of agricultural output and game 
meat. There are two possible states in this model: either the local people will manage to 
escape the anti-poaching patrols with the probability ( , or they will be caught 
with the probability θ. It is assumed that the decision problem of the local people is to 
maximize the expected utility given as 
)θ−1
 
(5) [ ] [ ])C(V)C(U)C(V)C(U)(EW cGcAeGeA +++−= θθ1  
 
Here, superscript ‘e’ denotes the resulting consumption levels if the local people 
manage to escape the patrol units, while superscript ‘c’ denotes the consumption levels 
if caught in illegal hunting. In order to simplify the analysis, the expected utility is 
specified as separable in agricultural and game meat consumption, i.e. C  and C  
respectively, where U  and V . The magnitude of the second order 
derivatives of U and V reflects the local people’s attitude towards risk. In general, the 
attitude towards risk depends on how wealthy the decision-maker is (see e.g. Dasgupta 
1993, chapter 8). It is plausible that poor households would be more averse to accepting 
additional risk compared to relatively more wealthy agents, because the disadvantage of 
A G
0>⋅ )(' 0>⋅ )('
                                                 
8 N is endogenous in this model. One may argue that there are constraints on the working hours in formal 
employment, which makes it difficult for individuals to adjust the working hours to changes in the wage rate in 
that sector. However, T is interpreted as the size of the human population and, hence, changes in N are due to 
individuals choosing not to work or to enter employment in the formal sector without altering the individual 
working hours.  
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the risk, here represented by the monetary punishment, is particularly harsh for 
households who have little to fall back on. Because this analysis is related to poor 
communities in remote areas in developing countries, it is assumed that the local people 
are risk averse9.  This means that the expected utility function is strictly concave in 
agricultural and game meat consumption, i.e. U  and V .  0<⋅ )(''
c
A
e
G
0<⋅ )(''
 
A trade-off in hunting effort is present in the expected utility function (5). First, more 
hunting effort increases the consumption of game meat which, in turn, increases the 
utility for a given consumption of agricultural output and probability of being caught. 
However, more hunting effort reduces the income from formal employment which 
restricts the agricultural consumption. This works in the direction of reduced utility. In 
addition, the realized consumption levels are, in general, higher if the local people 
manage to escape the patrol units, i.e. C  and C  (see below). Therefore, as 
more hunting effort increases the probability of being caught it reduces the expected 
utility level. The local people must consider these trade-offs when determining the 
allocation of labour effort between agricultural production, wildlife hunting, and 
employment in the formal sector. 
e
A C≥ cGC≥
 
The next step is to specify the prevailing constraints on consumption if the local people 
manage to escape the patrol units. First, the consumption of game meat consists of the 
illegal offtake and legal game meat distributed from the managed culls. In the 
following, these are considered homogenous. The extent of the game meat distribution 
is set as a fraction m  of the wildlife stock X0> 10. It is assumed that the local 
community in consideration is the only community to receive game meat from the 
culling program, which means that the whole amount mX is transferred to this 
                                                 
9 We assume that the consumption level does not fall below a particular threshold or subsistence level at which 
point the local people would be attracted to the risk in order to avoid disaster.  
10 In the case of Serengeti the quota (mX) is set low relative to the wildlife stock for each village receiving meat 
from the culling program, meaning that m is low in the culling of today (see Appendix 2).   
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community11. Because there is no market for game meat, the consumption of meat if not 
caught in illegal hunting is constrained as in (6)12.  
 
(6)  mXX)E(fC h
e
G +=
 
The consumption of agricultural output if not caught in illegal hunting is constrained by 
the level of agricultural production, income from formal employment, and the income 
transfers from tourism. The latter is set as a fixed fraction [0, 1] of the net income 
in the tourism sector S(X). It is assumed that S(X) increases with the wildlife density as 
the number of tourists increases, but at a decreasing rate S ,  (see Bulte and 
van Kooten 1996). Employment in formal activities is paid by the exogenous wage ω. 
Let  be the unit price of agricultural output. Then, if the local people manage to 
escape the patrol units, the consumption expenditure on agricultural output equals 
. Solving this equation with respect to C  yields  
∈µ
0>' 0≤''S
AP
e
A = N)X(S)E(APCP AAA ωµ ++ eA
 
(7)  AAA
e
A P/NP/)X(S)E(AC ωµ ++=
 
In general  which means that the local people will buy excess agricultural 
food on the market if they escape the patrol units. However, in absence of formal 
employment and an ICDP program (i.e. ) the constraint in (7) reads 
. In this case, the agricultural consumption is constrained by the 
production level in this community.  
)E(AC A
e
A >
)A
0== µN
E(AC eA =
 
The prevailing constraints on agricultural and game meat consumption if caught in 
illegal hunting are strictly dependent on the design of the ICDP. Sections 3 and 4 below 
outline in detail the resulting constraints for the respective regimes. The final step in this 
section is to present the population dynamics of wildlife. As already noted, the local 
                                                 
11 For a discussion of a broader distribution scheme, see Brandon and Wells (1992).  
12 The absence of a market for game meat captures the nature of the village economy in this commodity in 
Serengeti (see also Barrett and Arcese 1998). While there is trade in meat among households within and 
between villages in the catchment area, there is a small and negligible trade outside the catchment area.  
 113 
peasants are the only agents involved in illegal hunting, meaning that their hunting 
constitutes the total illegal offtake.  The natural growth of the population is specified as 
logistic, while the stock shrinks according to illegal hunting and managed culling, as 
given in equation (8). 
 
(8)  mXX)E(f)K/X(rXdt/dX h −−−= 1
 
Here, r is the intrinsic growth rate and K is the carrying capacity of the protected area. 
The total harvest equals the sum of the illegal offtake , and the managed 
harvest mX. The ecological equilibrium is defined by a constant wildlife stock over 
time. Solving for X at  yields , so that wildlife 
abundance is reduced by m and . To obtain , the man made mortality must be 
restricted by 
X)E(f h
/K)m)h −0=dt/dX
hE
rm ≤
rE(fr(X −=
0≥X
)E(f h + 13. 
 
Before we turn to the specific ICDP regimes, we need to establish how the local people 
adapt to the ecology. As already noted, the State has the property rights to wildlife, 
while hunting performed by the local people is illegal. The local people experience, 
through the property rights scheme and anti-poaching law enforcement, a continuing 
risk of being effectively denied access to hunting. It is therefore assumed that their 
behaviour is based on short-term expected utility maximization and hence, they do not 
take the stock density into account when maximizing expected utility. Technically, this 
means that the local people treat the stock density as an exogenous variable and this 
corresponds to one of Smith’s models (1975). See also Lopez (1998), Barrett and 
Arcese (1998), and Skonhoft and Solstad (1998). 
 
3. Regime I 
In this regime, the ICDP manager transfers money from tourism and game meat to the 
local people independent of whether they are caught in illegal hunting. Hence, if caught 
in illegal hunting, the resulting budget available for agricultural consumption is lowered 
                                                 
13 Hence, the ecological equilibrium restricts the size of m: as X approaches zero m = r – f(Eh).  
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by the imposed fine F only. The constraint on agricultural consumption is therefore 
given by 
 
(9)  AAAA
c
A P/FP/NP/)X(S)E(AC −++= ωµ
 
In the absence of formal employment and an ICDP program, this constraint reads 
. This means that the local people must sell agricultural output to 
finance the imposed fine. However, in the presence of formal employment and an ICDP, 
the local people may purchase excess crops on the market as long as the additional 
income exceeds the imposed fine. 
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c
A P/F)E(AC −=
 
The next step is to present the resulting constraint on game meat consumption if caught 
in illegal hunting. In line with Skonhoft and Solstad (1998), it is assumed that the local 
people keep the illegal meat if caught. That is, they manage to hide the meat from the 
patrol units. In addition, as already mentioned, they will receive game meat from the 
culling program even if they are caught poaching. The resulting constraint on game 
meat consumption if caught therefore coincides with the prevailing constraint if they 
manage to escape in (6), i.e. .  eG
c
G CC =
 
Because the game meat consumption is independent of whether the local people are 
caught in illegal hunting, i.e. , the expected utility function reads 
, where the superscript on C  is omitted. 
Substituting the consumption constraints (6), (7) and (9), together with constraints (3) 
and (4), into this expression gives the expected utility function as 
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hE
. 
The local people must decide upon the optimal effort use in hunting  and agricultural 
production  in order to maximize its expected utility. Because the local people treat 
the wildlife stock as exogenous, they impose no shadow price on wildlife. The Kuhn-
Tucker first order maximum conditions are then given in (10)-(11).  
 115 
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Equation (10) gives the optimal effort use in agricultural production , where 
superscript I denotes the case of Regime I. In what follows, an interior solution for  
(> 0) is assumed to hold, so that the first order condition (10) holds with equality. The 
first parenthesis is positive and, hence, this condition reads . This 
means that effort should be directed towards agricultural production until the value of 
the marginal product equals the wage rate in formal employment. Therefore, the 
agricultural productivity, the price of agricultural output, and the wage rate in formal 
sector are the only factors determining the optimal effort use in agricultural production. 
Hence, effort is allocated to agriculture independent of the amount of effort directed 
towards hunting and formal employment. This result is identical to what is 
demonstrated by Bulte and van Soest (1999).  
I
AE
=AP
AE
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Equation (11) gives the first order condition with respect to the hunting effort . The 
first term on the left hand side reflects the marginal expected utility from hunting where 
more effort in illegal hunting increases the expected utility due to increased game meat 
consumption. The second and third terms give the marginal cost or disutility from 
hunting. The second term implies that more effort use in illegal hunting reduces the time 
in formal employment and, consequently, reduces the budget available for consumption 
of agricultural commodities. In addition, as seen in the third term, more hunting effort 
increases the probability of being caught, which reduces the expected utility for a given 
consumption bundle. The local people will refrain from illegal hunting, i.e. , if 
the marginal disutility exceeds the marginal utility. This will be the case if the fraction 
of meat distributed to the community, the fine level, and the marginal probability of 
being detected are ‘high’. However, because the intention of ICDP is to promote 
I
hE
=Ih 0E
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wildlife conservation by stimulating the local people to reduce the poaching, the case of 
no illegal hunting will not be considered in the following. Instead, it is assumed that an 
interior solution for  exists, where the local people divert effort to illegal hunting 
until the marginal utility of hunting equals the marginal disutility.  
hE
I
A
 
Having solved for  through (10),  and XE IhE
I follow simultaneously in (8) (with dX/dt 
= 0) and (11), while NI is determined in (4). The resulting consumption of game meat 
and the agricultural consumption, depending on whether the local people are caught in 
illegal hunting, follows from (6), and (7) or (9), respectively.  
 
The next step is to analyse how the benefit-sharing instruments of ICDP influence the 
hunting decision of the local people, wildlife conservation and local welfare. The 
comparative static results in ecological equilibrium are derived from the derivatives of 
(8) (with dX/dt = 0) and (11). The welfare effect follows from (5) when taking into 
account the impact of a changing wildlife stock14. See Appendix 1. Consider first the 
effect of an increase in the amount of game meat distributed from the managed culls to 
the local people, i.e. m increases. The direct effect on wildlife conservation is negative. 
The indirect effect works through a changing effort use in illegal hunting. Because there 
exists no external market where the local people can sell excess game meat, the only 
option is to consume the legal meat domestically (or within the community). The local 
people will therefore substitute illegal meat for distributed meat and reduce their effort 
in illegal hunting. Therefore, the indirect effect of game culling works in the direction of 
a higher degree of wildlife conservation. It can be demonstrated, however, that the 
direct connection is the dominating effect. Hence, while this policy fulfils the aim of 
reducing illegal hunting, the aggregate offtake increases and this lowers the degree of 
wildlife conservation. This result is in line with the findings of Barrett and Arcese 
(1998). By providing game meat to the local people, the management authority 
                                                 
14 The actual welfare of the local people is strictly dependent on the realized consumption bundle, i.e. it is 
conditional upon whether they are caught in illegal hunting. More precisely, the actual welfare level is higher if 
the local people manage to escape the patrol units. However, we cannot observe which of the two states are 
realized. Instead, we investigate the welfare effect of ICDP by deriving its impact on the expected utility 
function.  
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contributes to increased pressure on the wildlife stock. The wildlife is therefore more 
protected without this kind of interference from the authorities. 
 
Second, an increase in the income from tourism, i.e. µ increases, leads to an increase in 
illegal hunting and a smaller wildlife stock. The mechanism works as follows: money 
transfers which are received for certain increase the level of income in both of the states 
‘escape’ and ‘caught’ (see section 2). This has two positive and quite similar effects on 
the hunting effort. First, it enables the local people to carry more risk. That is, they pay 
less attention to the probability of being caught when deciding upon the optimal use of 
effort in illegal hunting. Second, an increased certain income makes the local people 
less responsive to the fact that increased hunting effort reduces the income in formal 
employment. Both effects reduce the marginal cost of hunting and stimulate increased 
hunting effort. Consequently, certain income transfers reduce the degree of wildlife 
conservation. Although the mechanism is somehow different, this result is in 
accordance with both Barrett and Arcese (1998) and Skonhoft (1998), and suggests that 
ICDPs relying on money transfers fail to conserve wildlife. 
 
Third, the effect of a positive shift in the wage rate  in formal employment is 
generally unclear. All else equal, a higher wage level increases the certain income level. 
Quite similar to increased money transfers from tourism, this enables the local people to 
carry more risk and to draw back workers from the formal sector. Hence, this effect 
works in the direction of increased hunting effort. Compared to the money transfers 
from tourism, the difference lies in the fact that an increased wage rate in formal 
employment has a direct negative effect on hunting as it increases the alternative cost of 
effort use in this activity. The total effect is therefore unclear. However, if the latter 
effect dominates, then a higher wage rate will promote wildlife conservation. This will 
be the case if the marginal probability of detection is ‘high’ and the employment in 
formal sector is initially ‘low’. See also Table 1. In this case, a higher payment in 
formal sector will also improve the economic conditions of the local people. The 
conclusion is therefore that ICDPs relying on work opportunities in the formal sector 
may fulfil the aim of promoting both wildlife conservation and local welfare.  
ω
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Fourth, improved agricultural productivity or a higher price of agricultural output  
has an ambiguous effect on hunting effort and wildlife conservation. See Table 1. The 
effect is strictly dependent on the fine level. Recall from equation (9) that when the fine 
level is ‘low’, the local people will buy food on the market to supplement their 
consumption. In this case, the effect of a higher agricultural price is ambiguous. On the 
other hand, when faced with a ‘high’ fine level the local people will sell excess 
agricultural output on the market in order to finance the penalty if caught in illegal 
hunting. That is, the local people are net producers of agricultural output. Then, all else 
equal, a higher price increases the level of certain income which enables the local 
people to carry more risk and, therefore, increase the hunting effort. Hence, if the local 
people are net agricultural producers, policies which stimulate a higher agricultural 
return will lower the degree of wildlife conservation. This result is contrary to the 
arguments of Brown et al. (1993) and the findings of Skonhoft and Solstad (1998)
AP
15.  
 
The final policy option is to increase the degree of anti-poaching law enforcement in 
order to increase the marginal cost of illegal hunting. This policy includes more 
extensive use of guards and patrols, which increases the probability of being caught, and 
a higher fine level. Obviously, such attempts will promote wildlife conservation. 
However, the effect on the welfare of the local people is ambiguous. See Table 1. While 
the direct welfare effect is negative, there is a positive indirect effect working through a 
changing wildlife stock, as more wildlife increases the transfers of game meat and 
money from the tourism sector. If the latter effect dominates, law enforcement will 
promote both wildlife conservation and human welfare.  
  
4. Regime II 
The objective so far has been to investigate the impact on wildlife conservation and 
human welfare of the most common instruments of existing ICDPs. One of these 
instruments is benefit-sharing which consists of distribution of game meat and income 
                                                 
15 Skonhoft and Solstad (1998) present a model of a producer (firm) who sells both agricultural output and 
game meat on the market, while no market exists for labour. In their model, the alternative cost of hunting 
equals the foregone return from agricultural production and, therefore, a higher agricultural price reduces the 
hunting effort. Assuming that C , i.e. a market exists for game meat, and  makes the 
present model similar to the profit-maximizing model of Skonhoft and Solstad (1998). 
mXX)E(f hg +< 0=N
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transfers from tourism. Most existing ICDPs lack a proper link between the benefit 
transfers and illegal hunting, and section 3 demonstrated that transfers relying on this 
design do not have the potential of promoting wildlife conservation. Instead, it is clear 
that working opportunities in the formal sector provide, under given conditions, the 
most promising way of encouraging wildlife conservation and human welfare. 
 
Despite the fact that game meat distribution and income transfers fail in meeting the 
aims of today’s ICDPs, they are launched as having the potential to curtail illegal 
hunting and promote wildlife conservation. Therefore, the objective of this section is to 
look at an alternative design of the benefit-sharing strategies in order to reach the aim of 
integrated wildlife conservation and improved human welfare. In section 3 it was shown 
that a higher fine level reduces the illegal hunting pressure and promotes wildlife 
conservation. In addition, this policy may improve the economic conditions of the local 
people if the benefit transfers are ‘high’. This suggests that one promising strategy may 
be to increase the costs of being caught in illegal hunting. One possible way is to attach 
an uncertainty to the benefit transfers so that participation in benefit sharing becomes 
conditioned by whether the local people are caught in illegal hunting. Then, in contrast 
to section 3, the transfers are no longer certain; the local people receive them if they 
manage to escape the patrol units, while they are denied transfers if they get caught. 
This section presents an ICDP design based on such a link between participation in 
benefit sharing and the imposed punishment if caught in illegal hunting.  
 
Compared to Regime I, the present ICDP design restricts the resulting consumption 
possibilities of the local people if they are caught in illegal hunting. First, the local 
people receive no money transfers from tourism and, hence, . The resulting 
constraint on agricultural consumption yields 
0=µ
 
(12)  AAA
c
A P/FP/N)E(AC −+= ω
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Second, the local people are excluded from the game meat distribution program if they 
get caught in illegal hunting. Then, the constraint on game meat consumption equals16  
 
(13)   X)E(fC h
c
G =
 
When inserting the consumption constraints in (6), (7), (12), and (13), together with the 
probability of being caught in equation (3) and the time constraint in (4), the expected 
utility follows as 
 
[ ])mXX)E(f(V)P/)EET(P/)X(S)E(A((U)E(EW hAhAAAh ++−−++−= ωµδ1
[ ])X)E(f(V)P/FP/)EET()E(A((UE hAAhAAh +−−−++ ωδ
hE AE
. Again, the decision 
problem of the local people is to decide upon the optimal effort directed towards illegal 
hunting  and agricultural production  in order to maximize the expected utility. 
With an interior solution present (see section 3), the first order conditions for maximum 
are given in (14)-(15). 
 
(14) [ ] 01 =−+− )P/)E('A()C('UE)C('U)E( AAcAheAh ωδδ      
 
(15) [ ] X)E('f)C('VE)C('V)E( hcGheGh δδ +−1  
[ ] AcAheAh P/)C('UE)C('U)E( ωδδ +−− 1 [ ] 0=−−+− )C(V)C(U)C(V)C(U cGcAeGeAδ  
  
Equation (14) gives the optimal effort use in agricultural production , where 
superscript II denotes Regime II. Again, the first parenthesis is positive, so that the first 
order condition reads . Hence, the presence of a link does not alter 
the result that the optimal effort use in agriculture is determined by the price and 
productivity in agriculture and the wage rate in formal sector, but independent of the 
effort use in hunting and formal employment. 
II
AE
0=− AA P/)E('A ω
 
                                                 
16 The link presented here is implemented so that the management authority distributes money and meat at the 
end of a period, i.e. a quarter or a year. Then, the local people do not benefit if they have been caught in illegal 
hunting during that period.   
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Having solved for  in (14),  and XIIAE
II
hE
II follow simultaneously in (15) and (8) (with 
). The first order condition in (15) states that effort should be directed 
towards hunting until the marginal benefit (i.e. the first term) equals the marginal cost 
(i.e. the second and third term). For fixed parameter values, (  and 
. Consequently, the first order condition in (15) differs in general from 
(11). In order to compare the regimes, consider first the impact of a link on the income 
transfers from tourism. Because there is an uncertainty attached to the income transfers 
in Regime II, the realized consumption level of agricultural output if caught in illegal 
hunting is lower than in Regime I. Therefore, as seen from the second term in (15), a 
link on the income transfers will increase the marginal cost of hunting and work in the 
direction of reduced hunting effort. There is an additional effect working through the 
fact that this link increases the gap between the consumption levels  and C . The 
resulting loss if being caught in illegal hunting is therefore higher in Regime II, which 
strengthens the negative impact on hunting effort. This means that ICDPs relying on a 
link between income transfers and the costs of being caught in illegal hunting will 
produce a higher degree of wildlife conservation.  
0=dt/dX
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Consider now the effect on illegal hunting of implementing a link on the game meat 
distribution. First, compared to Regime I the realized consumption level of game meat if 
caught is now lower. This increases the marginal expected utility of hunting and leads 
the local people to increase their hunting effort in order to compensate for the 
uncertainty of the transfers of game meat. The second effect works through the fact that 
this link increases the gap between consumption levels  and C . The loss resulting 
from being caught in illegal hunting is therefore higher in Regime II. Hence, this leads 
towards reduced hunting effort (see the third term in (15)). The total effect on hunting 
effort and wildlife conservation of a link on game meat distribution is therefore unclear. 
The numerical analysis in section 5 demonstrates under which conditions ICDPs relying 
on such a link will perform better than the ICDP design of today.  
e
GC
c
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The next step is to investigate the effect on wildlife conservation and human welfare of 
increased transfers of game meat and income from the tourism sector. The comparative 
static results are derived from the derivatives of (8) (with dX/dt = 0), (15), and (5) (see 
Appendix 1)17. First, consider the impact of increased game meat distribution m. In the 
same way as shown in section 3, the direct effect on hunting effort is negative as the 
local people substitute illegal meat for distributed meat in consumption. In the present 
scenario there is an additional negative effect working through the increased cost of 
being caught in illegal hunting. As a result, the effect on hunting effort is negative and 
stronger compared to Regime I. Increased distribution of game meat may therefore 
promote wildlife conservation. It can be demonstrated that the degree of wildlife 
conservation increases if game meat distribution is combined with policies that increase 
the probability of being caught in illegal hunting. See Table 1. If this is the case, culling 
operations may also succeed in promoting human welfare. The conclusion is therefore 
that transfers of game meat have the potential of encouraging both conservation and 
welfare if combined with anti-poaching law enforcement and if properly linked to the 
cost of being caught in illegal hunting. 
 
The effect on hunting effort in Regime II of increased money transfers from tourism is 
ambiguous. The positive effect is the same as discussed for Regime I in section 3. 
However, creating a link between the money transfers and the involvement in illegal 
hunting increases the marginal cost of being caught. This additional effect works in the 
direction of reduced hunting effort. The total effect on illegal hunting and wildlife 
conservation is therefore unclear. However, as seen from Table 1, money transfers may 
promote wildlife conservation if combined with policies which increase the probability 
of being caught in illegal hunting. In this case, income transfers may also promote 
human welfare. 
 
 
                                                 
17 It is assumed that (8) reads , also when the local people are caught 
in illegal hunting. This means that the park manager takes out a fraction m of the stock even if it is not 
distributed to the local people. Instead, the manager distributes the meat to the management staff or sells it on 
markets outside the region.  
mXX)E(f)K/X(rXdt/dX h −−−= 1
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 Table 1: The conservation effect of the respective policies and the corresponding 
welfare  effect*. 
  XI  EWI   XII  EWII 
 
 m 
 
÷ 
+    if µ, m are ‘small’;  
  
÷  if µ, m are ‘high’
+     if δ is ‘high’;  
 
+/÷  otherwise     
+ 
 
+/÷     
 
 µ 
 
÷ 
+    if S’(X), m are 
 ‘small’;      
÷  if S’(X), m are 
 ‘high’  
+    if δ is ‘high’;
  
÷     if δ is ‘low’; 
+ 
 
÷    if S’(X) , m are   
 ‘high’ 
 
 ω 
+    if δ is ‘high’,    
 N is ‘low’;   
+/÷  otherwise 
+ 
 
+/÷  
+    if δ is ‘high’,    
 N is ‘low’;   
+/÷  otherwise 
+ 
 
+/÷  
 
 PA 
÷   if F is ‘high’;  
 
+/÷  otherwise 
 
+/÷   
÷   if F is ‘high’;  
 
+/÷  otherwise 
 
+/÷   
 
 δ, F 
 
+ 
+ if µ, m are ‘high’;   
  
÷ otherwise 
 
+ 
+ if µ, m are ‘high’;   
  
÷ otherwise 
* This table reports possible negative impact of m, µ and ω on human welfare. This occurs because of the 
effect working through a changing wildlife stock. If we assume that the local people are not able to 
calculate the impact on the future stock size, they may accept higher transfers and a higher wage level 
even if the welfare effect turns out as negative. 
 
5. Numerical analysis 
The theoretical reasoning will now be illustrated by data which fits the wildlife 
exploitation in the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem. This ecosystem is positioned on the 
border between Tanzania and Kenya and contains the world’s largest ungulate herds 
(Sinclair and Arcese 1995, Barrett and Arcese 1998). The Serengeti National Park is a 
part of it, and compromises more than half of the ecosystem’s land area (Barrett and 
Arcese 1998). The outer area of focus in the numerical analysis is the border area along 
the western corridor of the park where most of the poaching takes place. This area has 
experienced a rapid growth in human settlement (Campbell and Hofer 1995, Barrett and 
Arcese 1998) which coincides with a marked increase in the number of poachers 
arrested in the park (Arcese et al. 1995). As a result, Sinclair (1995, p. 24) states that 
''the illegal killing of the migrant ungulates by poachers is potentially the most serious 
threat to the Serengeti system''. 
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The local people living on the western border of the park are mainly agro-pastoralists 
(Kauzeni and Kiwasila 1994). In addition, a survey conducted in Bunda and Serengeti 
District in 2001 predicts that almost 30 per cent of the households in this area are 
involved in illegal hunting (see Chapter 5 of this thesis). Hunting in the protected area is 
illegal, i.e. there are no local property rights to wildlife. However, local people in 
western Serengeti benefit from the existing ICDP in the area, namely the Serengeti 
Regional Conservation Project. This project was implemented during 1993/1994 and 
aims to improve wildlife conservation mainly through distribution of game meat from 
the managed harvest of wild ungulates (see Barrett and Arcese 1998 and Rugumayo 
1999). In addition, a revenue-sharing programme exists for Robanda village in 
Serengeti District, under which the village receives money transfers from tourism 
activities established within the village area18. These benefit-sharing strategies are not 
subject to any risk of being expelled from the transfers as discussed in section 4. The 
current management regime in Serengeti is therefore characterised as an ICDP of 
Regime I. 
  
The economic and ecological parts of the model are specified at the scale of one km2 
and one year. This means that the simulation results below report the wildlife density, 
that is, the number of animals per km2. The closer definitions of the protected area and 
the outer area are found in Appendix 2. The baseline values for transfers, anti-poaching 
law enforcement, ecological data, and data for crop production and hunting used in the 
simulations are derived from the model of Regime I and also presented here. As 
demonstrated above, the conservation effect of money transfers and game meat 
distribution depend critically on the design of the benefit-sharing scheme. Because of 
the unclear effects, the coefficients m and µ, as well as , will be varied throughout the 
simulations. 
ω
 
                                                 
18 This revenue-sharing programme is of direct benefit to Robanda village. In addition the district authorities 
and the State gain revenues from fees paid by the tourism sector (Kauzeni and Kiwasila 1994), but the villages 
complain that they do not gain any income from these fees. For a broad overview of tourism activities in 
Serengeti, see Kauzeni and Kiwasila (1994). For the objectives of Tanzanian National Parks regarding revenue 
sharing in tourism, see TANAPA (1996). 
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Table 2 demonstrates how wildlife abundance varies with the culling coefficient m 
under the two regimes. The first column reports the results in Regime I, while the others 
give the results in Regime II when there is a link related to game meat distribution only 
(second column) and in the case where there also is a link to the income transfers from 
tourism (third column). In baseline , and, consequently, wildlife density is 
 and . As demonstrated in the theoretical analysis, increased legal 
offtake reduces the degree of wildlife conservation in this scenario. Compared to the 
baseline regime, the degree of wildlife conservation is barely affected by introducing a 
link between involvement in illegal hunting and the benefit transfers. This is because 
the current transfers generate such a small amount of legal meat and income so that, all 
else equal, the expected cost of being caught only just increases when a risk of being 
expelled from the benefit-sharing programme is created. On the other hand, we see that 
a ‘high’ culling rate is sufficient to ensure that a link on game meat distribution will 
promote both wildlife conservation and human welfare. In fact, this is the case for a 
culling rate up to 7 per cent of the wildlife stock. Hence, in this range, the reduction in 
illegal hunting more than offsets the legal offtake. Contrary to Barrett and Arcese 
(1998), this indicates that the culling programme may succeed in promoting both 
wildlife conservation and local welfare if the distribution of meat is properly linked to 
the illegal hunting. However, if the culling rate exceeds 7 per cent, the degree of 
conservation reduces with a higher culling rate.  
00020.m =
50=IX 185=IEW
       
 
Table 2: Simulation results of a changing culling fraction m*.  
 No risk of exclusion  Risk of exclusion from  
meat distribution 
Risk of exclusion from  
meat and money transfers 
 XI EWI XII EWII XII EWII 
00020.m =  50 185 50 185 51 185 
070.m =  35 187 57 191 57 191 
090.m =  31 187 52 192 52 192 
* Here, X measures the stock density. All parameters except m are fixed at their respective baseline value. 
 
The simulations show, for both regimes, that the degree of wildlife conservation varies 
slightly with the money transfers from the tourism sector (see Appendix 2, Table A2). 
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This means that the risk of being excluded from the money transfers cannot conquer the 
effect working through an increased expected income. Consequently, as seen in Table 2, 
there is no additional conservation effect of linking both benefit transfers to the illegal 
hunting. This suggests that a link on game meat distribution combined with a higher 
culling rate is a more promising strategy in order to fulfil the aim of a higher degree of 
wildlife conservation and improved welfare for the local people.  
 
Let us turn to the wage rate in the formal sector. The theoretical analysis of Regime I 
revealed an ambiguous relationship between wildlife conservation and the wage rate . 
The numerical analysis discloses, however, a positive relationship. See Table 3. This 
means that the increased alternative cost of hunting is the dominating effect. 
Consequently, subsidies which stimulate increased wage rate in formal employment will 
promote both wildlife conservation and human welfare.  
ω
 
           Table 3: Simulation results of a changing wage rate *. ω
 XI EWI 
285=ω  50 185 
430=ω  57 205 
570=ω  60 229 
 * Here, X measures the stock density. All parameters except  
   ω are fixed at their respective baseline value.  
 
As discussed in the theoretical analysis of Regime I in section 3, a higher fine level may 
increase the degree of wildlife conservation without deteriorating the economic 
conditions of the local people. This will be the case if the conservation effect is 
relatively strong, so that the local community experiences a net gain due to increased 
transfers of game meat and money from the tourism sector. Table 4 demonstrates that 
the welfare is barely sensitive to a changing fine level. In fact, a double fine will 
increase the wildlife stock and leave local welfare unchanged. 
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           Table 4: Simulation results of a changing fine level F*. 
 XI EWI 
110=F  50 185 
220=F  54 185 
440=F  58 184 
* Here, X measures the stock density. All parameters except F  
   are fixed at their  respective baseline value. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
The attempt of wildlife ICDPs is to link conservation in protected areas to economic 
development in the surrounding communities. However, many of the existing ICDPs 
have experienced difficulties which may be traced to the specific design of the projects 
(see Brandon and Wells 1992, Wells and Brandon 1992, Barrett and Arcese 1995, 
Gibson and Marks 1995). The central contribution of this exercise is to highlight some 
possible pitfalls, and to clarify in what way the management design is crucial for the 
success of ICDPs. In order to do so, this paper presents a hunter-agrarian community 
located on the periphery of a protected area. Hunting performed by the local people is 
illegal, but the law enforcement imposed by the park manager is not sufficient to 
eliminate the illegal hunting. Markets exist for labour and agricultural commodities, 
while no market is present for game meat.  
 
The theoretical model specifies two alternative ICDP designs for benefit transfers, i.e. 
distribution of game meat from managed culling and transfers of income from the 
tourism sector. In the first regime, the project manager fails to link the benefit transfers 
to the illegal hunting. Consequently, the local people receive game meat and money 
from tourism independent of whether they get caught in illegal hunting. This regime is 
in accordance with most of the existing ICDPs. In the second regime the project 
manager imposes on the local people a continuous risk of being expelled from the 
benefit transfers if caught in illegal hunting. Hence, in addition to the risk of receiving a 
monetary fine, there is also a risk of being denied benefit transfers.  
 
It is demonstrated that the success of benefit sharing is conditional on the ICDP design. 
A benefit-sharing scheme implemented without a proper link to illegal hunting is less 
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likely to succeed in gaining wildlife conservation. In fact, it turns out that both game 
meat distribution and money transfers from tourism will contribute to wildlife 
degradation in this regime. Transfers of game meat fail because the reduction in illegal 
hunting is not sufficient to offset increased culling. Money transfers from tourism fail 
because a higher level of the certain income enables the local people to carry more risk 
and makes them less dependent on the income from formal employment.  
 
In order for benefit sharing to succeed, this analysis shows that there must be a risk for 
the local people of being expelled from the transfers if they get caught in illegal hunting. 
If such a risk is present, distribution of game meat and money transfers may succeed in 
promoting both wildlife conservation and human welfare. These results are in contrast 
to the conclusion of Barrett and Arcese (1998). In the case of Serengeti we have seen 
that a link on game meat distribution combined with a higher culling rate may lead to a 
higher degree of wildlife conservation and improved economic conditions of the local 
people.  
 
Another important result of this study is that a higher return from formal employment 
may promote wildlife conservation. As long as the effect working through an increased 
alternative cost of hunting is relatively strong, the local people will shift the allocation 
of labour from illegal hunting to formal employment. This will be the case in areas with 
limited opportunities for formal employment and extensive use of anti-poaching law 
enforcement. For the case of Serengeti we have seen that a higher wage rate in formal 
employment reduces the pressure on wildlife and improves the livelihood of the local 
people. 
 
The general conclusion of this analysis is that work should be done in order to design 
some type of explicit agreement over the benefit-sharing instruments between the 
management authorities and the local people. This agreement must specify the rights 
and duties of the respective parties and must be supported by enforceable penalties that 
provide enough incentives for the parties to comply. However, in practice, designing 
such contracts may be difficult, especially in poor African countries where the local 
people lack resources or power to secure their interests. Still, ICDP projects need to let 
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go of the assumption that transfers and support alone will make people who live in 
periphery areas refrain from illegal hunting in absence of sufficient anti-poaching law 
enforcement and penalties (see also Wells and Brandon 1992). Projects partly 
depending on guard patrols and penalties are not inconsistent with the ICDP concept if 
combined with attempts to improve of human welfare. 
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Appendix 1 
1. Regime I 
In Regime I, where there is no link between benefit transfers and involvement in illegal 
hunting, the effect on hunting effort and wildlife conservation of altering the 
management instruments are found by taking the total differential of (8) (with dX/dt = 
0) and (11). In the following, we specify U  and V , where 
 i = A, G,  and 0 . For risk-averse poachers  and . 
The differential is given in (A1) where  denotes the derivative of (11) with respect to 
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The welfare effect 
The effect on local welfare is derived by taking the differential of (5) when taking into 
account the effect of a changing wildlife stock in (8) as 
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2. Regime II 
In the present of a link the effects are found by taking the total differential of (8) (with 
dX/dt = 0) and (15) as in (A3). 
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Again, we specify the utility function as U , where  i = A, G, 
 and .  The sign of 
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[ ] X)E('f)C()C(k hcGeGG 112 −− −− ββδβ  is negative from the second order maximum 
condition. It is assumed that the sign of  
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 is positive, which holds whenever µ 
and m are ‘not too high’. Then, the determinant of the system, , is 
negative. The sign of  is 
positive, while the sign of 
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The welfare effect 
Again, the effect on local welfare is derived by taking the differential of (5) when taking 
into account the effect of a changing wildlife stock in (8) as 
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Appendix 2 
The numerical analysis 
As mentioned in the main text, the ecological model is specified for the numerical 
analysis at the scale of one km2 and one year. The same scale is also used for the 
agricultural benefit, as well as the hunting benefit, given in 1998/99 prices. The 
protected area, consisting of Serengeti National Park (SNP) and its surrounding game 
reserves, covers an area of some 26 000 km2 (TANAPA 1996). The ‘outer area’ is 
thought of as the surrounding area on the western edge of the protected land. Campbell 
and Hofer (1995) identify the catchment area, i.e. the region in which the poachers 
reside, as the area within a maximum distance of 45 km to the protected land. This 
region constitutes some 30 500 km2 and is, in this numerical analysis, interpreted as the 
‘outer area’. The human population in this region is estimated to be about 1.1 million 
with an average household size of about 7 persons (Campbell and Hofer 1995). 
Accordingly, there will be about 5 households per km2 in the outer area. On average, it 
is assumed that 2 persons per household work in agricultural production, hunting, and 
formal sector. Hence, the effort constraint T is 10 man-labour years and, hence, 
. NEE hA ++=10
 
The numerical analysis is exemplified by the wildebeest exploitation. The wildebeest 
population is estimated to be about 1.3 million animals and the annual offtake to some 
120 000 animals (Campbell and Hofer 1995). The wildlife density in the protected area 
is therefore 50 animals per km2, while the offtake is some 5 animals per km2. Following 
Campbell and Hofer (1995), it is assumed to be 0.2 hunters per average household in 
western Serengeti. Consequently, it is one person involved in hunting at full time basis 
for every 5 households, and the baseline value of  is accordingly 1. The hunting 
function in (2) is specified as h , where q is the catchability coefficient and γ is 
a scale parameter. γ is set to 0.9 (Barrett and Arcese 1998). By imposing the baseline 
value of  into the hunting function with h , q is calculated to 0.1. The 
baseline value of the legal offtake is calculated from the hunting quotas of SRCP for the 
year 2000 hunting season. Based on a quota of 15 wildebeest per project village, m is 
set to 0.0002. The maximum specific growth rate is fixed as r = 0.3 (Caughley and 
hE
5 /
XqEh
γ=
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Sinclar 1994). To calculate the wildlife stock at its base level the carrying capacity K is 
set to 75 animals per km2, meaning that the protected area can carry a stock of 
wildebeest just below 2 million animals. 
 
The agricultural yield function is specified as  with z as a productivity 
parameter and σ as a scale parameter. The scale parameter is given as 0.8 (Barrett and 
Arcese 1998). According to a questionnaire among 300 households in Serengeti and 
Bunda Districts in 2001 (see Chapter 5 of this thesis), the average plot size per 
household is 7.4 acres, corresponding to a cultivated area of a fraction of 0.15 per km
σ)E(z)E(A AA =
NET h −=−− 10
2 
for the average 5 households. For the same districts, the value of the crop production is 
estimated to US$ 5 861 000 or some US$ 19 000 per km2 cultivated land (Emerton and 
Mfunda 1999). At our scale of one km2, this represents a value of US$ 19 000×0.15 = 
US$ 2 850 (or US$ 570 per household). This is assumed to be representative for the 
whole outer area. The main crops grown in western Serengeti are sorghum, cassava, 
maize, and cotton (SRCP 1998). Personal communication with SRCP (1999) indicates a 
per kg price of US$ 0.18 for sorghum, US$ 0.05 for cassava, US$ 0.11 for maize, and 
US$ 0.19 for cotton. By weighting the crop prices by the relative magnitude of these 
crops (SRCP 1998), the price per kilo agricultural output equals US$ 0.15, so that  = 
0.15. The time constraint in (3) gives . Because a large 
fraction of the households in western Serengeti lack the opportunity of formal 
employment, it is assumed that only 20 per cent of the households have one person 
employed at full time basis in the formal sector. This means that the baseline value of N 
is set to 1 and, hence,  to 8. Consequently, the value of the crop production, i.e. 
, is balanced with . This means that one labour year in 
agricultural production gives an output of 3600 kilos crops. 
AP
NEA −= 1
3600=
AE
285080 =.AA zEP z
 
The wage rate in formal employment follows from the first order condition in (10) 
which balances with , i.e. the annual income of full-time employment is US$ 
285. This corresponds well with the average wage of US$ 0.8 per day paid in the food 
processing industry in Mara Region (Hofer et al. 2000). The income from tourism S(X) 
285=ω
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is interpreted as the revenue from public fees (entering fees, bed fees etc.) paid by 
tourists visiting SNP. According to Kauzeni and Kiwasila (1994), the income from fees 
in 1993 was US$ 420 000 or some US$ 5 per tourist. It is assumed that the average fee 
is fixed at the level of US$ 5. Kauzeni and Kiwasila (1994) report that the number of 
tourists visiting SNP in 1990 was 63 000 with an average annual growth equal to 7000 
tourists in the period of 1984-1990. Using the same annual growth, the number of 
visitor in 1999 is calculated to 126 000. This gives an income from fees of US$ 630 
000. Records from the village administration in Robanda show that this village received 
US$ 17 000 from the wildlife lodge in its village area. This corresponds to 3% of the 
annual tourism income and, hence, µ is set to 0.03. Because the model is specified at the 
scale of one km2, we must correct for this in S(X). The ratio of the tourism income to the 
value of crop production equals 0.11 which must also be the case at the scale of one 
km2. Therefore, the baseline value of S(X) is set to 314. S(X) is specified as , 
where  is the average fee paid per tourist and is the number of tourists 
which depends on the wildlife density, where . Then, solving for ε gives . 
When it comes to the probability of being caught in illegal hunting, Hofer et al. (2000) 
provide an estimate equal to 0.002 per day. If the hunter spends all hunting effort on one 
continuously hunting trip, then the probability of being caught equals 0 . 
In reality, however, the hunter divides the hunting effort between several hunting trips 
lasting for a number of days, where the probability of being caught on one particular 
trip may be independent of past and future trips. In this case, a value of 0.7 represents an 
overestimation of δ. In the following, we set the baseline of δ to half of this value, i.e. 
. This means that the probability of being caught for a full time hunter is 0.35 a 
year. Based on Hofer et al. (2000), the fine F equals US$ 110.26. Finally, U  is 
specified as U  with  and , while V  is specified as 
 with . Then, in order to fit the model to its baseline values  is set 
to 30. Table A1 summarises the baseline parameter values. 
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Table A1: Baseline values economical and ecological parameters 
Parameter Description Value 
AP  Crop price 0.15 ($/kg) 
α Scale parameter utility of agric. output 0.5 
kA Linear parameter utility of agric. output 1 
β Scale parameter utility of game meat 0.2 
kG Linear parameter utility of game meat 30 
σ Input elasticity labour crop production 0.8 
z Productivity crop production 3600 (kg) 
T Available labour effort, man-labour years 10  
q Catchability coefficient 0.1 
γ Input elasticity labour hunting 0.9 
ω Wage rate formal employment 285 ($) 
µ Fraction of tourism income 
transferred to every 5 households 
0.03 
TP  Average fee 5 ($/tourist) 
ε Constant, tourism income 16 
δ Probability of detection in illegal hunting 0.35 
F Fine imposed if detected in illegal hunting 110.26 ($) 
T Total available effort 10 (labour year) 
m Cropping ratio 0.0002 
K Carrying capacity 75 (animal/km2) 
r Intrinsic growth rate 0.3 
 
 
          Table A2: Simulation results of changing the money transfers µ*.  
 In Regime II: link on money transfers only. 
 XI EWI XII EWII 
µ = 0.03 50 185 51 185 
µ = 0.15 50 186 52 191 
 * Here X measures the stock density. All parameters except µ are fixed at their respective 
    baseline value. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Wildlife conservation policies and incentives to hunt: 
An empirical analysis of illegal hunting in western Serengeti, Tanzania 
 
Anne Borge Johannesen 
Department of Economics 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, NTNU 
NO-7491 Trondheim 
(E-mail: anne.borge@svt.ntnu.no) 
 
Abstract: 
This paper estimates functions for effort use in illegal hunting using cross-sectional 
survey data from households in western Serengeti, Tanzania. One purpose of the 
analysis is to investigate the impact on illegal hunting of the integrated conservation and 
development project established in this area, namely the Serengeti Regional 
Conservation Project (SRCP). We also investigate how the pattern of crop production in 
agriculture and wildlife-induced damage to crops and domestic animals affect illegal 
hunting. The empirical results show that the hunting effort is inversely related to 
participation in SRCP and positively related to the degree of crop production for own 
consumption. However, the data indicates that the SRCP of today cannot improve the 
economic conditions in the project villages. Instead, in order to promote both wildlife 
conservation and human welfare, policymakers should encourage a higher degree of 
crop production for the market. In addition, assistance and support for preventing 
wildlife-induced damage have the potential of reducing the hunting pressure and 
improving the economic conditions in agriculture. 
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1. Introduction 
Protected areas such as national parks and game reserves have long been regarded as 
crucial in wildlife conservation. The effort to restrict the impact of humans in protected 
areas has traditionally been concentrated around guard patrols and penalties in order to 
discourage and prevent encroachment and illegal activities. However, during the past 
decades, this kind of exclusionary protected area management has been viewed as 
having failed to preserve wildlife in developing countries (Kiss 1990, Barrett and 
Arcese 1995, Gibson and Marks 1995). Today there is a growing recognition that the 
successful management of protected areas depends on the co-operation and support of 
the local people living with wildlife. In response to this, Integrated Conservation and 
Development Projects (ICDPs) are frequently adopted in developing countries. These 
projects aim at changing the incentives of rural inhabitants through benefit-sharing 
schemes (e.g. direct utilization of wildlife, income transfers from the tourism sector, 
improved conditions in the agricultural sector etc.), awareness building, and education 
in wildlife conservation.  
 
ICDPs are based on the assumption that an appropriate set of incentives exists to induce 
people to change their exploitation practices. However, these projects have recently 
been the focus of attention because of the untested assumptions behind their strategies. 
Based on case studies of existing ICDPs, Brandon and Wells (1992) discuss design 
dilemmas and highlight possible pitfalls regarding their benefit-sharing schemes. They 
point to several issues that make the design complex, such as defining what uses to 
allow and how to link the benefit-sharing approach with the conservation objective. 
Benefit-sharing strategies have also been of focus in the bio-economic literature. For 
instance, Barrett and Arcese (1998) reveal possible undesirable effects of culling 
programmes where game meat is distributed to the local people, while Lopez (1998) and 
Bulte and van Soest (1999) show that improved agricultural productivity may result in 
increased resource exploitation.  
 
A common feature in the bio-economic models referred to above is that they consider 
the incompleteness or absence of particular markets. This is a structural characteristic of 
rural areas in developing countries (de Janvry et al. 1991). Access to markets in remote 
 144 
communities tends to be limited by the large transaction costs associated with 
geographic isolation and poor infrastructure. Some products are therefore likely to be 
selected for subsistence use rather than for sale in small towns or other regional 
markets. 
 
In a household model with no market for game meat, Barrett and Arcese (1998) analyse 
the wildebeest exploitation in western Serengeti in Tanzania. The existing ICDP in this 
area is the Serengeti Regional Conservation Project which, among other strategies, 
distributes game meat to the local people from managed culling operations. Barrett and 
Arcese investigate the impact of this strategy in a sensitive analysis where the 
household derives utility from consumption of game meat, agricultural output and 
leisure. This model implies that increased endowment of game meat through a managed 
game meat distribution programme reduces the illegal offtake. However, because game 
meat consumption is a normal good, there is a less than one-for-one trade-off of 
distributed meat for illegal meat, meaning that the aggregate wildlife offtake increases1. 
Hence, game meat distribution reduces the degree of wildlife conservation. 
 
Another strategy repeatedly proposed in order to promote wildlife conservation is to 
implement policies which improve the economic conditions in the agricultural sector. 
For instance, Brown et al. (1993) suggest that improved productivity of labour in 
agriculture will divert labour away from hunting and thereby reduce the pressure on 
wildlife. Productivity improvements may be attained through the support of more 
sophisticated technologies, expansion of irrigation systems, more extensive fertilizer 
and pesticide use, and easier access to land. Lopez (1998) and Bulte and van Soest 
(1999) investigate the impact of productivity improvements with varying assumptions 
about the presence of markets. Bulte and van Soest (1999) assume that there exists a 
market for agricultural output and demonstrate that the impact on wildlife conservation 
of increased agricultural productivity is critically dependent on whether there exist 
markets for game meat and labour. With such markets present, the household solves for 
                                                 
1 This result follows automatically from the assumption that game meat is non-tradable, i.e. the consumption C 
equals the sum of illegal meat h and distributed meat M as . Partial derivation of this constraint with 
respect to M gives . Because game meat is a normal good, i.e. ∂ , it follows 
from this equality that . 
MhC +=
1+∂∂=∂∂ M/hM/C
1−>∂∂ M/h
0>∂M/C
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the optimal labour use in agriculture and hunting separately2. Consequently, improved 
productivity in the agricultural sector has no effect on wildlife exploitation. With no 
markets present, they show that the conservation effect of productivity improvements is 
ambiguous. 
 
Lopez (1998) presents a model where the household produces two agricultural 
commodities, a labour-intensive one and a land-intensive one. He investigates the 
impact of productivity improvements in agriculture when the household participates in 
the markets for agricultural commodities and the extracted resource. In the case of fixed 
endowment of land and no market for labour, he shows that increased productivity of 
the labour-intensive output is likely to increase the labour demand for farming, and 
hence reduce the resource extraction. In contrast, increased productivity of the land-
intensive output results in increased resource exploitation.  
 
The bio-economic analyses referred to above use theoretical models and numerical 
analyses in order to identify the impact on resource exploitation of game culling and 
productivity improvements in agriculture. Moreover, few, if any, empirical regression 
analyses of the economic incentives to hunt exist in the literature. The present paper 
adds to the scarce empirical literature by undertaking an analysis of the hunting 
incentives using cross-sectional survey data from households in western Serengeti. The 
survey was conducted in the period June to August 2001 among the local communities 
along the western border of the Serengeti National Park. This area has experienced a 
rapid growth in human settlement (Campbell and Hofer 1995, Barrett and Arcese 1998) 
which coincides with a marked increase in the number of poachers arrested in the park 
(Arcese et al. 1995). Today, Serengeti National Park and its surrounding game reserves 
contain the world’s largest ungulate herds (Sinclair and Arcese 1995, Barrett and Arcese 
1998), but Sinclair (1995, page 24) states that “the illegal killing of the migrant 
ungulates by poachers is potentially the most serious threat to the Serengeti ecosystem”. 
 
                                                 
2 The intuition is that when a labour market is present  (e.g. formal employment) the household is able to alter 
the effort use in agriculture by adjusting its labour supply in formal employment, while the effort use in 
wildlife harvesting is left unchanged, and vice versa.   
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The local people in Serengeti have no legal rights to exploit wildlife, but hunt illegally3. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine what may induce the local people to participate 
in this activity. We investigate the effect of the Serengeti Regional Conservation Project 
(SRCP) which was implemented in 1993/94 as a response to the increasing pressure 
from the communities on the western border of Serengeti National Park. The intention 
of the project is to reconcile wildlife conservation and development for the human 
populations by providing wildlife benefits to the local people. The main strategy of 
SRCP is to distribute game meat to the project villages (see SRCS 1993, SRCS 1995, 
Rugumayo 1999). SRCP has also assisted the training of village game scouts and the 
establishment village wildlife funds (see also section 3.1). 
 
In addition to the impact of SRCP, this paper investigates how the illegal hunting is 
related to the crop composition in agriculture. Here, we distinguish between cash crops 
and food crops sold on the market, and food crops produced for own consumption only. 
This distinction allows us to analyse the impact of access and participation in the market 
for agricultural crops on illegal hunting. The third contribution of this paper is to 
investigate how wildlife-induced damage to crops and domestic animals affects illegal 
hunting.    
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
modelling of the hunting decision of the household. The data set is presented in section 
3, while the empirical specification and the estimation results are derived in section 4. 
Finally, section 5 contains a summary and discussion of the main findings in the paper. 
 
2. The theoretical model 
The starting point of the theoretical modelling is an ecosystem that serves as a habitat 
for wildlife and a living area for humans. The local people are involved in two 
production activities; agricultural crop production and wildlife harvesting. The State or 
a management authority has the property rights to wildlife and wildlife utilization 
                                                 
3 Hunting is not strictly illegal in parts of the western side of Serengeti National Park and persons having a 
licence are allowed to hunt wildlife. However, none of the respondents in this survey have such a licence and, 
hence, all hunting reported is illegal. 
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performed by the local people is illegal. Still, illegal hunting takes place due to lack of 
anti-poaching law enforcement. There are two basic motives behind hunting. First, the 
local people hunt to supplement domestic income and game meat consumption. In 
addition, they hunt to get rid of ‘problem’ animals destroying agricultural crops.  
 
The following investigates the impact on illegal hunting of game meat transfers to the 
local people from managed culling operations, productivity improvements in 
agriculture, and policies aimed at reducing the wildlife-induced damage. The theoretical 
model also captures the effect of income transfers from the tourism sector, a tool which 
is frequently implemented in existing ICDPs. It is demonstrated that such transfers may 
provide the household with sufficient money to purchase game meat on the market. It 
turns out that this affects the impact on illegal hunting of a changing price of game 
meat. 
 
Assume that the local people constitute a group of n identical households. Following de 
Janvry et al. (1991), the representative household diverts labour between agricultural 
crop production and illegal hunting, so as to maximize the utility it derives from 
consumption of these goods. The utility function is given by  
 
(1) ,    )C,C(UU im
i
c
i = n,...,i 1=
 
where  is the consumption of agricultural crops and C  is the consumption of game 
meat in household i. The utility function is assumed to have the regular properties, i.e. 
strictly quasi-concave with positive marginal utilities. 
i
cC
i
m
 
The agricultural crop production depends on effort use  and the amount of 
agricultural land , while we disregard the use of fertilizer, pesticides etc. In the same 
way as Barrett and Arcese (1998), one of Lopez’s models (1998), and Bulte and van 
Soest (1999), the land cultivated for crops is of fixed size. The production function is 
given as  
i
cE
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where output increases by a decreasing rate in effort,  and . Wildlife 
roaming in the village area causes damage to agricultural production. Following Zivin et 
al. (2000) it is assumed that the damage increases with the size of the wildlife stock X. 
The fraction of agricultural crops in household i destroyed by wildlife is 
 where  and  (see also Carlson and 
Wetzstein 1994). The net agricultural output is therefore given by 
0f1 >
0>
0f11 ≤
)X(DCDC ii = [ 10,DC i ∈ ] dX/dDC i
[ ])XRi (DC i−1 .  
 
Game meat is produced through illegal hunting of wildlife. The wildlife harvesting 
function of household i is given by the Schaefer function as  
 
(2) , XqEh ih
i =
 
where  is effort directed to hunting and q is the catchability coefficient identical for 
all household. Let  be the fixed endowment of effort in household i. The constraint 
on labour use reads 
i
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An alternative cost of effort use in hunting is therefore present. 
 
It is assumed that the household consumption of agricultural crops is constrained by the 
net production as given in (4). The household sells excess crops on the market whenever 
the domestic consumption is below the level of crop production. In this case, the 
constraint in (4) is non-binding. Otherwise, the household produces crops for own 
consumption only, which means that the constraint is binding.  
 
(4) [ ])X(DC)L;E(fC iiicic −≤ 1  
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The household maximizes its utility given the time constraint (3), the constraint on crop 
consumption in (4), and a budget constraint. The budget constraint is outlined as 
follows. The consumption of game meat in household i consists of illegally harvested 
game meat , and the legal game meat Sih i distributed from the management authorities. 
Following Barrett and Arcese (1998), Si is fixed and distributed freely to the household. 
Illegal and legal meat are considered homogenous in consumption and sold at the same 
price  on the market. ZmP
i is a fixed composed factor of labour-free income (e.g. money 
transfers from tourism), taxes and costs related to the purchase of basis goods (clothes, 
housing etc.). It is assumed that Zi > 0 if the household receive ‘high’ transfers from 
tourism, while Zi < 0 reflects ‘high’ fixed costs and taxes. Let  be the unit price of 
agricultural crops. Then, the household faces the following budget constraint
cP
4.  
 
(5)   [ ] [ iiihmiiicc
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If  and the constraint on crop consumption is binding, the household is a net 
producer of meat, i.e. . This is also the case when the constraint on 
crop consumption is non-binding combined with a ‘high’ fixed cost  (< 0). In this 
case, the household must sell excess meat on the market in order to finance the fixed 
cost. On the other hand, ‘high’ money transfers from tourism, i.e.  is positive, and a 
non-binding constraint on crop consumption must be offset by net consumption of game 
meat, i.e. . In this case, the income from crops and the money transfers 
enable the household to purchase game meat from other poachers. 
0<iZ
ii
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The decision problem of the household is to decide the optimal hunting effort  and 
consumption of agricultural crops C  in order to maximize its utility, subject to the 
i
hE
i
c
 
4 Hunting performed by the local people is illegal. However, the probability of being caught in illegal hunting 
and the resulting costs, such as imposed fine, imprisonment etc., are ignored in this analysis.  When analysing 
the cross-sectional data set, these components are fixed and equal for every household and, therefore, omitted.  
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constraints in (3), (4) and (5)5. The first order conditions for maximum are given in 
Appendix 1. The resulting equation for the optimal hunting effort can be expressed as 
 
(6)  0
                                                
≥= )Z,M,S),X(DC,L,X,q,P,P(EE iiiiimcih
 
An interior solution for  (>0) emerges when effort is directed to hunting until the 
marginal benefit of hunting equals the marginal cost (see Appendix 1). A corner 
solution takes place, i.e. , if the marginal cost of hunting exceeds the marginal 
benefit. The latter will be the case if the wildlife-induced damage to crops is ‘low’ and 
the price of agricultural crops relative to the price of game meat is ‘high’.  
i
hE
i
hE 0=
 
The household may produce agricultural crops for own consumption and trade any 
surplus on the market. However, the market fails for a particular household when it 
faces a ‘low’ price at which it can sell a crop. If this is the case, the household is better 
off by producing crops for own consumption only. That is, the constraint on crop 
consumption in (4) is binding. On the other hand, the individual household will sell 
excess crops on the market if the crop price is ‘high’. Then the production of crops 
exceeds the household consumption and, consequently, the constraint on crop 
consumption is non-binding. Recall from above that a ‘high’ relative price , all 
else equal, drives the hunting effort towards zero. A higher crop price may therefore 
encourage the household both to sell crops on the market and to reduce the effort use in 
illegal hunting.  
mc P/P
 
Given the optimal hunting effort and household consumption of crops, the consumption 
of game meat follows from the budget constraint in equation (5). The optimal effort in 
crop production results from the time constraint in equation (3). The comparative static 
is derived in Appendix 1. The sign of the respective derivatives depends on whether the 
 
5 The wildlife stock X is treated as exogenous in this model. In the same way as Lopez (1998), it is assumed 
that the household does not account for the stock effect when deciding upon the optimal hunting effort. 
Moreover, the ecological dynamics are not of focus in the present analysis. Instead, we investigate the labour 
use in illegal hunting and interpret more labour use as an increased pressure on the wildlife stock. See also the 
empirical specification of (6) in section 4.1.    
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constraint on crop consumption is binding. Assume first that the constraint is non-
binding, i.e. the household sells excess crops on the market. In this case, the household 
behaves as if the production and consumption decisions are made sequentially. That is, 
in the first step the household solves the production problem by maximizing the income 
from crop production and illegal hunting. This gives the budget constraint. In the second 
step the household determines the optimal consumption bundle subject to the budget 
constraint (see Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995).  
 
The comparative static results are straightforward with a non-binding constraint on crop 
consumption. First, the hunting decision is independent of the amount of game meat 
distributed from the culling programme. This result stems from the fact that increased 
endowment of meat represents a lump-sum transfer when there are competitive markets 
for both agricultural crops and game meat. Second, the household reacts to an increased 
market price for crops by directing less effort towards hunting. In the same way, more 
agricultural land increases the marginal productivity of labour in crop production which 
leads the household to increase the effort use in this activity at the expense of hunting. 
In contrast, the household responds to increased wildlife-induced damage to crops by 
directing more effort towards hunting. This is also the effect of a higher price for meat. 
Finally, the time spent hunting increases as the endowment of time, i.e. number of 
household members able to work, increases.  
 
The effects are somehow different when the constraint on crop consumption is binding, 
i.e. when the household utilizes harvested crops for own consumption only. Contrary to 
the non-binding scenario, the household directs less effort towards hunting when a 
larger amount of game meat is distributed from the culling programme. The mechanism 
works as follows. First, the household substitutes its consumption of illegal game meat 
with legal game meat. Second, the income effect works in the direction of an increase in 
domestic crop consumption. Both effects lead the household to devote less effort on 
hunting.  
 
In contrast to the non-binding scenario, the hunting decision is now made independently 
of the market price for agricultural crops. Obviously, this result holds only for an upper 
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limit where the household choose not to sell crops on the market. The effect of 
increased endowment of agricultural land on hunting effort is ambiguous. First, more 
cultivated land increases the output of crops for a given . The household moderates 
the following effect on crop consumption by reducing its effort use in crop production. 
This is the direct effect and works in the direction of increased hunting effort. On the 
other hand, more land increases the marginal productivity of labour in crop production, 
which leads the household to devote less effort towards hunting. The total effect is 
therefore unclear. In the same way, increased damage in crop production has an 
ambiguous effect on hunting effort. The effect of a changing meat price is also 
ambiguous and strictly dependent on whether the household receive income transfers 
from tourism, i.e. whether it is a net consumer of meat. For net consumers ( Z ) a 
higher meat price reduces the real budget available to buy meat. Consequently, the 
household increases the hunting effort to substitute purchased meat with own illegal 
offtake. In contrast, a higher price of game meat increases the income for net producers 
of meat ( ). In this case, the household diverts less effort towards hunting. 
Finally, the effect of increased endowment of labour is positive and similar to the case 
of a non-binding constraint on crop consumption.  
i
cE
0>i
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3. Data collection and descriptive analyses 
3.1. Data collection  
The empirical analysis of wildlife hunting is based on survey data from the Serengeti 
and Bunda Districts in Tanzania. Data was collected among 297 households in 6 
villages of which half of the sample households live in villages which participate in the 
Serengeti Regional Conservation Project (SRCP). 166 households are from Bunda, 
while 131 households are from Serengeti. For a further description of the survey, see 
Appendix 2. The questionnaire deals with economic conditions and activities centred 
around the human-wildlife interface, such as wildlife hunting, household income, and 
wildlife-induced damage to crops and domestic animals, all for the year 2000. The 
households were also asked whether they participate in agricultural crop production for 
own consumption or as an income generating activity. The data on crop production 
cover mainly seven different crops: cotton, maize, sorghum, cassava, millet, potatoes 
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and beans. Cotton is the only cash crop, while the food crops are produced both for sale 
on the market and as food for the household, or for household consumption only. 
Among the food crops, maize is the main income-generating crop. In addition to crop 
production and domestic animal keeping, 37 per cent of households in the study area 
earn income from selling fish, charcoal, local brew, running small shops etc. In the 
following, these activities will be referred to as ‘other’ activities6. Finally, to add to 
income and domestic consumption, people go hunting. 
  
One main purpose of the empirical analysis is to investigate SRCP’s impact on the 
illegal hunting activity in this area. This project currently includes fourteen villages 
spread evenly between Serengeti and Bunda Districts. The selection of the project 
villages has not been based on thorough studies of illegal activities, but is based on their 
closeness to the western borders of Serengeti National Park. As mentioned, SRCP’s 
main strategy is to manage the game-culling programme. The culling quota is set as 
equal for each project village and determined by the government, i.e. the Ministry of 
natural resources and tourism7. The responsibility of SRCP is to organize the hunting 
and distribute the offtake to the respective villages. The villagers buy the meat at a price 
set in agreement between SRCP and the village authorities8.  
 
In addition to game meat distribution, SRCP has assisted the establishment of village-
level institutions responsible for managing the fund from the hunting quota revenues. 
These funds finance village projects such as schools and dispensaries which, in turn, has 
reduced the individual tax burden. SRCP is also responsible for the set-up and training 
of game scouts in the project villages. Finally, SRCP works with awareness building in 
order to improve the relationship between the local people and the park. This includes 
public meetings at village level, seminars and training courses on wildlife utilization 
and management etc. For a broader overview of the activities of SRCP, see Rugumayo 
                                                 
6 The complete list of ‘other’ activities also includes selling water, honey, and fruit, house rent, carpentry, 
making spears, and employment (teaching or other work at school, wildlife management, village secretary, 
other employment). Only 8 respondents in the sample households (less than 3 per cent) report that they have 
formal employment. 
7 For the year 2000 hunting season the quota was 15 wildebeest, 10 zebra and 5 topi for each project village. 
8 This price is set below the price of illegal game meat. The price of meat from SRCP was 400 tzh per kg in 
year 2000, while the mean reported price of illegal meat was some 600 tzh per kg (year 2001).  
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(1999)9. In the present analysis, four of the sample villages participate in SRCP10, while 
there exists no village project in the sample villages outside SRCP11.  
 
3.2. Descriptive analysis and the sample 
The households were asked about their participation in illegal hunting, hunting trips and 
travel distance to the hunting area. The data on hunted species covers wildebeest, zebra, 
gazelle, topi, and impala. Table 1 shows that 80 households, or 27 per cent of the 
sample, report that some household members are involved in illegal hunting. The 
participation rate in illegal hunting differs between sub-groups of the sample. For 
instance, the participation rate is 32 per cent among SRCP households and 22 per cent 
for households outside SRCP. These differences demonstrate the need for a further 
investigation of the impact of SRCP on illegal hunting. In addition, the participation rate 
varies between the districts, 22 per cent in Bunda District and 34 per cent in Serengeti 
District.  
 
             Table 1: Distribution of reported participation in hunting.     
 Hunting 
    Number Participation No participation
Total sample  297  80 (27%)  217 (73%) 
SRCP  148  47 (32%)  101 (68%) 
Not SRCP  149  33 (22%)  116 (78%) 
Bunda District  166  36 (22%)  130 (78%) 
Serengeti District  131  44 (34%)  87 (66%) 
 
Table 2 demonstrates that we can divide the hunters into two groups. This division is 
also important for the empirical specification of the model (see section 4.1). We have 
one group of hunters who report that they go on hunting trips and a second group of 
                                                 
9 SRCP intends to assist with loans and other kind of support to promote income-generating projects among the 
project villages. However, this is a small-scale project which is reflected by the fact that only 9% of the sample 
households participating in SRCP report that they benefit from this kind of assistance.  
10 The project was implemented in Robanda and Nyakitono (Serengeti) in 1993, and in Nyamatoke and 
Mariwanda (Bunda) in 1994. 
11 The village excecutive secretary in both Bukore and Rwamchanga village confirmed the absence of village 
projects. 
 155 
hunters who don’t go on hunting trips. 55 per cent of the hunters go on hunting trips, i.e. 
trips that last for several days and where the hunters usually hunt within the protected 
area. Wildebeest is the major target for this group, followed by zebra and gazelle. The 
remaining 45% of the hunters hunt closer to their homes and within the village area. For 
this group, hunting is carried out during the annual wildebeest migration when 
wildebeest enters village land during the dry season12. Several of these households 
report that they kill wildebeest when they enter their agricultural field or yard. This 
indicates that hunting in the home area is less time consuming than going on hunting 
trips.  
 
        Table 2: Distribution of the households involved in hunting.     
    Total Households with  
zero trips 
Households with a 
positive number of trips 
Number  80  36 (45%)   44 (55%) 
SRCP  47  27 (57%)  20 (43%) 
Not SRCP  33  9 (27%)  24 (73%) 
Bunda District  36  5 (14%)  31 (86%) 
Serengeti District  44  31 (70%)  13 (30%) 
  
As seen in Table 2, the fraction of the hunters reporting a positive number of hunting 
trips differs between sub-groups of the sample. For instance, 43 per cent of the hunters 
in the SRCP villages report that they go on hunting trips, while the same rate for hunters 
outside SRCP is 73 per cent. The rates differ even more between the districts: 86 per 
cent of the hunters in Bunda go on hunting trips, while only 30 per cent of the hunters in 
Serengeti report the same. When it comes to the motivation for hunting, both groups of 
hunters report that they hunt both as a source of income and for domestic consumption. 
However, the groups differ when it comes to the reported income from illegal hunting. 
While 96 per cent of the households going on hunting trips earn income from this 
activity, this only applies to 33 per cent of those who hunt in their home area13. One 
                                                 
12 See Sinclair and Arcese (1995) for a description of the wildebeest migration. 
13 It is important to note that distinguishing between hunting in the protected area and the village area as done 
here must not be confused with the terms ‘subsistence’ and ‘organized’ poaching used by Leader-Williams and 
Milner-Gulland (1993). The ‘organized’ poacher gangs of Leader-Williams and Milner-Gulland originate from 
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plausible explanation of the observed deviation in income is that the average offtake is 
considerably higher among households who go on hunting trips (see Table A1 in 
Appendix 3). 
 
Between the districts, the data set reveals different participation rates in three income-
generating activities, where some households earn income from several of these 
activities. While Table 3 clearly shows that crop production is the most common income 
generating activity among the sample households, the rate of households with income 
from this activity differs between the districts. All of the households in Bunda District 
possess agricultural land and 86 per cent earn income from crop production. 81 per cent 
of the Bunda households earning income from crops grow cotton, while 52 per cent 
grow maize.  
 
Table 3 also shows that crop production is a major activity in Serengeti where 60 per 
cent of the households earn income from crops. In comparison with Bunda, only 11 per 
cent of the Serengeti households who earn income from crops devote land for cotton, 
while 94 per cent of these households grow maize. It turns out that the mean income 
from crops is significantly higher in Bunda than in Serengeti (see Appendix 3, Table 
A2), a result which may partly be due to the discovered difference in crop composition: 
while cotton is the only cash crop in the study area, maize is produced for both domestic 
consumption and as a source of income. 
          
Table 3 shows that animal keeping is the second major activity in the study area. The 
households mainly hold cattle, goat, sheep, and poultry. The rate of households with a 
positive income from animal keeping is higher in Serengeti than in Bunda. Moreover, 
the mean income from animal keeping is significantly higher among the Serengeti 
households (see Appendix 3, Table A2). Finally, as seen in Table 3, 110 households 
earn income from other activities than crop production and domestic animal keeping. 
                                                                                                                                               
outside the local community of the study area Luangwa Valley, Zambia. In addition, they use more 
sophisticated hunting methods (i.e. automatic weapons) and hunt more often for trophies (i.e. elephant and 
rhino), than the subsistence hunters. Here, however, all hunters originate from the local community, they all 
hunt for meat (for domestic consumption or to sell), and they all use traditional hunting methods (i.e. wire 
snares, pitfall traps, knives, machetes etc. (see Arcese et al. 1995)). Therefore, in line with Leader-Williams 
and Milner-Gulland’s terminology, both groups of hunters in this survey are subsistence hunters.   
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Again, the rate of participation differs between the districts, 40 per cent in Bunda and 33 
per cent in Serengeti. The mean income from ‘other’ activities is significantly higher in 
Serengeti (see Appendix 3, Table A2). However, we find no significant difference in the 
mean total income (except hunting) between the districts. Hence, while the districts 
differ in type of income generating activities, there is no significant difference in the 
mean income level. 
 
             Table 3: Number of households earning income from the various activities. 
Activity:   Crop Domestic animals   ‘Other’* 
Total sample  220  153  110 
Bunda District**  142 (86%)  74 (45%)   67 (40%) 
SerengetiDistrict**  78 (60%)  79 (60%)    43 (33%) 
SRCP**  100 (68%)  58 (39%)   66 (45%) 
Not SRCP**  120 (81%)  95 (64%)    44 (30%) 
               *‘Other’ income does not include hunting. 
               **Per cent of the number of sample households in the respective sub-group. 
 
When grouping the households by participation in SRCP, Table 3 shows that the rate of 
households with income from crops, domestic animals and other activities differ 
between the sub-groups. The rate of households earning income from crops and/or 
domestic animals is lower among SRCP households than those outside SRCP. 
Moreover, the mean income from each of these activities is significantly lower among 
the SRCP households (see Appendix 3, Table A2). In contrast, a higher rate of the 
SRCP households earns income from ‘other’ activities. However, the mean income 
from these activities does not differ significantly between the sub-samples. Still, the 
mean total income is significantly higher outside SRCP (see Appendix 3, Table A2).  
 
The households were asked to indicate the level of wildlife-induced damage to crops 
and domestic animals as ‘no damage’, ‘very little’, ‘much’ or ‘very much’. Table 4 
reports the answers. The second row shows that some 86 per cent of the respondents 
complain that wildlife causes ‘much’ or ‘very much’ damage to crops. This number 
seems high, and a further investigation of the percentage damage reported by the 
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individual household shows a considerable variation within each response category. 
However, the survey reveals that the mean percentage damage increases between the 
categories and the means differ significantly. Still, there are some serious measurement 
problems regarding both of the reported measures of crop damage. First of all, the 
respondents may over-estimate the damage in the hope for future compensations. 
Second, the individual respondent estimated the percentage damage to his crops as the 
number of cultivated acres damaged relative to the number of acres cultivated. This may 
cause both over and under estimation of the money value of the damage as one acre of 
cotton (cash crop) is given the same weight as e.g. sorghum (food crop).  
 
Table 4: Distribution of reported wildlife-induced damage to crops and domestic 
animals.  
 Response categories: No 
damage 
Very 
little 
Much Very 
much 
Total P* 
Number of respondents 24 18 72 180 294  
% of respondents 8.2 6.1 24.5 61.2 100  
 
 Crop 
 damage 
Mean % damage 1.7 12.3 17.8 22.6 19.1 0.000 
Number of respondents 73 12 70 55 210  
% of respondents 34.8 5.7 33.3 26.2 100  
Mean poultry lost/injured 
 
1.2 2.7 5.5 9.4 5.1  
 
  
 Damage 
 domestic 
 animals 
Mean livestock 
lost/injured** 
0.25 2.3 2.0 3.4 1.9  
*P is the observed significance level. The null hypothesis of equal means is rejected for  050P .≤
**Here, ‘livestock’ includes cattle, goats and sheep. 
 
Table 4 also shows the distribution of the reported damage to domestic animals. As seen 
in the fifth row, some 60 per cent complain that wildlife causes ‘much’ or ‘very much’ 
damage. Compared to the reported crop damage, far more households respond that they 
experience ‘no damage’ to domestic animals. When it comes to the number of animals 
killed or injured by wildlife, we distinguish between damage to poultry on one hand and 
damage to bigger animals like cattle, goats and sheep on the other. The term livestock in 
Table 4 refers to bigger animals. The reported numbers vary considerably within each 
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respond category. Some inconsistency may be present, but the variation may also reflect 
varying dependence on domestic animal keeping among the households.   
 
4. Empirical specification and estimation results 
4.1. Empirical specification 
The sample used in the following empirical analysis is limited to the 80 households who 
report that they are involved in illegal hunting. In equation (6) the hunting effort  
was defined as time spent on illegal hunting. The data set provides information on the 
number of hunting trips in 2000. In addition, for households reporting that they go on 
hunting trips, the data set states the average number of days per trip. However, for 
households hunting in their home area only (i.e. involved in illegal hunting but no trips, 
see Table 2), we lack information about how much time they spend hunting. For all 
these reasons, hunting effort is defined as the number of hunting trips, where  for 
those who go on hunting trips, while  for those who hunt in their home area. 
This means that the empirical analysis is related to the number of hunting trips rather 
than the actual time spent hunting. Still, this specification of the dependent variable is 
reasonable because the offtake is significantly higher among hunters who go on hunting 
trips (see Appendix 3, Table A1). Hence, there seems to be a potential for reduced 
aggregate illegal offtake when stimulating reduced hunting effort, i.e. reduced number 
of hunting trips per year.  
hE
0>hE
0=hE
 
Because we have data on the actual number of hunting trips for the households with a 
positive number of trips, we specify the empirical model as a Tobit model. The basic 
equation to be estimated is given in (7) where the number of hunting trips in household i 
 is positive for the 44 sample households who go on hunting trips, while  
for the 36 sample households who hunt within their home area
*i
hE 0=*ihE
14.    
 
 
 
                                                 
14 See Johnston and Dinardo (1997) chapter 13. 
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, where 
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d, the crop composition in agricultural production varies in that 
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995) for estimates of the wildlife population in the Serengeti ecosystem. 
animals, and wildlife-induced damage to this herd  as explanatory variables.  
is a discrete variable in the same way as for the crop damage. We expect that an 
increased size of the domestic stock and/or reduced damage to this stock will increase 
the marginal return from animal keeping and stimulate the household to direct less 
effort towards illegal hunting. M  is the number of household members and we expect 
that the hunting effort increases with the size of the household. However, it is important 
to note that this explanatory variable counts all members of the households, frequently 
ranging from small children to elders. Consequently, this is not an adequate measure of 
number of household members capable of working. Still, it is worthwhile to investigate 
the impact of this kind of household characteristic. Finally, u  is the error term. 
Summary statistics of the variables are reported in Table A2 in Appendix 3. 
iDY iDY
i
i
 
Equation (7) is the basic empirical model. However, later this model will be modified in 
order to capture patterns in crop production and domestic animal keeping, income from 
other legal activities than agricultural production, and game meat bought from SRCP. 
When investigating the impact of domestic animal keeping we will distinguish between 
the poultry and bigger animals like cattle, goat, and sheep. POULTRYi counts the 
number of poultry in household i, while the variable LIVESTOCKi measures the number 
of domestic animals except poultry. The explanatory variable OTHERi captures the 
income from other activities than agricultural production and illegal hunting in 
household i. We will also introduce the variable MEATi which indicates the number of 
kilo game meat bought from SRCP in household i year 2000. This is a discrete variable 
ranging from ‘<5kg’, ‘[5, 10]kg’, ‘[11, 20]kg’, ‘[21, 30]kg’, to ‘>30kg’. 
 
Explanatory variables for the number of acres directed to the production of cotton 
Li_COT and maize Li_MAI will also be included. In addition, because some crops are 
produced for both own consumption and the market, it is necessary to compute an index 
working as a proxy for the degree of crop production for own consumption in the 
respective household. The households were asked to indicate whether a particular crop 
is produced for own consumption and/or for sale on the market. They also specified 
how many acres of land they devote for each crop. The index is based on this 
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information and defined as follows. First, let  be the number of acres devoted to crop 
 by household i  in district . Then, the total number of acres 
cultivated for crop production in household i in district k is . Second, let ω  be 
the share of the households in district k who produce crop j for own consumption only. 
The index of crop production for own consumption in household i district k is then 
given by  
i,j
kL
k ∈[ v,j 1∈ ] ] ][ kn,1∈ [ 10,
∑
=
v
1j
i,j
kL
j
k
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The index is district specific in the sense that it is based on consumption shares in the 
respective district. An increase in  means that a higher share of crop 
production in household i in district k is used for own consumption only.  
i
kINDEX
 
4.2. Estimation results 
Table 5 reports the Tobit estimates for the basic model in (7) as well as the additional 
regressions. The coefficient of the political variable SRCP in the basic regression (a) has 
a significant negative sign, which suggests that SRCP has succeeded in reducing the 
number of hunting trips in the study area. This is also the case for regressions (c) to (d). 
However, we cannot state from which activities of SRCP this result stems from. For 
instance, the dummy variable SRCP may reflect the culling programme where game 
meat is distributed to the project villages. In order to investigate the impact of game 
meat distribution, the SRCP households who report that they buy game meat from this 
programme (i.e. 94 per cent) were asked to estimate the number of kilo meat bought 
(see section 4.1). This gives the discrete variable MEAT in regression (e). The 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero, which means that we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis saying that game meat distribution has no effect on hunting effort. 
Instead, the significant negative sign of SRCP in regression (a)-(d) may reflect the 
presence of village game scouts and the establishment of village wildlife funds which 
may have reduced the antagonism towards wildlife in the SRCP villages. It is also 
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possible that SRCP’s attempts on awareness building have affected the villagers’ 
attitude towards wildlife in the same direction.  
 
The coefficient of L in the basic regression (a), the amount of land cultivated for crop 
production by the household, is negative but not significantly different from zero. As 
discussed in section 3.1 the crop composition differs between the districts in that cotton 
– the main crop in Bunda – is produced for the market, while maize – the main crop in 
Serengeti – is produced both for the market and household consumption. Regression (b) 
controls for the different patterns of crop production by distinguishing between land 
devoted to cotton and land devoted to maize. The coefficient of L_COT comes out as 
negative and significantly different from zero. The coefficient of L_MAI is also 
negative, but only significant on the 10 per cent significance level. Both results are in 
accordance with the theoretical model of a net producer of agricultural crops. The sign 
of the coefficient of L in regression (b) is positive but not significant. However, the sign 
differs from regression (a), which may indicate that the hunting effort increases if 
additional land is used for a subsistence food crop. Therefore, regression (c) makes a 
distinction between crop production for own consumption and crop production for the 
market by introducing INDEX as an independent variable. The coefficient is positive 
and significantly different from zero, which means that peasants with a higher degree of 
subsistence crop production devote more effort towards hunting. In order to reduce the 
hunting effort, the policy implication is therefore to provide for easier access to the 
market for agricultural crops.  
 
The underlying theoretical model predicts that wildlife-induced damage to crops leads 
to an increase in the hunting effort when the peasant is a net producer of crops, whereas 
the effect is ambiguous when crops are produced for own consumption only. The 
estimated coefficients in regressions (a) to (d) square with the hypothesis that damage to 
crops increases the hunting effort. The sample in regression (f) counts the households 
reporting that they earn no income from crop production, i.e. crop production for own 
consumption only. Also here the coefficient comes out as positive and significantly 
different from zero.  
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Regressions (a) to (c) report that the impact on the hunting effort of more extensive 
wildlife-induced damage to domestic animals is positive and significantly different from 
zero. This result, together with the findings for crop damage above, supports the 
widespread view that damage induces a shift in labour use towards wildlife extraction 
(see Skonhoft and Solstad (1998) for a theoretical analysis and Kiss (1990) for a broader 
discussion of the costs of living with wildlife). This suggests that policies which support 
a tighter damage control, such as fencing, chasing problem animals out of the villages 
and so forth, will reduce the hunting pressure and increase the degree of wildlife 
conservation. 
 
In regressions (a) to (c) the number of domestic animals comes out with a negative sign 
and the coefficient is significantly different from zero. There are two possible reasons 
for this result: first, more domestic animals may increase the time spent herding and, 
second, it may reduce the consumption of game meat via a substitution effect, both of 
which lead the household to devote less effort towards hunting. Regression (d) 
distinguishes between livestock (i.e. cattle, goat, and sheep) and poultry keeping and 
demonstrates negative significant effects of both. Livestock herding is a relatively time-
consuming activity and, consequently, the negative coefficient may reflect that the 
household responds to more livestock by increasing the labour use in this activity. In 
contrast, because poultry keeping is less time-consuming, the negative coefficient may 
reflect that poultry is a substitute for game meat in consumption.  
 
The theoretical model assumes that the household is involved in two activities only; 
crop production and illegal hunting. Above, we also looked at the estimated effects of 
domestic animal keeping. However, 46 per cent of the sample households report that 
they earn income from other activities as well. In regression (b) to (d) the coefficient of 
the income from these activities OTHER is positive, but not significantly different from 
zero, which supports the theoretical model. 
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Table 5: Estimation results. Tobit model. Dependent variable . hE
    t-values in parentheses  
SRCP: 0 = no, 1 = yes, DISTRICT: 0 = Serengeti, 1 = Bunda 
    (a)     (b)   (c)   (d)   (e)   (f)  
   
 
   
SRCP only 
Crop income 
=0 
SRCP 
 
-4.195 
(-4.63) 
-4.414 
(-5.13) 
-4.197 
(-5.07) 
-4.211 
(-5.09) 
 -4.513 
(-2.20) 
MEAT     0.888 
(0.70) 
 
DISTRICT 3.914 
(4.63) 
4.185 
(4.80) 
3.922 
(5.29) 
3.945 
(5.33) 
4.413 
(3.47) 
6.560 
(2.72) 
L 
 
-0.125 
(-0.76) 
0.259 
(1.37) 
  0.418 
(1.06) 
0.313 
(0.82) 
L_COT  -0.791 
(-2.19) 
    
L_MAI 
 
 -0.551 
(-1.76) 
    
INDEX   6.379 
(2.49) 
6.007 
(2.26) 
  
Y -0.156 
(-3.53) 
-0.165 
(-3.98) 
-0.159 
(-4.21) 
 -0.193 
(-2.14) 
-0.232 
(-2.03) 
POULTRY 
 
   -0.172 
(-3.77) 
  
LIVESTOCK 
 
   -0.144 
(-3.04) 
  
DC 1.918 
(2.77) 
2.170 
(3.34) 
1.825 
(2.94) 
1.820 
(2.97) 
5.980 
(3.02) 
6.666 
(2.45) 
DY 1.790 
(4.73) 
1.665 
(4.42) 
1.904 
(5.42) 
1.905 
(5.44) 
2.598 
(3.62) 
3.250 
(3.26) 
OTHER  -0.029 
(-1.07) 
-0.021 
(-0.80) 
-0.023 
(-0.85) 
  
M -0.297 
(-2.01) 
-0.316 
(-2.37) 
-0.313 
(-2.64) 
-0.317 
(-2.68) 
-1.108 
(-2.83) 
-0.400 
(-0.71) 
 
# obs. 
R2adj 
 
58 
0.270 
 
57 
0.314 
 
55 
0.328 
 
55 
0.329 
 
34 
0.286 
 
25 
0.386 
Note: a coefficient is significantly different from zero at level of 5 per cent for 2>t . 
 
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
The incentives to hunt illegally are detrimental for wildlife conservation in protected 
areas in developing countries. Despite of this, little empirical attention has been paid to 
the underlying motivation for illegal hunting. Knowledge about this issue is crucial for 
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providing sound advice to policymakers in order to reach the joint aim of wildlife 
conservation and economic development. 
 
This paper estimates functions for labour effort in illegal hunting, where the number of 
hunting trips serves as a proxy for labour use. The analysis provides several policy 
recommendations that have the potential of reducing the number of hunting trips and 
thereby promoting wildlife conservation. Cross-sectional data from a household survey 
in western Serengeti is used to identify factors determining the labour use in illegal 
hunting in this area. First, the empirical results suggest that the establishment of the 
ICDP in western Serengeti, i.e. the Serengeti Regional Conservation Project (SRCP), 
has reduced the illegal hunting pressure. However, it is important to note that we cannot 
draw a conclusion on the conservation effect of SRCP based on this result alone. SRCP 
exercises game culling and we do not know how this has affected the aggregate wildlife 
offtake. Further investigations of the extent of the culling programme relative to the 
illegal offtake is therefore of major importance.  
 
Second, the empirical analysis reveals another important relationship, namely that 
hunting in western Serengeti is related to the patterns in agricultural crop production. 
The estimation results demonstrate that a higher degree of cotton production and other 
crop production for the market stimulate to increased effort in agricultural production 
and a reduced illegal hunting pressure. In Bunda District, policies which stimulate 
increased cotton production, e.g. more extensive use of pesticides and irrigation 
systems, have the potential of reducing the hunting pressure.  
 
The number of cotton buyers visiting Bunda District during the harvest period reflects 
that the access to the market for cotton is relatively easy for the households in this 
district. However, the situation is somehow different in Serengeti District, where people 
complain about poor access to market. It is therefore important to stimulate increased 
accessibility to market for the households in this district. One important challenge is to 
improve the infrastructure in the area, for instance through road construction, in order to 
reduce the transaction costs. In addition, support of fertilizer use and pesticides will 
reduce the costs of crop production and, hence, encourage the peasants to participate in 
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the market. However, policymakers should be aware of possible trade-offs between 
such improvements and environmental degradation. For instance, road construction may 
facilitate the illegal transport of wildlife products out of this area and make them more 
tradable. Infrastructure improvements should therefore be combined with more 
extensive use of anti-poaching law enforcement. 
 
Wildlife imposes damage to crops and domestic animals and the empirical results 
indicate that this increases the illegal hunting. This result should encourage 
policymakers to make initiatives to reduce and prevent wildlife-induced damage, such 
as support of fencing, chasing problem animals out of the villages, and so forth. Another 
option is to compensate the local peasants for the costs of living with wildlife. There 
are, however, some obvious pitfalls related to this strategy; people may overestimate the 
damage and a compensation scheme may attract people from other areas and thereby 
increase the human pressure on the park borders. 
 
We have also seen in this analysis that the hunting pressure is negatively related to 
domestic animal keeping. Policies which stimulate the local people to keep more 
animals will therefore reduce the hunting pressure in the study area. However, 
policymakers should be aware that more livestock (i.e. cattle, goat, and sheep) means 
more intensive grazing, which may reduce the quality of the wildlife habitat. The long-
term consequence for wildlife conservation is therefore highly unclear. However, 
poultry does not compete with wildlife in the same way as grazing animals. A better 
strategy for promoting wildlife conservation is therefore to support poultry keeping.      
 
In summary, the empirical results suggest that SRCP has succeeded in reducing the 
illegal hunting pressure in Serengeti. Other initiatives that may promote wildlife 
conservation include attempts which encourage a higher degree of crop production for 
the market and more extensive use of damage control. Moreover, the empirical results 
suggest the best strategy for achieving a joint objective of wildlife conservation and 
economic development. While the implementation of SRCP has reduced the illegal 
hunting pressure, we do not know the impact on the wildlife stock. In addition, records 
from SRCP show an average expected revenue from the culling programme of 834 000 
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tzh per village in 2000, or some 2 300 tzh per household. This is low compared to the 
potential return from agriculture where the average income from crops among the cotton 
producers was 88 000 tzh (see Appendix 3, Table A4). These numbers indicate that the 
individual income-advantage of participating in SRCP is highly limited. In order to 
promote both wildlife conservation and local welfare policymakers should instead make 
arrangements which encourage and ease the access to markets for agricultural crops. 
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Appendix 1: Optimisation and comparative static 
Solving equation (5) for C , equation (3) for  and inserting in (1) yields im
i
cE
[ ]{ }miiihciciiihiici P/ZSXqE/P(C))X(DCL;EM(f,CUU +++−−= 1  m )P)( −
The decision problem of the household is therefore to determine the optimal hunting 
effort  and crop consumption  in order to maximize its utility. The Lagrange 
function reads  
i
hE
i
cC
[ ]{ }miiihmciciiihiici P/ZSXqE)P/P(C))X(DC)(L;EM(f,CUV +++−−−= 1[ ])X(DC)(L;EM(fC iiihiic −−−− 1λ . The first order conditions are given by  
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where  and U  denote the first order derivative with respect to  and C , 
respectively, while f
cU m
i
c
i
cC
λ
i
m
1 denotes the first order derivative with respect to .  is the 
shadow value of crop consumption and states that the utility in optimum either increases 
or is not affected by a positive shift in the net crop output, e.g. reduced crop damage. In 
the case of a non-binding constraint on crop consumption, the household sells excess 
crops on the market, which drives the shadow value to zero, . When the market 
for crops fails, the consumption of crops is constrained by the net production in the 
sense that the household produces crops for own consumption only. This gives a 
positive shadow value, . (A1) and (A2) determine  and C , while the effort use 
in agriculture  and the consumption of game meat C  follow from equations (3) and 
(5), respectively.  
i
cE 0≥
0=λ
i
c0>λ ihE
i
mE
 
First, consider the case of a non-binding constraint on crop consumption. Then, in case 
of an interior solution, (A1) is reduced to 
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which determines the optimal hunting effort . Differentiation of (A1’) gives ihE
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Second, consider the case of a binding constraint on crop consumption, i.e. 
 and λ . Then (5) gives C . 
Solving (A2) for  and inserting this in (A1) gives the first order condition for an 
interior solution as   
))X(DC)(L;E(fC iiic
i
c −= 1
λ
0> miihim P/ZSXqE ++=
 
(A3)  011 =−− ))X(DC)(L;E(fUqXU iiiccm
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Differentiation of (A3), when accounting for the time constraint in (3), gives the 
comparative static results (σ  from the second order maximum condition for ): 0< ihE
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Appendix 2: The survey  
During the period of June-August 2001 I conducted interviews in 297 households in 
Serengeti and Bunda Districts. In order to capture the human-wildlife interface, six 
villages located along the western border of the Serengeti National Park were selected 
for participation in the survey. The villages are Bukore, Mariwanda, and Nyamatoke in 
Bunda District and Nyakitono, Robanda, and Rwamchanga in Serengeti District. Four 
of these villages participate in SRCP, namely Nyamatoke, Mariwanda, Nyakitono, and 
Robanda. The households were picked at random from lists of names, and the number 
of households from each village was decided by weighting the villages by their 
respective size. In each household, whenever possible, the head of the household was 
interviewed. The interviews were conducted in Kiswahili with translation assistance 
from two local Tanzanians.  
 
Based on experience from test interviews in Bukore, a strategy was developed on how 
to approach the questionnaire in general and especially the sensitive questions on illegal 
hunting. In order to gain confidence from the local people, we spent much time in the 
villages and had two inhabitants in each village to visit the households in advance and 
explain the purpose of the survey. The interviews took place in the home of the 
respective household.   
 
The households were asked whether any of the household members were involved in 
hunting in 2000. Those who answered yes were asked additional questions in order to 
capture the extent of the hunting activity. None of the respondents have a licence to 
hunt, which means that all hunting recorded in this survey is illegal. People submitted 
information about the number of hunting trips, the number of days spent per hunting 
trip, and the average travel distance per trip. However, we discovered that some of the 
hunters hunt within their home area only, especially during the annual wildebeest 
migration. The questions on trips and distance were therefore omitted for this group.  
 
Some caveats should be made as the data set have a few weaknesses that are common 
for questionnaires. First, information on income is likely to be understated because 
some respondents are suspicious and fear that the information will be handed over to the 
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district and central government for taxation purposes. Second, the quantitative data on 
plot size under various agricultural uses are given by the respondent’s subjective 
estimate, which may be subject to errors. The same applies to the estimated wildlife-
induced damage to crops and livestock. The reader should be aware of these problems 
when reading the paper.  
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Appendix 3: Tables 
Table A1: Mean wildlife offtake per household in 2000 for  
 households involved in hunting. Kruskal-Wallis test. 
  Hunting trips?  
 Yes No P* 
Mean 
(st. dev.) 
13.86  
(30.39) 
2.25 
(1.99) 
0.000 
N** N=43 N=36  
*P is the observed significance level. The null hypothesis of equal  
 means is rejected for  050.P ≤
**The third row reports the number of observations in the respective  
   sub-sample. Here, one observation is missing among those who go  
 on hunting trips. 
   
 
Table A2: Mean income among households involved in the respective  
  categories (1000 tzh). Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis. N is  
  the number of observations in the respective sub-samples. Kruskal-Wallis 
test. 
 Crop1 Domestic animals2 ‘Other’3  Total4 
Bunda 87.85 (122.81) 
 N=166 
26.72 (50.24) 
 N=122 
73.91 (129.09) 
 N=67 
140.88 
(171.23) 
 N=166 
Serengeti 44.72 (99.37) 
 N*=129 
43.39 (84.99) 
 N=109 
175.19 (261.40) 
 N=43 
137.80 
(205.15) 
 N=131 
P5 0.000 0.005 0.028 0.203 
SRCP 60.39 (96.79) 
 N*=147 
26.05 (43.48) 
 N=113 
 
73.45 (130.63) 
 N=66 
113.24 
(135.02) 
 N=148 
Not SRCP 77.53 (130.36.) 
 N*=148 
42.76 (86.42) 
 N=118 
173.57 (258.11) 
 N=44 
165.62 
(224.00) 
 N=149 
P5 0.009 0.017 0.210 0.048 
Total  68.99 (114.99) 
 N*=295 
34.59 (69.21) 
 N=231 
113.50 (197.19) 
 N=110 
139.52 
(186.63) 
 N=297 
1 Here N is the number of respondents in the respective sub-samples reporting that they cultivate land for 
crop production. 
2 Here N is the number of respondents in the respective sub-samples reporting that they keep domestic 
animals. 
3 Here N is the number of respondents in the respective sub-samples reporting positive income from other 
activities than crop production, animal keeping and hunting. 
4 Here N is the number of respondents in the respective sub-samples 
5 P is the observed significance level. The null hypothesis of equal means is rejected for . 050.P ≤
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Table A3: Data description and descriptive statistics. 
Variable Description N  Mean 
 (st. dev.) 
MEAT Kilo game meat bought from SRCP 45 
 
 2.20 
 (0.690) 
L Acres of land cultivated for crop production 
in the household 
80      6.147 
 (5.236) 
L_COT Number of acres cultivated for cotton in the 
household  
75  0.7400 
 (1.167) 
L_MAI Number of acres cultivated for maize in the 
household 
75  1.437 
 (1.807) 
INDEX Index for the degree of crop production for 
own consumption [0,1] 
72  0.702 
 (0.168) 
Y Number of animals in the household 75  13.60 
 (14.92) 
POULTRY Number of poultry in the household 75  7.63 
 (8.69) 
LIVESTOCK Number of livestock in the household 75  5.97 
 (12.52) 
DC Crop damage indicated from 1 (no damage) 
to 4 (very much damage) 
80  3.50 
 (0.78) 
DY Poultry/livestock damage indicated from 1 
(no damage) to 4 (very much damage) 
63  2.37 
 (1.17) 
OTHER Income from non-agricultural activities 
(except hunting) year 2000, 1000 tzh 
80  42.51 
 (112.13) 
M Household size, number of household 
members 
80  6.09 
 (3.30) 
 
 
 
Table A4: Mean income in 2000 (1000 tzh).  
                  Standard deviation in parentheses. Kruskal-Wallis test. 
 Cotton (N=129) No cotton (N=142)   P* 
Crop income 88.37 (85.94) 37.50 (92.56) 0.000 
Total income** 147.43 (151.01) 125.37 (197.22) 0.001 
*P is the observed significance level. The null hypothesis of equal means 
  is rejected for  050.P ≤
**Total income except income from hunting. 
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 Table A5: Correlation matrix for variables in the equation for hunting effort 
     Dep SRCP
vari 
Meat
SRCP 
Dist- 
rict 
Acre 
crops 
Acre 
cotton 
Acre 
maize 
Index No.
anim 
No. 
poult 
No. 
livest 
Crop 
damage 
Domestic 
animal 
damage 
Other 
inc 
House 
memb 
Dep vari               1.000  
SRCP               
               
             
           
          
         
         
                
                
               
              
               
               
               
-.453 1.000
Meat SRCP -.033 1.000
District .611 -.309 .154 1.000
Acre crops -.124 -.159 .274 -.070 1.000
Acre cotton .215 -.187 .182 .460 .321 1.000
Acre maize -.198 -.433 .270 -.200 .363 -.194 1.000
Index -.035 .554 -.288 -.169 -.059 -.438 -.470 1.000
No. animals -.238 -.084 .210 -.175 .545 .002 .204 -.074 1.000
No. poultry -.080 -.261 .245 .017 .099 .094 .381 -.413 .456 1.000
No. 
livestock 
-.210 -.082 .110 -.205 .541 -.061 -.031 .195 .801 -.167 1.000
Crop 
damage 
.026 .274 .097 -.177 .128 .063 -.068 .013 -.032 .123 -.118 1.000
Domestic 
animal 
damage 
.502 -.264 .016 .227 .242 .266 -.105 -.150 .245 .218 .125 .027 1.000
Other 
income 
-.194 .105 .070 -.160 -.038 -.104 .026 .030 .071 .138 -.014 .053 -.267 1.000
House 
memb 
.033 -.100 -.015 .122 .413 .314 -.134 .068 .072 -.094 .143 -.021 .204 .071 1.000
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Questionnaire 
 
 
Village:   
 1 ............................. 
 2 ............................. 
 3 ............................. 
 4 ............................. 
 5 ............................. 
 6 ............................. 
 
SRCP village?   
 Yes ......................... 
 No .......................... 
 
SRCP village since year   
       
      
 
 
1.a You are:   
 Man ........................ 
 Woman................... 
 
1.b Your age is:    
     
    
 
1.c Your education is:   
 Never been to school................. 
 Primary school .......................... 
 Secondary school ...................... 
 College/University .................... 
 
1.d Number of household members:    
     
    
 
2. Tribe   
 
 
3.a  Were you borne in this village? 
 Yes ......................... 
 No ..........................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3.b If no, why did you move to this village?   
 Family ....................................... 
 Land .......................................... 
 Employment.............................. 
 Game meat ................................ 
 Firewood ................................... 
 Other ......................................... Explain  ⇓ 
 
 
 
 
4.What income generating activities is your household involved in?  
Indicate, the approximate annual income from these activities.  
(In thousand tzs.) 
 Previous year (2000) 
 Agricultural crop production       
       000 tzs
    
 Livestock/poultry keeping       
       
    
000 tzs
 Firewood      
       
 Previous year (2000) 
000 tzs
              Other tree production        
                                                                         
  
              Handicraft       
                                                                         
  
              Industry       
                                                                         
  
              Employment in tourist       
              lodges/camps, as guides etc               
  
              Employment in village game       
              scouts                                                 
 
 
Other:       
       
 
 
 
 182  
 
  
000 tzs
0
0
0
0 
 
  
00 tzs
0  
  
00 tzs
 
 
  
00 tzs 
 00 tzs     00 tzs
5.a How many acres of land does your household cultivate for crop production?  
 
            
Before SRCP:    , , 
 
 
5.b How many acres do you
 
         Crop Befo
    
    
 
    
    
 
    
    
 
    
    
 
    
    
 
    
    
 
 
6. Which of these crops ar
produced for the market
 
 
Sorghum .................................
Cassava...................................
Maize ......................................
Cotton .....................................
Finger Millet...........................
Potatoes ..................................
Beans ......................................
Rice.........................................
Tomatoes ................................
   
 
   
 
 
  Acres   Year 2000:    
 cultivate for each crop? 
re SRCP  Year 2000 
     
 Acres     
     
 Acres     
     
 Acres     
     
 Acres     
     
 Acres     
     
 Acres     
e produced for own consumption an
?  
Before SRCP                         
Own             Market             Ow
............. ....................................
............. ....................................
............. ....................................
............. ....................................
............. ....................................
............. ....................................
............. ....................................
............. ....................................
............. ....................................
             ...............   ....................
...........   ...............   ......................
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 Acres  
   , 
  ,  
 Acres  
   , 
  ,  
 Acres  
   , 
  ,  
 Acres  
   , 
  ,  
 Acres  
   , 
  ,  
 Acres  
   , 
  ,d which are  
Today     
n       Market 
............. 
............. 
............. 
............. 
............. 
............. 
............. 
............. 
............. 
............ 
.............. ....
 
7.     How many animals does your household have?  
 Before SRCP    Year 2000                   Today 
              Cattle                    
                                           
 
              Goats                    
                                           
 
            Chicken                    
                                             
 
              Pigs                    
                                           
 
              Sheep                    
                                           
 
 Other:                                
                                           
 
 
8. Do you keep livestock/poultry for own consumption  
(including draught power), and/or to sell at the market? 
        Before SRCP  Today   
 Own consumption ....................................................................................... 
 Market ......................................................................................................... 
 
 
9.a How much damage did wildlife cause to your crops during a year? 
  Before SRCP Year 2000  
 No damages................................................................................................. 
 Very little .................................................................................................... 
 Much ........................................................................................................... 
 Very much................................................................................................... 
 
 
9.b  Please indicate, for the previous year (2000), this damage as a percentage  
of total crop production: 
    
    % of annual crop production 
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9.c How much damage/injury/loss did wildlife cause to your  
livestock/poultry during a year? 
  Before SRCP Year 2000  
 No damages............................................... ......................... 
 Very little .................................................. ......................... 
 Much ......................................................... ......................... 
 Very much................................................. ......................... 
 
 
9.d  How many livestock/poultry were lost/injured by wildlife during  
the last year (2000)? 
        
Livestock:    Poultry:    
 
 
9.e    How many poultry/livestock were lost/injured by birds/eagles  
last year (2000)? 
        
Livestock:    Poultry:    
 
 
9.f Is your livestock more often afflicted by illness in the period when  
wildebeest and zebra migrate through your area? 
 Yes .................................   No...................................... 
 
 
10.a Is any member of this household involved in hunting? 
  Yes ................................   No...................................... 
 
10.b If yes, what is your household’s motivation for hunting?  
Mark the alternatives relevant for your household. 
  Before SRCP Year 2000   
 Meat for the household ............................................................................... 
 Meat for the market.....................................................................................  
 Skin/trophies for own use ........................................................................... 
 Skin/trophies for the market........................................................................ 
 Get rid of animals causing livestock and crop losses.................................. 
 Culture and tradition ................................................................................... 
   
.......... ........................... 
   
.......... ........................... 
 
 
15.a Does your household buy wildlife meat from SRCP? 
 Yes ......................... 
 No ..........................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15.b If yes, how many kilograms of meat did you buy from SRCP last year (2000)? 
 <5 .............................. 
 5-10 ........................... 
 11-20 ......................... 
 21-30 ......................... 
 >30 ............................ 
  
 
15.c Would you buy more if the price was lower? 
 Yes ...............................   No...................................... 
 
15.d Do you buy game meat from other sources than SRCP? 
 Yes ...............................   No...................................... 
If yes, specify:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
16. How much does your household benefit from SRCP? 
 No Little Much Very 
    much 
Money transfers to your household ............................................. ....... 
Reduced taxes and school fees for your household......... ....... ................ 
Loan/help with handicraft etc.......................................... ....... ................ 
Village gets money for schools, hospital ........................ ....... ................ 
Other: 
 
 
 
17. Does your household have a hunting licence?   
 Yes ......................... 
 No .......................... 
 
 
18. Did your household hunt more animals than legally permitted 
last year (2000)?   
 Yes ......................... 
 No .......................... 
 186 
 
 
19. Has any member of your household been arrested because of 
hunting during a hunting trip during this or last year (2000-2001)? 
Yes ........... 
No............. 
 
 
20.a In your knowledge, are any members of this village  
involved in illegal hunting? 
Yes ........... 
No............. 
 
20.b If yes, in your opinion, 
why do they hunt 
illegally? 
 
 
Own comments: 
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